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Abstract 
 
 
 
Although the refugee protection regime is grounded in principles of international 
human rights and refugee law aimed at protecting individuals from abuses of state 
power, in practice it still privileges and produces state sovereignty.  Principles of 
protection can become subverted to serve state interests, normalising the 
increasingly exceptional treatment of refugees.  The tensions that result from this 
paradox, however, may also present opportunities for contesting and denaturalising 
such exceptionalism.  This thesis explores this phenomenon as it emerged in the 
post-2003 Iraqi refugee crisis.  Grounded in Agamben’s work on sovereignty and the 
“state of exception”, it considers how sovereignty and exceptionalism were 
expressed through biopolitics and governmentality in the governance of refugees.  
Using methods of critical legal geography, it maps and analyses how state, 
institutional, and individual practices reproduced, intersected with, or contested 
sovereignty and exceptionalism in four spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis: the Iraqi 
state, host states in the region, camps in the borderlands, and resettlement.  This 
thesis argues that Iraqi refugees, their legal status, and the spaces they occupied 
came to embody the contests for identity, power, and authority lodged between 
states, local actors, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.  In the 
process, the technologies of power deployed in the governance of these spaces 
revealed the persistence and proliferation of the logic of sovereignty.  Yet at the 
same time, they also created opportunities to expose and un-work sovereign 
violence and to envision forms of protection beyond the state.     
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Introduction 
 
 
Although the refugee protection regime is grounded in principles of 
international human rights and refugee law aimed at protecting individuals from 
abuses of state power, in practice it still privileges and produces state sovereignty by 
providing a regulatory framework for states to decide whom to include or exclude 
from their protection.  The exercise of sovereign power through such decisions 
defines and protects the citizen body through either the re-territorialisation or 
exclusion of the non-citizen.  This is critical for states in constructing their 
boundaries, reproducing their fictions of themselves, and circumscribing their 
national identities.  Refugees seeking protection are the symbolic front on which this 
sovereign power is both exercised and affirmed.   
International refugee law is therefore not simply a set of rules for the protection 
of certain non-nationals by states.  It is also a social and political phenomenon that 
produces and maintains state power through the regulation of individual bodies. 
Principles of protection can become subverted to serve state interests, normalising 
the increasingly exceptional treatment of refugees.  The tensions that result from 
this paradox, however, may also present opportunities for contesting and 
denaturalising such exceptionalism.   
This thesis explores this phenomenon as it emerged in the post-2003 Iraqi 
refugee crisis.  Grounded in Agamben’s work on sovereignty and the “state of 
exception”, it considers how sovereignty and exceptionalism were expressed 
through biopolitics and governmentality in the governance of refugees.  Using 
methods of critical legal geography, it maps and analyses how state, institutional, 
and individual practices reproduced, intersected with, or contested sovereignty and 
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exceptionalism in four spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis: the Iraqi state, host states in 
the region, camps in the borderlands, and resettlement.   
This thesis argues that Iraqi refugees, their legal status, and the spaces they 
occupied came to embody the contests for identity, power, and authority lodged 
between states, local actors, and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).  In the process, the technologies of power deployed in the 
governance of these spaces revealed the persistence and proliferation of the logic of 
sovereignty.  Yet at the same time, they also created opportunities to expose and un-
work sovereign violence and to envision forms of protection beyond the state.     
To begin this project, the following sections introduce first the paradox of 
sovereignty and international refugee protection in the Iraqi refugee crisis, then the 
theory of sovereignty that guides this inquiry and the methodology used in the 
research, and finally an outline of the substantive chapters of this thesis. 
 
 
I. The paradox of sovereignty and refugee protection in the Iraqi 
refugee crisis 
 
The 2003 war in Iraq and subsequent internal security crisis led to the flight of 
four million Iraqis from their homes, displacing 17 percent of the population,1 and 
forcing two million to seek refuge in neighbouring countries in the region.2  An 
additional 40,000 refugees of other nationalities, who had received protection in 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime, were further displaced, fleeing to makeshift 
camps along Iraq’s borders with Syria, Jordan, and Iran.3  Such displacements were 
driven by the violence of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations and the 
emergence of sectarian militias in the aftermath of the war.  The numbers of 
                                                                 
1
 IDP Working Group (2008). Internally displaced persons in Iraq. (Update 24 March 2008). UNHCR and IOM; Iraqi 
Red Crescent Organization (2008). The internally displaced people in Iraq. (Update 31). 
2
 Bruno, A., Margesson, R., & Sharp, J. (2009, February 13). Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons: A 
deepening humanitarian crisis? United States: US Congressional Research Service; UNHCR (2007, September). 
Statistics on displaced Iraqis around the world. 
3
 UNHCR (2007, July). Iraq situation response: Update on revised activities under the January 2007 supplementary 
appeal. 
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refugees who fled testified to widespread and systematic kidnappings, rapes, 
murders, torture, lootings, forcible evictions, and threats against their lives.  Seeking 
refuge in the territories of neighbouring states, whose initial warm welcome quickly 
turned into reluctant acquiescence to their presence, the refugees often found 
themselves living in legally precarious and physically dangerous situations.  Often 
having no long-term residence or work permits and only limited access to public 
services, they lived in constant fear of arrest, detention, and deportation to the 
violence they had escaped from in Iraq. 
In cooperation with host countries in the Middle East and donor states, UNHCR 
mobilised resources in response to the enormity of this crisis, with the goal of 
increasing protection space for persons forcibly displaced from and within Iraq.4  It 
first convened a conference in April 2007 to obtain commitments from donor states 
to help meet the refugees’ escalating needs, and the agency’s budget increased to 
USD 271 million by 2008.5 
In 2007, I joined UNHCR’s regional office for the Middle East and North Africa for 
two years as a consultant in their Iraqi resettlement programme, resettling refugees 
from the region to the Americas, Europe, and Australia where they could obtain 
permanent residence and eventual citizenship.  The office served as a “hub”, 
situated at the juncture between the refugee communities, host states in the Middle 
East, UNHCR headquarters and field offices, and resettlement and donor states.  
From this unique position, I witnessed first-hand the consequences of the 
convergence of these actors’ varying interests and activities for the realisation of 
refugee protection.  While these actors all pursued ostensibly similar objectives of 
                                                                 
4
 UNHCR (2007, January 8). Supplementary appeal, Iraq situation response: Protection and assistance to Iraqi 
refugees in neighbouring states and to IDPs and non-Iraqi refugees in Iraq.  Protection under UNHCR’s mandate 
requires preventing refoulement (expulsion to a country where a refugee will face persecution, other ill-
treatment, or torture); ensuring access to an asylum determination procedures, release from detention, and 
issuance travel and identity documents; facilitating voluntary repatriation, family reunification, and 
naturalisation; and promoting access to educational institutions, the rights to work, and access to medical 
treatment. See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (3 December 1949) 
UN Doc. A/RES/428; Goodwin-Gill, G. & McAdam, J. (2007). The refugee in international law. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 201, 447; Kelley, N. (Ed.). (2006). Protection gaps: Framework for analysis, enhancing 
protection of refugees. Strengthening Protection Capacity Project, European Commission and UNHCR. 
5
 UNHCR (2009, July). Surviving in the city: A review of UNHCR’s operation for Iraqi refugees in urban areas of 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (PDES/2009/03), p. 3. 
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managing the Iraqi refugee crisis, their respective commitments to promoting 
protection varied widely based upon their political interests.  Some engaged in 
strategies for “managing” the refugees that at times conflicted with others’ efforts to 
protect them.  Such conflicts often occurred at great cost to the refugees’ safety and 
dignity. 
Despite this, there were some significant successes in obtaining protection for 
Iraqi refugees, particularly in the form of resettlement for over 100,000 and securing 
limited access to basic social and health services in host countries in the Middle East.  
However, these successes were often circumscribed and hard-won, given the larger 
political environment of restrictive state policies resistant to “burden-sharing” and 
often derogating from fundamental principles of refugee protection enshrined in the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.6   
A further complicating factor in securing protection specifically for Iraqi refugees 
was that both states party to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol7 − many of 
whom comprised UNHCR’s largest donors8 – and states not party to these 
international instruments,9 continued to construct and respond to the Iraq crisis 
more in terms of the need for humanitarian aid,10 than the obligation to protect 
fundamental rights.  Refugee rights were often subsumed within a broader 
                                                                 
6
 Younes, K. (2007, March 14). The Iraqi refugee crisis. Foreign Policy in Focus; Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (“1951 Convention”); 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 
UNTS 267 (“Optional Protocol”). 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Amongst the primary donors to the UNHCR Iraqi refugee operation are the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia. See ‘Table A: List of all commitments/contributions and pledges as of 05 May 2009’ in 
UNHCR (2007). Iraq 2007 (incl. Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries).  Other states in the region heavily 
involved in the Iraq refugee response and who are parties to the 1951 Convention include Turkey and Egypt.  
However, Turkey entered a geographic reservation in acceding to the protocol, and Egypt entered reservations to 
several provisions of the 1951 Convention (supra note 6) concerning Articles 20 (Rationing), 22 Para.1 (Primary 
Education), 23 (Public Relief), and 24 (Labour Legislation and Social Security). 
9
 States not party to the 1951 Convention include Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon.   
10
 See Bruno, A., Margesson, R., & Sharp, J. (supra note 2); Zaiotti, R. (2006). Dealing with non-Palestinian 
refugees in the Middle East: Policies and practices in an uncertain environment. International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 18 (2), 333-353, p. 343; Rajaram, P. & Grundy-Warr, C. (2004). The irregular migrant as Homo Sacer: 
Migration and detention in Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand. International Migration, 42 (1), 33-64, p. 39; 
Harrell-Bond, B. (2002). Can humanitarian work with refugees be humane? Human Rights Quarterly, 24, 51-85, p. 
53; Hazelzet, H., Salomon, M., Tostensen, A., & Vandenhole, W. (2007). Conclusions: New human rights duty-
bearers: A conversation on policy implications. In M. Salomon, A. Tostensen, & W. Vandenhole (Eds.). Casting the 
net wider: Human rights, development, and the new-bearers (pp. 395-415). Oxford: Intersentia, p. 396. 
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humanitarian agenda, evident in a discourse of charitable compassion superseding 
one of responsibility and obligation.11  This dynamic was also evident in 
disproportionate donor funding for discretionary humanitarian assistance, 
particularly resettlement for less than five percent of Iraqi refugees and basic aid for 
the most vulnerable,12 in the face of much wider human rights protection needs for 
the vast majority of Iraqi refugees in the Middle East.   
Within discussions at UNHCR, states’ reluctance to address refugee protection 
from a rights-based framework was often attributed to their sovereign prerogative 
and their framing of the crisis in terms of emergency.  Not only were states able to 
exercise influence through funding, but they also were recognised as having the final 
power to define the terms upon which they would receive and protect Iraqi 
refugees.  In accordance with its mandate, UNHCR continuously advocated for states 
to assume greater responsibilities for the protection of Iraqi refugees, but decisions 
on both legal protection and acceptance of refugees for resettlement remained 
ultimately state decisions made under their recognised sovereign powers.   
Given the continued persistence of state sovereignty and UNHCR’s reliance on 
state funding, advocacy and monitoring by UNHCR could be influential, but it could 
not guarantee state accountability.  As a consequence, there emerged continuous 
debates within the agency as to how, as an international organisation mandated to 
promote international norms of refugee protection, it could most effectively 
navigate and negotiate the realities of state sovereignty as expressed in state 
decisions on Iraqi refugee protection. 
 
                                                                 
11
 See UNHCR (2008). Iraq situation supplementary appeal.  Beyani notes that most states do not recognise the 
protection of refugees to fall within the scope of their international obligations (Beyani, C. (2006). The role of 
human rights bodies in protecting refugees. In A. Bayefsky (Ed.). Human rights and refugees, internally 
displaced persons, and migrant workers: Essays in memory of Joan Fitzpatrick and Arthur Helton (pp. 269-
281). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 271), although it may be possible to argue that states have a 
complementary obligation to protect human rights of refugees. See Salomon, M., Tostensen, A., & Vandenhole, 
W. (2007). Human rights, development, and new duty-bearers. In M. Salomon, A. Tostensen, & W. Vandenhole 
(Eds.) (supra note 10) (pp. 3-24), p. 15. Also note that material assistance was increasingly used by UNHCR to 
quietly promote the protection of economic and social rights. See UNHCR (supra note 5). 
12
 This calculation includes both registered and unregistered refugees.  See UNHCR (supra note 11), pp. 7-8; 
Loescher, G. (2003). The UNHCR and world politics: A perilous path. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15, 363. 
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Facing such obstacles to ensuring effective protection, and under pressure to 
provide urgent humanitarian aid, UNHCR focused its goals for the Iraqi refugee crisis 
on education and health within host states in the Middle East, registration with 
UNHCR, resettlement to states where refugees could become permanent residents, 
and food and financial assistance to those most in need.13  However, these activities 
did not always automatically secure the legal protection of refugees.  Resettlement, 
for example, was a tool for protecting the most vulnerable refugees.  It was also 
used strategically: burden-sharing through resettlement was offered to host states in 
exchange for their increased protection of those refugees remaining on their 
territories.14  However, resettlement is neither a legal right of refugees nor an 
obligation of states,15 and it is available to very few.16  Consequently, although it 
secures legal protections in practice, it is effectively a form of discretionary 
humanitarian assistance. 
Similarly, registration does provide identity documentation and can also serve as 
a tool for identifying refugees’ protection needs.  However, it is inconsistently 
recognised as legitimate by those host states not party to the 1951 Convention, 
leaving most refugees in the Middle East in situations of legal uncertainty.17  In 
downplaying UNHCR’s role in providing other forms of protection beyond limited 
humanitarian assistance, whether within host states in the Middle East or 
resettlement states further afield, states could obfuscate the legal right of protection 
in the interest of posing discretionary political solutions that did not threaten their 
respective interests.   
                                                                 
13
 See UNHCR (supra note 11), p. 2. 
14
 UNHCR (2007, March 12). Resettlement of Iraqi refugees, p. 2; UNHCR (1991, July 9). Resettlement as an 
instrument of protection: Traditional problems in achieving this durable solution and new directions in the 1990s. 
(UN doc. EC/SCP/65); UNHCR (2002, April 25). Strengthening and expanding resettlement today: Challenges and 
opportunities. (Global Consultations on International Protection, 4th Meeting, UN doc. EC/GC/02/7). 
15
 Goodwin-Gill, G. & McAdam, J. (supra note 4), p. 489. 
16
 See UNHCR (2010, June 18). UN chief announces 100,000 landmark in resettlement of Iraqi refugees. This 
number comprised five percent of the nearly two million Iraqi refugees living in the region, and one-fourth of the 
Iraqi refugee population registered with UNHCR. 
17
 UNHCR (2001). Registration of refugees and asylum-seekers. (Executive Committee Conclusion No. 91). 
Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme (52nd Session), para. (b)(vi); IPSOS (2007, November). Second 
IPSOS survey on Iraqi refugees: Preliminary results; Danish Refugee Council (2007, November). Iraqi population 
survey in Lebanon: A report; FAFO (2007, November). Iraqis in Jordan: Their number and characteristics. 
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Such policies exacerbated the instability of Iraqi refugees’ lives almost as often 
as they achieved small measures of protection.  Lacking any definitive legal status, 
most Iraqi refugees lived without legal protection and risked deportation or 
refoulement to Iraq.18  They had no right to work and minimal rights of residence and 
travel, and often faced exploitation and abuse by employers, police, landlords, and 
others who capitalised upon their status.19  They frequently lacked access to 
education and health care, although this began to change as UNHCR provided 
funding for increased access to these services.20  Facing such obstacles to basic 
survival in their daily lives, they were often reduced to seeking dangerous solutions 
in the forms of human trafficking and smuggling, engaging in exploitative work at risk 
of arrest and detention, or returning to the threats of violence in Iraq.21 
Academic literature has attributed these failures in the protection of refugees to 
narrow legal interpretations and procedural restrictions, state and economic 
interests in the containment of forcibly displaced persons, and institutions 
constrained by state interests and their own flourishing bureaucracies.  For example, 
in post-2003 Iraq, both Frelick and Woodall critiqued states’ procedural regulations 
restricting access to asylum for Iraqis.22  Romano detailed the impact of states’ legal 
developments upon the security of Iraqi refugees.23  Gabiem and Zaiotti analysed 
how negotiations between UNHCR and states, which resulted in some positive 
developments in refugee protection, were also undermined by security threats in the 
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region and states’ reluctance to admit Iraqi refugees.24  Feller, Barnes, and Lewis 
addressed the critical challenges faced by UNHCR in negotiating with states in an 
atmosphere of heightened security concerns and little political will to grapple with 
the true scope or implications of the Iraqi refugee crisis.25 
Working within the Iraqi resettlement programme, it became apparent that 
such political, economic, and institutional interests that undermined the protection 
of Iraqi refugees primarily centred upon the critical question of states’ sovereign 
powers.  Sovereignty expressed through “state interests” was referred to within 
academic, legal, and political discourse as a critical factor affecting the relative 
success of UNHCR in securing protection for Iraqi refugees.  States’ frequent 
recourse to discretionary humanitarian assistance in lieu of the obligatory protection 
of rights in the Iraqi refugee crisis, although contested in legal analysis and advocacy, 
was often in practice pragmatically treated as falling within the purview of their 
sovereign rights.  The power and force of state sovereignty persisted, accounting for 
why so many state decisions effectively left Iraqi refugees excluded from most basic 
forms of legal protection and social integration, despite UNHCR’s interventions and 
state obligations under international human rights and refugee law. 
Given the trenchancy of state sovereignty as it was manifested in decisions on 
the lives of refugees in the Iraqi context, it became evident that this theme required 
further exploration if UNHCR, states, and refugees themselves were ever to find a 
meaningful way to secure sustainable forms of protection.  In an era when state 
sovereignty is often viewed as eroded by emerging international legal norms and 
globalisation, the tendency in much legal scholarship on the promotion of 
international norms has been to focus more on the substantive content of these 
norms and their application in refugee and humanitarian emergencies.  Such norms 
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are important for setting standards, decreasing social exclusion, and pressing 
communities to become more welcoming of persons who have no states to protect 
them.   
At the same time, the continued role of sovereignty must also be taken seriously 
in the project of promoting and realising such protection norms.  State sovereignty is 
largely addressed by scholars of political science and dealt with pragmatically in the 
field, but is less addressed in legal scholarship promoting and interpreting refugee 
protection standards.  This divergence between practice and theory risks producing a 
situation in which it becomes difficult to imagine possibilities for effectively 
recognising and addressing the presence of both political sovereignty and emerging 
norms of human rights law in refugee protection operations.  The gaps between 
practice and theory do not simply have consequences for the direction of esoteric 
academic debates.  Responses in the field risk also premising pragmatism, 
compromise, and acquiescence to sovereign prerogatives over grounding in 
theoretical and normative principles of protection.  As such, this divide also has 
implications for whether and how refugees will be able to move beyond mere 
survival in spaces of exile to a place where they may live fully as human beings with 
dignity and political recognition. 
Therefore, in this thesis, I attempt to undertake exactly this project: to identify, 
expose, and consider the implications of state sovereignty in the context of emerging 
legal and normative frameworks for international refugee protection.  Inspired by 
critical reflections upon my experiences and observations working in the Iraqi 
resettlement programme, I approach this question by first asking how sovereignty 
was expressed, naturalised, or contested in the Iraqi refugee crisis.  I argue that 
state-centric conceptions of sovereignty are insufficient for understanding the 
implications of sovereignty for refugee protection, as the logic of sovereignty 
became de-territorialised, fragmented, and expanded across multiple state and non-
state actors in the governance of refugees in the crisis.  I then theorise whether, in 
such new configurations of sovereignty, ruptures and dissonances occurred that 
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made it possible to secure greater protections for Iraqi refugees in accordance with 
international human rights norms and expanded concepts of responsibility beyond 
the state. 
 
 
II. Introducing the theoretical approach 
 
Tracing the development of a theory of sovereignty from Thomas Hobbes, to 
Jean Bodin, to Carl Schmitt, Wendy Brown summarised the hallmarks of modern 
sovereignty as: 
 
“supremacy (no higher power), perpetuity over time (no time limits), 
decisionism (no boundedness by or submission to the law), absoluteness and 
completeness (sovereignty cannot be probable or partial), nontransferability 
(sovereignty cannot be conferred without transferring itself), and specified 
jurisdiction (territoriality)”.26  
 
However, in keeping with Brown’s reading of Bodin,27 stressing that sovereignty 
should read through “its attributes and activities, rather than through abstract 
essential qualities”, this thesis argues that in contests for authority and power in the 
Iraqi refugee crisis, many of these hallmarks of sovereignty within the state were 
contested, expanded, or shifted to new actors.   
Most significantly, the attributes and activities of decisionism existed at the crux 
of these contests for control, as measures to govern refugees in the Iraqi crisis and 
to determine whether they would benefit from state recognition and protection, 
were often enacted in contradiction to or in the absence of the law, or were justified 
in the name of emergency.  The work of Agamben serves as a departure point for 
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this analysis because his theory of sovereignty is based on the power of decisionism, 
recognising that state legitimacy is secured not only through the management of life, 
but also in decisions on its exclusion from protection in times of emergency.  His 
theory also provides a means for conceptualising the interactions of law and politics 
central to the rationality of sovereignty.  It further helps illuminate why and how 
Iraqi refugees became the embodiments of states of emergency, as they were often 
perceived and categorised as political, economic, racial, or security threats to 
sovereign states, and consequently were located increasingly outside of the 
protection of state law. 
Drawing upon Foucault’s theory of biopolitics, Agamben theorised that 
sovereign power is located, exercised and produced through management of the life 
of populations, or practices of biopolitics, which make human life the target of 
political power.28  In a biopolitical world, the sovereign has the ultimate authority to 
enact decisions regarding whether one will have access to political and legal 
protection and recognition of the state or will be excluded from it, living an existence 
of unprotected basic survival, in a form of life that Agamben termed “bare life”.29   
The location of sovereign power in decisions upon forms of life (whether one 
will have access to the politically qualified and protected life of the citizen or be 
relegated to the bare life of the exile) is most clearly evident in times of emergency 
when states enact exceptional measures against individuals whom they deem 
threatening to their security and identity.  State actions restricting such persons’ 
rights or lifting their legal protections altogether, relegating them to an existence of 
bare life in what Agamben referred to as a ‘state of exception’, assume an extra-legal 
quality, as these persons are no longer recognised or protected by law.30  
Concentration camp survivors, Guantanamo Bay detainees, and refugees are all 
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examples of persons subjected to such emergency measures, who have lost the 
protection and recognition of the law and have been reduced to their bare lives, 
living between exile and belonging, life and death, as their biological lives are laid 
bare before the authority of state power.31  Sovereignty is this power that both 
defines the law and those situations in which law no longer applies.32  This is clearly 
evident in the Iraqi refugee crisis, where states’ recourse to extra-legal measures to 
govern Iraqi refugees relegated the vast majority of them to states of exception, 
living in precarious situations of legal liminality, relative invisibility, and physical 
insecurity. 
Yet as these states of exception were manifested in lived social spaces, it is 
necessary to ask how one might understand the operation of bare life in a state of 
exception, and what this might reveal about the workings of sovereignty as a spatial 
practice.  Can the state of exception, when translated to a lived social space, ever be 
entirely a space where bare life exists in a relation of pure exclusion from the 
political by a unilinear exercise of sovereign power?  As many of Agamben’s critics 
have argued, the lived material spaces produced by exceptional measures may be far 
more contested and processual.  And as this thesis will show in the case of Iraqi 
refugees, persons relegated to states of exception are never passive, as they act to 
either contest or collude with the logic of the decisions that placed them there.  The 
state of exception, when translated into lived space, can never exist wholly outside 
of human sociality.  Rather, there will always be the production of new forms of life 
and law.33 
The spaces in which humans survive in a state of exception are therefore 
produced through the confluence of the exercise of sovereign power and the ways 
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that the excluded negotiate this power.  Foucault’s theory of governmentality 
provides a means for conceptualising such processes, as it recognises that in addition 
to state actions, many other actors reproduce, legitimise, problematise, or counter 
the power of the state.  In this analysis, sovereignty was revealed as powerful and 
persistent, but also as contingent and constructed, subject to the challenges of 
resistance and negotiation.  The operations of the refugees’ individual micropower 
and UNHCR’s institutional macropower, as much as state actions, drove the 
realisation and materialisation of sovereignty in social space.  This theoretical 
approach was particularly useful in the Iraqi context as a purely state-centric analysis 
of the effectiveness of refugee protection would surely have missed the many 
moments and opportunities found by UNHCR and refugees themselves for either 
collusion with or contestation of the logic of sovereignty.  It is critical that these 
moments be identified in the project of exposing the violence of sovereignty and in 
envisioning alternative sites of responsibility and forms of political ordering that 
could ensure greater protections for refugees. 
 
 
III. Methodology 
 
Using this theoretical approach to structure this investigation, this thesis 
employs methods of critical legal geography to consider how legal and normative 
practices of exceptionalism within the spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis reproduced 
sovereignty in new configurations, not only producing refugees as bodies without 
rights, but also revealing spaces where such rightlessness could be contested, 
negotiated, and exposed. 
Critical legal geographers recognise that social spaces involve many more 
terrains and sites than simply the geographical,34 and relations of power are 
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continuously produced,35 contested, and reified through legal and spatial 
processes.36  In the same way that law is not only textual or discursive, but also a 
violent phenomenon,37 geography is concerned not only with images and 
representations, but also their locations and distribution.38  Space can make 
intelligible the law and hence the reach of power,39 giving law a “physical 
presence”,40 as it works to create particular representations, practices, and 
configurations.41  In this sense, law and space work in concert to shape the 
relationships between people and territory and between materiality and meaning.42  
Territory is used to legally circumscribe and define a population, and law and norms 
are used to delimit and legitimise a particular ordering of space or bodies in space.43    
The state of exception may become increasingly reified in space as the sovereign 
power to lift the law moves from its grounding in an abstract principle to 
technologies and knowledge to master both bodily and territorial spaces.  As law 
requires space for its deployment, sovereignty needs a body to be in force.44  At the 
same time, however, in this move from the abstract to the concrete, law encounters 
contingency and contestation. Law attempts to produce a homogenous medium to 
define space, while space is contingent and chaotic.45  In Deleuzian terms, space in 
this sense is itself alive rather than inert or fixed.46   Conflicts over how states are 
organised spatially in both the human body and social territory are the spatial 
                                                                 
35
 Delaney, D., Ford, R.T., & Blomley, N. (2001). Preface: Where is law? In D. Delaney, et al (Eds.). The legal 
geographies reader: Law, power, and space (pp. xiii-xxi), USA: Blackwell, p. xvi. 
36
 Blomley, N. (2003). Law and geography in retrospect. In J. Holder & C. Harrison (Eds.) (supra note 34) (pp. 17-
33), pp. 22-23. 
37
 Holder, J. & Harrison, C. (supra note 34), p. 27; Delaney, D., et al (supra note 35), p. xx. 
38
 Delaney, D., et al, ibid. 
39
 Ibid., p. xviv. 
40
 Holder, J. & Harrison, C. (supra note 34), p. 5. 
41
 Blomley, N. (supra note 36), pp. 27, 29. 
42
 See ibid. 
43
 Rajaram, P.K. & Grundy-Warr, C. (2007). Introduction. In P.K. Rajaram & C. Grundy-Warr (Eds.). Borderscapes: 
Hidden geographies and politics at territory's edge (pp. ix-xl). Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 
xxviii, xxxi. 
44 Agamben (supra note 32), pp. 124-125. 
45
 Pavoni, A. (2010). Atmospheres of exception: FIFA fan fests and urban space in the 2010 South Africa World 
Cup. Critical Legal Conference, 10-12 September 2010. Utrecht University, the Netherlands. 
46
 Deleuze, G. (1997). Essays critical and clinical (D.W. Smith & M.A. Greco, Trans.). Minneapolis: Minnesota 
University Press (original work published in 1993). 
Introduction                                                                                                                              
 
 
28 
 
expressions of conflicts about power.47  Therefore, using critical legal geography to 
conceptualise and investigate practices of sovereign exceptionalism as spatial 
practices in the Iraqi refugee crisis also exposes the slippages, fissures, and 
inconsistencies that emerged when law was applied to social space, which provided 
openings for envisioning possibilities for human protection beyond the state.   
The legal, normative, and political practices that functioned as technologies of 
power in reproducing or contesting the logic of sovereignty in the spaces of the Iraqi 
refugee crisis were identified from several sources.  As this thesis is the result of 
praxis, or reflection-in-action, foremost, my experience working with the Iraq 
operation at UNHCR for two years served as the primary ground for identifying these 
practices.  Following my work with this programme, I considered how I might reflect 
upon and draw lessons from this experience in my research.  Having reviewed 
several thousand Iraqi refugee testimonies and participated in policy and operational 
discussions with both field offices and states, I was particularly struck by the variety 
of practices we encountered that functioned as de facto sovereign decisions, 
producing spaces of both protection and isolation in the Iraqi refugee crisis, and I 
decided to make these the focus of my inquiry.  Due to obligations of 
confidentiality,48 I cite here only public sources that document these practices, 
including international refugee law; state legislation, regulation, and policy; UNHCR 
policy, reports, and guidelines; bilateral agreements between states and UNHCR; 
refugee testimonies; and human rights and news reports.   
In each chapter, the practices identified are grouped into discrete categories of 
practices that are argued to function according to the logic of sovereignty.  Such 
practices included those that were developed in the name of crisis or emergency, 
determining whether refugees would lose their juridical subjectivity through 
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exclusion, expulsion, or banishment.  They also included the institutionalisation of 
norms that either excepted or recaptured refugees within the ambit of the state 
system through mechanisms of expulsion or re-territorialisation.  These were 
practices that refugees and UNHCR also attempted to appropriate, internalise, 
evade, subvert, or transform in an effort to secure greater refugee protection.  
Therefore, this descriptive survey of practices is also argumentative in its 
categorisation of them, as they were identified and ordered according to the tenets 
of the theory of sovereignty as the power to decide upon the exception.   
The identification of these sets of practices provided the grounding data for 
then considering how sovereignty was materialised in the social spaces that resulted.  
The material and truth effects of these practices were analysed to determine 
whether they enabled refugee protection as it is conceptualised in international 
refugee and human rights law, what they revealed about how refugee bodies were 
bound up in practices of statecraft,49 and ultimately how they reconfigured the logic 
of sovereignty.   
Following Chapter One, which presents the theoretical framework, Chapters 
Two through Five of this thesis map and analyse four particular spaces of the Iraqi 
refugee crisis between the years 2003, when Iraq was invaded, and 2011, when the 
Multinational Forces withdrew from Iraq, and the numbers of refugees fleeing Iraq 
began to wane, recognising, however, that this crisis had by no means come to an 
end.  Each space of the Iraqi refugee crisis was identified and conceptualised 
according to Agamben’s theory of sovereignty: in the context of an “emergency” or 
“crisis”, a specific population was biopolitically determined and governed through 
practices of sovereign decisionism in or across a particular geographical space.50  The 
four primary spaces that emerged in the Iraq war and subsequent refugee crisis 
included: the space of the war that displaced the refugees, the spaces of refugees’ 
exile in host states in the Middle East, the spaces of refugee encampments along the 
                                                                 
49
 See Soguk, N. (1999). States and strangers: Refugees and displacement of statecraft. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, p. 37. 
50
 See Diken, B. & Laustsen, C. (2006). The camp. Geographical Analysis, 88 B (4), 443-452, p. 443. 
Introduction                                                                                                                              
 
 
30 
 
borders of Iraq, and the spaces of refugee resettlement from the Middle East to 
states in the global north.  Chapters Two through Five each begin with a survey of 
the sets of practices that functioned as sovereign decisions on the exception in these 
spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis, and then follow with an exegesis on the 
implications of these practices for the workings of sovereignty in the field of refugee 
protection.    
 
 
IV. Outline of chapters 
 
Chapter One provides the theoretical framework that guided the development 
of this thesis.  It conceptualises the link between refugees and state sovereignty by 
tracing the history of the refugee protection regime as part of a larger project of 
sovereign state formation.  It then presents Agamben’s theory of sovereignty as the 
power to decide upon the exception of persons from state protection or legal 
recognition in the name of emergency.  It theorises how this form of exceptionalism 
has increasingly emerged as the norm in the context of contemporary refugee crises.  
It finally argues that in order to understand how such exceptionalism is translated 
into lived social space, it is necessary to examine the political and legal practices that 
produce these spaces and materialise the operations of law.  It suggests that in the 
translation of the state of exception to a space of exception, such practices also 
produce moments of contestation, opportunities for exposure, and possibilities for 
envisioning forms of political community and responsibility that exceed the 
boundaries of the sovereign state. 
Chapter Two investigates how law, exceptionalism, and the violent politicisation 
of life combined to reconfigure the logic of sovereignty in the space of the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, which produced the Iraqi refugee crisis. 
Technologies of power that realised the violence of this logic included justifications 
for military intervention, the imposition of neoliberal democratic governance, de 
facto states of emergency, normative discourses of identity, and the politicisation of 
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humanitarian aid.  These technologies were also spatial practices in the formation of 
the new Iraqi state, facilitating the emergence of differing visions of political 
authority within it.  They enabled the spatiotemporal manifestations of the states of 
exception that proliferated within Iraq.  Iraq was designated as an exception within 
the international order, and insurgent and sectarian militias challenged, 
appropriated, and reproduced the logic of sovereign exceptionalism through 
decisions upon life in their violent competition for control of the state.  However, as 
the state of exception became the dominant paradigm of governance in Iraq, and 
the state of emergency became indistinguishable from the normal mode of politics, 
sovereignty was revealed as contingent and delocalised in this highly contested 
social space. 
Chapter Three examines the legal topographies of the protection space that 
resulted from negotiations between host states in the Middle East and UNHCR, and 
considers their implications for the spatial location and exercise of sovereign power 
and authority in the region.  It maps how the logic of sovereignty shaped refugee 
spaces by tracing the technologies of power enacted by the governments of Syria, 
Jordan, and Lebanon to contain and manage the refugee population, and also the 
strategies employed by UNHCR in its attempts to counter many of the devastating 
effects of these practices.  These technologies included frameworks and bilateral 
agreements for the legal protection of Iraqi refugees, border controls and visa 
regimes, and the regulation of refugees’ access to economic and social rights.  This 
topography revealed new configurations of sovereignty, contesting the reach of both 
the power of the state and the authority of UNHCR.  Sovereignty was delocalised 
through humanitarian management, yet its logic persisted and was reproduced in 
new forms.  At the same time, the ruptures that resulted from the social spaces 
produced by these contests for control and management of the refugee crisis also 
presented possibilities for envisioning forms of global governance and responsibility 
for refugee protection beyond the state. 
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Chapter Four investigates how the logic of sovereignty was reconfigured in the 
liminal refugee spaces of Iraq’s borderlands.  Palestinian, Kurdish, Iranian, and 
Sudanese refugees, once hosted by the state of Iraq, were violently driven from their 
homes by militia groups who filled the power vacuum following the fall of Saddam 
Hussein.  Construed as security threats, these refugees were largely denied entry 
into neighbouring states, and were compelled to reside in a series of ad hoc 
encampments in or near the “no-man’s lands” along the borders of Iraq, Syria, and 
Jordan.  The technologies of power that functioned as expressions or contestations 
of the logic of sovereignty in these refugee spaces included violence and expulsion, 
displacement and re-emplacement, and exclusion and inclusion.  Functioning as 
spatial practices, these technologies not only instrumentalised the border in the 
production of specific forms of sovereignty, but also produced spaces of isolation 
and resistance and shaped processes of citizenship and territorialisation within the 
region.  Trapped in the margins, the refugees were often relegated to no state at all, 
their very presence contesting the myth of social closure that undergirds the 
rationality of statism.  As they mobilised their vulnerabilities and encampments to 
call for their recognition within the state system, and humanitarian organisations 
assumed greater powers of governance in the border zones, the contingency and 
processuality of sovereignty became apparent.  Their emplacements and assertions 
of new political subjectivities, while still premising the citizen as the proper subject 
of politics, also exposed the violence of the sovereign decisions that produced them 
as refugees. 
Chapter Five investigates how the logic of sovereignty was reconfigured in the 
space of resettlement of Iraqi refugees to states in the global north.  Resettlement 
was framed as a means of protecting the rights of the most vulnerable and for 
increasing their self-reliance.  But it also served as a filter for some resettlement 
states to screen out those refugees deemed to have insufficient “integration 
potential” or to be security threats.  Within this system, technologies of power 
included administrative classifications of vulnerability and rights, self-reliance and 
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integration, and inadmissibility and threat.  These concepts functioned as ideologies 
in the normalisation of sovereignty, the assertion of the neoliberal state, the 
production of hyper-visible and invisible refugee bodies, and the construction of the 
citizen as the ideal political subject.  At the same time, however, these technologies 
were mobilised by refugees and UNHCR to contest state sovereign authority, as 
tensions emerged between agendas for humanitarian aid and human rights 
protection, and refugees appropriated ideologies of vulnerability towards their own 
protection interests.  These practices and tensions, while reproducing the logic of 
sovereignty embedded within a statist paradigm, also presented possibilities for it to 
be contested and exposed in the project of promoting expanded forms of refugee 
protection. 
This thesis concludes that within each of these spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis, 
sovereignty was reproduced in many forms, and its logic was expanded as the power 
to decide upon the exception was no longer the sole purview of states, but also 
migrated to non-state actors and international institutions.  At the same time, given 
the ongoing forms of appropriation and contestation of practices of sovereign 
exceptionalism, the spaces produced by such decisions were neither static and 
hegemonic nor uncontested.  Rather, as legal and political decisions were realised on 
the bodies and spaces of refugee lives, slippages in the logic and practice of 
sovereignty were continuously revealed.  Within the small fissures that emerged, it 
became possible to envision how norms of human dignity and international refugee 
protection might gain greater purchase in the face of the persistence of sovereignty.
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Chapter 1 
 
Theorising the relationship between state sovereignty and 
refugee protection 
 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical approach that guides the development and 
direction of the inquiry into the relationship between sovereignty and refugee 
protection in the post-2003 Iraqi refugee crisis.  Section One introduces the 
framework for conceptualising this relationship by theorising the role of refugees in 
state formation, the challenges refugees pose to the logic of the state system, and 
how states have attempted to resolve these problems through the development of 
the refugee protection regime.   
Section Two theorises how the refugee protection regime is unable to resolve 
these problems fully, as it also serves as a device for either including or excluding 
refugee bodies from state protection and functions according to the logic of 
sovereignty.1  This theory, rooted in the philosophy of Agamben and later scholars of 
his work, is based upon the power to decide upon the exception of human bodies 
from legal recognition or political protection of the state in the name of emergency.   
Section Three theorises that as forced displacement has engendered 
increasingly exceptional treatment of refugees in the name of crisis, the exclusion of 
refugees has emerged as the norm.  It suggests that in this convergence of the 
exception and the norm, the fundamental logic of sovereignty undergirding the 
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ideology of liberal democracy and its implicit protection of human rights may be 
exposed, denaturalised, and delegitimated.   
Section Four then investigates how such political and legal exceptionalism is 
translated into lived social space.  Drawing upon Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality, it argues that the state of exception theorised by Agamben can 
never be fully totalising or hegemonic when it is realised in social and bodily space.  
Rather the spaces produced by practices of states, international institutions, and 
forms of micropower are fraught with contestation, sometimes reproducing and at 
other times exposing the violence of sovereign power.  Therefore, while Agamben’s 
theory of exceptionalism serves as a departure point for investigating the workings 
of sovereign exceptionalism in refugee spaces, it is also necessary to investigate the 
specific practices that reproduced or contested it – particularly those that enabled 
the entry of human rights norms that countered the reach of state power. 
The final section describes how the analytical structure of this theory of 
sovereignty is used to identify and map the practices of the four primary spaces of 
the Iraqi refugee crisis identified and investigated in this thesis: the space of forced 
displacement from Iraq, the urban centres of Iraq’s neighbouring states hosting 
refugees, the refugee camps in Iraq’s border zones, and the resettlement 
programme admitting refugees into states in the global north. 
 
 
I. Refugees as a symbolic affront to the logic of the state system 
 
Refugee status in modernity is a by-product of the post-Westphalian state 
system in which state borders and identities were formalised by tying bodies to 
territories in fundamentally new ways.  The post-Westphalian state system views the 
citizen as the only agent capable of democratic practice, the state as the sole 
facilitator of conditions necessary to enable democracy, and territory as critical to 
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the coherence of a national community.2  This rationality provides the basis for 
conceptualising state sovereignty as the power to define the scope and terms of this 
community framed as citizens.3   
This power is realised through the convergence of territorial jurisdiction and 
political authority, in the process creating boundaries that then make the exclusion 
of non-citizens and expulsion from territories possible.4  Boundaries structure 
political relationships within and outside the field of sovereign power,5 enclosing 
political communities of citizens founded upon the power to define any subject as a 
potential enemy.6  Citizenship is a status which must be continuously produced, 
differentiated, and institutionalised through boundary-making in order to ground 
and legitimate the authority of the state.7  Such processes both normalise and de-
contest the existence and necessity of the state.8    
Only in a world made up of sovereign states with citizens can refugees exist in 
juridical terms.9  As “territorial constructs”,10 refugees as a legal category are created 
by the actions of their states of origin establishing territorial and bodily boundaries 
around a delimited political community.  Yet they also become “problems” to their 
host states and are naturalised as a category because they are uprooted and severed 
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from those territories and communities which are expressed in states.11  As the 
identity and authority of a state turns upon its ability to inscribe its power over a 
delimited social body, individuals such as refugees who are unconnected to any 
state, while produced by states, also constitute a threat to states as an organising 
social principle.12   
The presence of refugees also undermines the ideology of the state as the 
protector of the domestic community.  As personifications of human insecurity,13 
refugees highlight the fragility of borders circumscribing communities and represent 
a threat to the idealised national citizen.14  Refugees become “scandalous” in light of 
how state sovereignty is practiced and how the “body politic” is articulated and 
imagined against a perceived danger.15  Refugees are thus individuals “between 
sovereigns”,16 representing the fragility of sovereignty, contesting it as a paradigm 
and the international state system as a natural and stable permanent entity, and 
exposing it as a “contingent historical effect”.17  In this sense, as Arendt noted, the 
problem that refugees pose is not only one of space, but also of how politics 
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organise individuals,18 as refugees and stateless persons threaten to confound the 
normalcy and legitimacy of the state,19 sovereignty, and the political order itself.20   
Therefore, faced with their own threatened dissolution21 (not only marked by 
the presence of refugees, but also by processes of globalisation, supra-nationalism, 
and transnationalism),22 states must continuously work to assert their sovereignty in 
order to reinstate the linkages between territory and nation.  The stabilisation of 
sovereignty is in this sense always immanent and ongoing.23  Therefore, a refugee 
crisis, while certainly invoking a humanitarian plight, might also be considered a 
crisis of the state. 
Posed as threats to the ideology of the sovereign state system, refugees then 
become imbricated in the constitution and continual re-making of the sovereign 
state in crisis.  They are created by states as problems that can only be solved by 
states.24  They become representations of the necessity of state(ism) to recapture 
them within the ambit of the state system.25  They are thus instrumentalised by the 
state to privilege and normalise the citizen/nation/state hierarchy as the solution to 
their refugee-ness,26  and are produced as the reference point for privileging the 
citizen and the state as the proper subject of the politics, in which the citizen is both 
the constitutive and representative agent of the state.27  Refugee bodies are hence 
problems and representations of marginality that produce, circulate, and privilege 
citizen bodies as only possible within the territorial state.28  Therefore, refugees are 
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not wholly “outsiders”; they are also “practical insiders” in the process that makes 
the state.29 
 Solutions to the refugee problem, then, have long been posed in these terms,30 
finding ways to re-instate refugees within the category of citizenship.  Restoring 
international society requires reaffirming the citizen-state-territory hierarchy 
through re-territorialising refugees through mechanisms for obtaining citizenship.31  
Refugee bodies become the sites and spaces where this re-territorialisation occurs, 
“just as political and open to reinscription and redrawing as the maps they negotiate 
and shift”.32  They provide the “corporeal links” between sovereign rationalities and 
practices of statecraft.33 
The refugee protection regime was created towards this end, as Soguk argued, 
as a form of “intergovernmental regimentation” − coordination between states − 
and as a set of practices of statecraft,34 which stabilised the boundaries of citizenship 
and sovereign statehood.  This was critical at a time when the strength of state 
borders was deeply in flux due to the Balkan wars, WWI, counterrevolutionary wars 
in Russia, and the collapse of the Ottoman, Austria-Hungarian, and Russian 
Empires.35  Territorial nation-states faced a crisis of representation, which many 
attempted to neutralise through forced population exchanges, mass expulsions, and 
exterminations dominated by nationalist revision projects.36  However, the 
expulsions of problematic bodies simply shifted the problem to other national 
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territories.37  Hence, the need for intergovernmental coordination became the 
primary solution to the problems that mass populations of refugees posed to 
projects of statecraft.  The challenges were rearticulated as techniques or knowledge 
that states could harness in reasserting their primacy and authority.38   
The refugee regime that emerged grew from early states’ attempts to create an 
international mechanism to re-territorialise the 20 million displaced Jews, Russians, 
Poles, Germans, Greeks, Turks, Hungarians, and Armenians during the decline of the 
Ottoman and the Tsarist Empires.39  It was conceptualised under the League of 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (LNHCR)40 created in 1921 in the inter-war 
period as the first international organisation established to deal with what Count di 
Valminuta termed “the racial chaos” and instability to the world order posed by 
refugees.41  The LNCHR launched intergovernmental relief efforts that provided the 
basis for later incarnations of the refugee protection regime which responded to 
refugees in terms of the statist hierarchy.42  Through its activities, the LNHCR 
determined and formalised the ontology of the refugee that became central to later 
developments of the refugee regime; it problematised and normalised human 
displacement, placed the state as the corrective agent at the centre of refugee 
events, made the refugee the object of intervention, and institutionalised formal 
intergovernmental legal regimes to address refugee problems in statist terms, 
tracing a history of statecraft in crisis as much as trajectories of human 
displacement.43  The LNHCR’s centrality to statecraft was further evident in the 
activities it undertook in managing refugee populations.  Not only providing 
humanitarian aid, the LNHCR also coordinated the forced exchanged of two million 
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Greeks and Turks between the two countries as a means of “mediating” the 
conflict.44   
One of the most significant activities linking refugees to the practice of 
statecraft was the invention of the refugee identity certificate in 1922, also known as 
the “Nansen passport”, which linked refugees directly to statist subjectivities and 
institutions, and identified, documented, and mapped a certain form of otherness in 
the process of producing the citizen as the norm.45  While they permitted a certain 
freedom of movement, the identity certificates also provided states with 
frameworks for intervention and management of persons displaced across borders.46  
Revealing its intricate link to the production of the state, the creation of this refugee 
identity document coincided with the resurrection of national passport systems by 
states after WWI, when states began systematically issuing them to citizens and 
requesting them of non-citizens who entered their territories.47   
The LNHCR was succeeded by a number of organisations, most predominantly 
the Nansen International Office for Refugees, the Intergovernmental Committee on 
Refugees, the International Refugee Organisation of 1946, and then UNHCR 
following World War II, which was lauded as the ideal institutional arrangement for 
protecting refugees.48  During the evolution of these refugee agencies, the process of 
refugee regimentation intensified, perhaps most dramatically realised in the 
adoption of the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees in 
1933,49 which enlarged the legal scope of the refugee regime.50  
The progressive universalisation and individualisation of the legal definition of a 
refugee followed, capturing and encoding individuals within a system of rights, 
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privileges, inclusions, exclusions, duties, and responsibilities.51  This definition was 
enshrined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees [hereinafter the 
“1951 Convention”], stating that a refugee is any person who: 
 
As a result of events occurring [in Europe] before 1 January 1951 and owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or  political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.52 
 
The advent of postcolonial developments and wars of independence in former 
colonial states produced increasing numbers of refugees, to whom the international 
community responded with the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
removing the temporal and geographical restrictions on the definition of the refugee 
that were present in the 1951 Convention.53   
Later regional instruments expanded the refugee definition’s substantive causes 
of flight; subject to geographical location, persons fleeing serious disturbances to 
public order (1969 Organization for African Unity Convention)54 or widespread 
human rights violations (1984 Cartegena Declaration)55 could now also assert their 
claims for protection.  While expanding the possibilities for persons forcibly 
displaced to find re-entry into state protection, these universalising instruments also 
worked to define the parameters of the authentic refugee event, disciplining and 
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regimenting refugee identities, experiences, and voices56 in terms premising and 
centralising the state as both the arbiter and protector of human life. 
In this context, UNHCR works to promote international standards of protection 
in the legislation adopted by states.57  However, such standards rarely translate into 
the emergence of binding customary international law, as UNHCR is caught between 
its own strictly non-political humanitarian mandate58 and state interests, often 
participating in statecraft, institutionalising statist definitions of refugees, 
constructing refugees as problems in terms of states, and developing an institutional 
identity which respects state sovereignty.59  At the heart of the refugee regime, then, 
states remain the fundamental arbiters of protection.   
Hence, the refugee regime seeks to re-establish refugees within the ambit of 
state territorial control through either repatriation to one’s country of origin,60 local 
integration in a state of asylum, or permanent resettlement to a third state.61  Such 
re-territorialisation measures reproduce state power across borders and mobilise 
populations to recognise states as the legitimate agents for solving the problems 
that refugees pose to the stabilisation of sovereign territorial relations.62  Although 
the refugee regime was also intended to provide a transnational solution connected 
to the development of universal human rights instruments,63 it is questionable 
whether this was really possible within the statist paradigm of the international 
system in which the protection of human rights is ultimately dependent on state 
action.64  Modern refugee law, as Hathaway argued, in this respect may have derived 
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more from states’ interests in governing “disruptions of regulated international 
migration” than in meeting the humanitarian needs of refugees.65   
 
 
II. Exclusion and expulsion as a practices of state sovereignty 
 
The role of the state in refugee protection is particularly evident in the legal 
regime which determines whom to admit and whom to exclude from state 
territories,66 a set of representations that shape and limit the possibilities for 
refugees’ lives.67  Although developed as a re-territorialisation mechanism, the 
refugee protection regime also guarantees states the continued sovereign power to 
exclude persons from legal protection by either determining that they fall outside of 
the definition of a refugee or should be excluded from international protection.68  
The “refugee” as a juridical construct therefore provides the mechanism for states to 
determine whether to bring bodies expelled from the protection of one state under 
the jurisdiction and control of another or whether to relegate them to a marginal 
existence, often in state territories without the benefit of any state protection.   
Why is it critical that the power of exclusion be built into the refugee regime?  
The exclusion clauses in the 1951 Convention are intended to maintain the integrity 
of the refugee protection regime, ensuring that it does not protect individuals who 
have themselves participated in persecutory acts.  However, the definition of 
persecution can be elusive, circumscribed and shaped according to political and 
national interests, demonstrated most clearly in the popular saying that “one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.69  In this respect, then, the power of 
exclusion also provides states with a mechanism for denying legal recognition to 
certain persons seeking asylum on their territories.   
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Refugees, having no state to represent them, expose the fragility of the state, 
the porousness of its boundaries, and the myth that it is capable of fully 
encompassing human need.  Hence, the state must continually work to shore up its 
borders and to legitimate and produce itself as the normative mode of political 
ordering.  How does the state engage in such a project when faced with refugee 
crises?  Following the theoretical work of Agamben70 elaborated below, in order for 
the state to be produced and legitimated, there must be a threatening “outside” of 
politics against which the state can be defined as the norm.  This outside must also 
be construed as the danger against which only the state can protect its citizens.  And 
this outside is often populated with persons deemed undeserving of or ineligible for 
asylum. 
Therefore, in producing itself as the norm, the state must also produce an 
exception.  It is in this creation of the threatening outside or exception that states 
found and legitimate their power.  This power is seated in the ability to render 
certain bodies to the exceptional space outside of law or politics and to capture 
other bodies within the citizenry.  In this process, the citizen body is defined and 
delineated, and the threatening refugee body is continuously produced, recouped, 
or expelled.  For example, states delimit their political identities by producing 
refugees – expelling individuals perceived to challenge a particular national identity 
(such as expulsions from Russia and Turkey); by admitting refugees as symbols of a 
particular political goal (such as admittance of Eastern Europeans and Russians by 
Western capitalist states to demonstrate their opposition to Communism); or by 
excluding refugees from legal recognition (particularly where states have no 
domestic asylum legislation). 
The production of refugees and their exclusion from recognition therefore 
become expressions of sovereignty implicit in state formation.  They provide the 
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“other” against whom the state can define itself and assert its sovereignty,71 marking 
the division between inside and outside, self and other, identity and difference, 
community and anarchy,72 legal and non-legal, and citizen and exile.73  They are 
external bodies which states regulate in order to define the social body within.  
Refugees, having no state protection, are thus created and relegated to this 
boundary between the norm and the exception.  It is in this space between 
citizenship and exile that they must contend with state decisions about whether to 
exclude them from legal recognition and protection.  Such decisions, while often 
grounded in norms, law, and regulatory administrative codes, are nonetheless 
deeply political and discretionary.  They are reflections of national identities, 
ideologies of democracy, and claims for security.   
And for all the iterations of responsibility in which popular sovereignty finds its 
legitimacy, it is this power of exception, “the capacity to impose authority in the last 
instance”,74 that continues to form the core of sovereignty.  States retained this 
power in the development of the refugee protection regime and in the drafting of 
the 1951 Convention.  An underlying concern was maintaining the sovereign power 
to decide upon full inclusion within the state.  While refusal of the right to seek 
asylum may arguably be construed as contrary to the legal principle of non-
refoulement,75 the drafters of the Convention nonetheless agreed that states would 
not be required to admit all refugees at their borders on a permanent basis.76  
Hence, it is unsurprising that most of the world’s refugees do not benefit from 
traditional schemes of re-territorialisation through repatriation to their states of 
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origin, local integration in their asylum states, or resettlement to third states, but 
instead are excluded from legal protection or living in “protracted situations”.77   
Therefore, the refugee protection regime, represented as a practice of 
facilitating refugee inclusion in the polis, and state processes of expulsion might not 
be entirely oppositional.  Rather, they may represent complementary governmental 
practices which turn on the power of discretionary state decisions, re-inscribing 
sovereign power and promoting state identities, which refugees, by virtue of their 
very existence, at the same time contest.  The paradox lies in refugees both being 
central to and challenging the state system.  
The frequent failure of states to protect refugees may thus be attributed to the 
tenuous and uneven balance between refugees’ human rights and interests of state 
sovereignty.  States legislate access to asylum to mediate their power over refugees’ 
lives in the act of reproducing relations critical for maintaining sovereignty, 
subordinating humanitarianism to the requirements of statism.78  They intercept 
displaced persons as objects of political instability as much as they receive them as 
subjects requiring refuge.79  The project of premising the state system in the 
development of the refugee protection regime may then explain why the human 
rights of refugees have only partially served as the fundamental basis for state 
responses to refugee crises, and protection regimes have been so easy to 
undermine.  The refugee protection regime not only protects the individual from 
state violence, but also reproduces it, as it regulates the relationship between the 
individual and the state.   
This theory of the centrality of exceptionalism to sovereign power serves as the 
theoretical departure point for investigating the workings of sovereignty in the Iraqi 
refugee context.  As experience repeatedly demonstrated, Iraqi refugees rarely 
enjoyed the full protections of international refugee and human rights law within 
their host states.  More often than being granted asylum or resettlement, they were 
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deemed threatening others, illegitimate, or unwelcome and were left to fend for 
themselves in situations of considerable legal uncertainty and often outright 
extralegality.  Sovereignty, as it was expressed in decisions on the exception of Iraqi 
refugee bodies from state recognition and protection, was continuously produced by 
law and regulation as a means of normalising and legitimising state authority and 
power, and it had profound, violent, and material implications for refugees’ lives. 
This demonstrated how sovereignty is ultimately realised in the lives and bodies 
of refugees whose very existence materialises the border between exile and 
inclusion.  This expression of sovereign power through the production and 
regimentation of refugees reveals the unique relationship between human life and 
state law that is at play in the operations of sovereignty – what could be termed the 
biopolitical nature of refugee protection, meaning that human lives are placed at the 
center of politics.80  As human bodies serve as the sites upon which sovereign control 
is exercised and national identities are forged, the body becomes the primary site of 
political legitimacy81 and statist intervention.  The body (or life itself) becomes a 
space of sovereignty, and it is this politicised form of life that was implicated in every 
aspect of the Iraqi refugee crisis all the way from the violence and expulsion of 
bodies in displacement to the movement of bodies in re-territorialisation projects.  
Biopolitical theory can bring the dilemmas and paradoxes of sovereignty and the 
refugee protection regime into sharper focus. 
Foucault theorised that biopolitics accounted for how the relationship of 
individual life to political power evolved in the modern era.  He posited that 
sovereignty, originally expressed in the unconditional right to decide on death, 
evolved in the 18th century to focus increasingly on the administration of life as new 
technological innovations led to a heightened awareness of the ways in which 
human welfare could be controlled and improved.  This new awareness of power 
over life, termed “biopower”, marked a transformation in the workings of power, as 
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the human body became the centre of power’s focus.  Aristotle’s “living being with 
an additional capacity for a political existence” was replaced by the “modern man 
whose politics places his existence as a living being in question”.82  In the emergence 
of biopower, the sovereign’s exclusive right of death began to appear more 
prominently as the right of society to improve upon its life.83   
Agamben expanded upon Foucault’s theory of biopower, arguing that biopolitics 
is not a modern phenomenon, but has always been the ground of sovereign power.  
He traced how unqualified human life became implicated in political existence from 
antiquity to the present.  Classical Greek thought considered human beings to be 
truly “human” only when they engaged in a specific form of politics in which the 
political was distinguished and premised above one’s animal existence.  Referencing 
Aristotle’s distinction between the animal life which one is born into (zoë) and the 
“good” life of political participation into which one enters (bios),84 Agamben 
theorised that to pass from zoë into bios implies that animal life is a prerequisite for 
entrance into political life and therefore exists in a relationship of exclusion to 
political life.   
Agamben argued that in one’s movement towards political existence, animal life 
therefore becomes bare life by virtue of being excluded from political recognition, 
while still existing in a radical relation to it85 – in Strathern’s terms, a hybrid between 
the human and nonhuman.86  The human being is politically constituted in part by 
the existence of the vulnerability of the body.87   The inclusion of this bare life in the 
realm of politics is constitutive and fundamental to the exercise of sovereignty,88 as 
the law of the sovereign needs a body in order to be in force.89 
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Biopolitics thus locate decisions over life (whether one will have entry into 
political life or remain excluded from it, existing at the level of bare survival) as the 
target of political power.  Sovereignty operates at this borderline, masking its 
unlimited power to decide upon life with legal norms that legitimise the state’s 
authority, but always retaining the ability to exercise this power over life without 
legal constraint.90  Biopolitics, Agamben argued, thus underpin the paradigm of 
sovereignty (or what Biswas and Nair termed the “logic of sovereignty”)91 whose 
function is to politicise and exercise control over forms of life,92 and which turns on 
states’ ability to subject human lives to spaces outside of law’s protection93 − to bare 
life. 
Agamben used the juridical category of the sacred man, having its origins in 
homo sacer in Roman law, to investigate what it means to be relegated to bare life.94  
Homo sacer was a criminal whom the state deemed worthy of death, but who was 
banned by the state from being legally executed or religiously sacrificed, meaning 
that he had no clear legal or moral status.  The sacred man could be killed by anyone 
with impunity, and it would not be considered murder.  He lived in a bare life of exile 
in a “state of exception”, an empty legal form, subject to state violence, but 
unprotected by law.95   
Agamben argued that the logic of sovereignty becomes most evident in times of 
emergency, when individuals may be subject to bare life in a state of exception. 
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States abandon them, removing them from law’s application or protection, in order 
to preserve sovereign authority.96  This concept is derived from Schmitt’s theory of 
sovereignty as a power that both defines the scope of the law and the situations in 
which law no longer holds.97  Schmitt argued that sovereignty is not simply a 
monopoly on violence, or legitimised by a population or another state’s recognition; 
its roots may also be found in situations of emergency when it manifests itself in 
decisions regarding the application or suspension of the law.98   
The power to decide upon the state of exception is central to understanding 
sovereignty.99  Life and death enter the realm of the political through the exercise of 
such sovereign decisions.100   Not simply a punishment enacted within the legal order 
of the state, to be abandoned by the law and left to a state of exception is to be 
placed outside of the juridical-political order that defines the frame of the “city” or 
the polis.  Yet the act of being placed outside of law’s protection is to also be subject 
to the power that places one there,101 exposed continuously to an unconditional 
threat of a death that cannot be classified as murder.  For the body caught in the 
sovereign ban, excluded from recognition or protection, survival is sought in 
constant flight.102  As Agamben noted, “In this sense, no life, as exiles and bandits 
know well, is more ‘political’ than [this].”103 
How is it possible to reconcile at once being excluded by legal recognition yet 
also being subject to the continued violence of the state?  Schmitt defined the 
sovereign as the one who decides on the exception, and in so doing, merges the 
legal and the non-legal by means of a political decision that has the force of law.104  
Humphreys critiqued Schmitt’s definition as a legal construct intended to 
domesticate pure or “non-state” violence and called it an attempt “to legislate for 
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anomie” in a move towards closure within the legal system.105  Fitzpatrick argued 
that the state of exception cannot exist outside of the law because law has no 
foundation; it continuously expands and absorbs exteriority to contain what it 
excludes.106  Other scholars alternatively read the state of exception as essentially 
political − the exclusive product of executive action, however closely it might be 
regulated once the emergency is declared.107   
These critiques converge to some extent with Agamben’s own theory of the 
relationship between law and the state of exception.  In asking what law does when 
confronted with “the irreducibly non-legal”, meaning human beings reduced to “life 
itself” in a state of emergency, he pointed to the encompassing nature of law, as it 
attempts to embed lawless spaces within itself through constitutionalism or rules of 
derogation.108  Therein is revealed the internal contradiction of sovereignty – the 
exception is not a complete exclusion, but rather a partial inclusion.  It is created and 
required to maintain the validity of the law that governs and defines the normal 
situation by providing a means for this law to be temporarily suspended in times of 
emergency.  The creation of the exception gives the law its meaning and validates 
the political order as the norm.  It is the originary form of law, enabling law to work 
by creating an “inside”, or that which is within the juridical and political order, and 
an “outside”, where law is no longer able to recognise, protect, or prosecute – the 
space occupied by the homo sacer.109    
The homo sacer therefore remains tied to the state in a relationship of 
abandonment by the law.110  The ban is what ties together bare life and sovereign 
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power.111  The state of exception is hence a legal fiction claiming to maintain the law 
in the act of suspending it, but is actually a violence that has “shed every relation to 
law”, producing what Butler called “a law that is no law”,112 and a “paralegal 
universe that goes by the name of law”.113  This reveals how the state of exception 
both binds and abandons human beings to the law.114   
Therefore, Agamben reasoned, the state of nature which was presupposed as 
on the outside, reappears on the inside as the state of exception: “The state of 
exception is neither internal nor external to the juridical order, and the problem of 
defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and 
outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with one another.”115  Or as Rasch 
pithily stated, “The state from which Hobbes’s sovereign rescues us is the state into 
which Agamben’s sovereign plunges us;”116 “the problem that Hobbes thinks he 
solves is in reality the product of the political space he creates and the consequence 
of the sovereign ban.”117  The state of exception is therefore not the chaos preceding 
a political order, but rather the result of the suspension of that order,118 and it is the 
ground and source of the law that governs that order.119  It does not exist prior to 
the foundation of the polis, but is rather a product of it.120   It is a consequence of 
                                                                 
111
 Agamben, G., ibid., p. 109. 
112
 Agamben, G. (2005) (supra note 70), pp. 59, 79; Humphreys, S. (supra note 105), p. 334; Butler, J. (supra note 
19). pp. 58, 62; Papastergiadis, N. (supra note 108), p. 435. 
113
 Butler, J., ibid., p. 61. 
114
 Agamben, G. (2005) (supra note 70), p. 1. 
115
 Ibid, p. 23; Agamben, G. (supra note 14), pp. 36-37. See Schmitt, C. (2003). The nomos of the earth in 
international law of the jus publicum Europaeum. (G. Ulmen, Trans.). New York: Telos (Original work published 
1950).  
116
 Rasch, W. (2007). From sovereign ban to banning sovereignty. In Calarcom, M. & DeCaroli, S. (Eds.) (supra 
note 4) (pp. 92-108), p. 101. 
117
 Ibid., p. 102. 
118
 Agamben, G. (supra note 14), p. 18. See also Agamben, G. (2005) (supra note 70), p. 29. 
119
 See Agamben, G. (2005), ibid., pp. 26, 51.  de la Durantaye (supra note 84), p. 351 argues that this presents a 
limitation for conceptualising solutions or other possibilities. In grounding politics in the state of exception, it 
becomes difficult to conceive of an answer in terms of politics, thereby opening only the possibility for a kind of 
utopia outside of politics, ultimately unrealisable and nihilist in its persuasion.  However, Khurana has suggested 
that a different reading would be that Agamben is calling not for a “political project”, but an “ethical turn”, not 
immediate and concrete political action, but new modes for understanding and constructing value. Khurana, T. 
(2007). Desaster und Versprechen. Eine irritierende Nähe im Werk Giorgio Agambens. In: Die gouvernementale 
Maschine. Zur politischen Philosophie Girogio Agambens. Böckelman, J. and Meier, F. (Eds.) (pp. 29-44). Münster: 
Unrast, pp. 34-35. 
120
 Agamben, G. (2005) (supra note 70), pp. 105-109. 
Chapter 1. Theorising the relationship between state sovereignty and refugee protection                     
 
 
54 
 
sovereignty producing its own field of application, and in the process, asserting itself 
as the norm; it confers reality and constitutes itself through repetition.121  
And in so doing, sovereignty is inherently violent.  Violence operates in the 
repetition and production of norms of law, political ordering, and ideology.  Norms 
of sovereignty grounded in biopolitics constrain the possibilities for life and render 
those lives which are unliveable within the normative framework susceptible to 
violence.   And, as Mills argued, norms themselves not only allow for violence, but 
also are ontologically violent, as their “world-making capacity” requires the exclusion 
of those who are unintelligible within the normative framework of the state from the 
space of “appearance” to the state.122  
Therefore, to understand the operations of sovereignty in the Iraqi refugee 
context, it is necessary to ask how biopolitics, law, regulation, norms, and violence 
were implicated in responses to the crisis.  Iraqi refugees, perceived as sources of 
threat and instability, and relegated to spaces of violence, extralegality, and 
containment, became embodiments and expressions of bare life in a state of 
exception.  And states attempted to ground, realise, and normalise their visions of 
political identity, law, and sovereign authority in both the production of and contests 
for control over these spaces of exile. 
 
 
III. Normalising the exception of refugees from state protection 
 
Subjected to repeated decisions withholding their protection in the name of 
crisis and emergency, Iraqi refugees were relegated to states of exception.  Yet as 
the Iraqi refugee crisis became protracted, and Iraqis faced interminable waits for 
durable solutions, their presence in their host states moved from a status of 
temporary emergency to one of growing permanency.  The state of exception to 
which they were relegated thus became increasingly difficult to distinguish from the 
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normal situation.  This reflected Agamben’s contention that modernity has been 
marked by the state of exception becoming the rule.  He postulated that the 
extension of military power into the civilian sphere has merged with the suspension 
of constitutional protections of civil liberties by means of governmental decrees.123  
As life increasingly becomes the primary object of state power, bare life, once 
situated at the margins, has begun to enter the political realm such that bios and zoë 
have become indistinguishable.124  As modern states in crisis attempt to cope with 
anxieties about threats to the sovereign state system,125 employing exceptionalism 
during peacetime to justify broadened executive powers,126 the state of exception 
increasingly has become the paradigm constituting the juridical order.127   
The previous temporary displacement of law in the time of emergency has now 
become the norm,128 and provisional and exceptional measures have been 
transformed into techniques of government.  The danger of this convergence is the 
extent to which the sovereign may resort to violence in the state of exception, 
providing for the growth of authoritarianism within the hearts of liberal democratic 
orders.129  Agamben noted, “The state of exception, which was essentially a 
temporary suspension of the juridico-political order, now becomes a new and stable 
spatial arrangement inhabited by the bare life that more and more can no longer be 
inscribed in that order.”130   
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Agamben’s primary example of the exception becoming indistinguishable from 
the norm, or what he referred to as the total politicisation of life131 in modernity, is 
the World War II concentration camp.132  He posited two models of social 
organisation − the camp and the polis.  The polis is the state in which citizens 
participate in full life. The camp represents the space created when the state of 
exception suspending rules on the basis of perceived danger becomes normalised, 
confused with the juridical rule, and extended to an entire population.133  The state 
of exception becomes concretised in the space of the camp.134   
Agamben argued that the camp is the exemplary biopolitical space of modernity 
where normal order is suspended, and ethics and civility, rather than law, determine 
whether atrocities will be committed by the authorities against those relegated to 
bare life.135  In the continuous state of emergency, the biological body and political 
body are no longer distinguishable,136 and law loses all content and abandons those 
once within it to the vagaries of state power.137  The state of exception, which is an 
order without localisation where law is suspended, corresponds to the camp, which 
is a localisation without order where the state of exception becomes permanent.138   
Critics have asked whether Agamben’s theory grounding the logic of sovereignty 
in biopolitics and the state of exception essentialises a form of sovereignty over 
time,139 making it ahistorical or lacking in empirically grounded argument.140  
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However, Agamben claimed that he was theorising a paradigm, or a kind of logic, 
rather than a historical event,141 using concrete and real occurrences to “elucidate a 
larger historical experience”,142 first contextualising them,143 and then revealing the 
connections between phenomena that “might escape the historian’s gaze”.144  This 
provided a structure for understanding “the historical present and its concealed 
structures of discipline and control”.145  Gulli concurred, arguing that the only way 
that a radically new understanding of the political and living could be found in 
Agamben’s approach was to examine the structure that makes possible the factual – 
the ontological structure of contingency.146 
Towards this end, Agamben theorised that the absolutism of the concentration 
camps provides a basis for conceptualising other camp-like spaces which share 
similar juridical situations.  In these spaces, homo sacer and the normalisation of the 
camp emerge in new forms.147  Such spaces, where bare life and juridical rule enter a 
zone of indistinction, must be recognised regardless of their specific topographies or 
the forms of violence that occur within them.148  Although not directly extermination 
camps in the sense of the Holocaust, these spaces of exception depersonalise, 
isolate, and deny humanity,149 and the power to kill or let live transforms into the 
power to cause to survive150 – “the production of survival in bare life”.151 
Agamben cited refugees, comatose persons, persons held in zones d’attentes in 
airports, persons subjected to military intervention on humanitarian grounds, and 
death row inmates as examples of persons reduced to bare lives, living in spaces 
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between life and death.  These persons represent the paradoxical relationship 
between homo sacer and the law, as biological life is laid bare before the authority of 
state power.152  
Refugees are indeed emerging as the homo sacer of the modern state – often 
existing at the level of survival in the liminal space between their country of origin 
and their country of asylum.  Similar to one who in bare life is subject to law’s power 
by virtue of being excluded from it, many refugees are subject to the violence of 
state power by virtue of their exclusion from state recognition.153  When they are 
refused recognition under refugee law or are denied any kind of subsidiary 
protection, they lose all legal status and become “irregular” or “extralegal” migrants, 
no longer recognisable or legible to state law.  Having no law to which they may turn, 
they exist in host states in situations of exile, fearing the violence of state power 
through arrest, detention, or deportation, but unable to seek recourse as refugees 
through the state juridical system. 
In the context of increasing restrictions on refugee rights, exclusionary practices 
towards refugees are becoming normalised.  The principle of inscribing life in the 
order of the state is subject to new and restrictive regulation.  Struggling to stay alive 
in their countries of origin, people are fleeing in greater numbers, encountering 
states reluctant to meet the challenges posed by this new reality.  Soguk noted the 
emergence of a permanent refugee crisis as repatriation becomes politically 
impossible, host countries fail to accommodate vast numbers of refugees, and 
resettlement is restricted to a small minority.154  Refugee rights advocates, making 
claims for refugees as recognised members of a human community through 
international law,155  are losing traction as Foucault’s theory of the power over life in 
excess of death, perhaps envisioned in early refugee rights instruments, now enters 
into reverse.   
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However, in using Agamben’s theory of sovereignty to analyse responses to the 
Iraqi refugee crisis, there are several critical points that must be considered.  These 
points suggest that while this theory may well serve as a departure point for 
investigating conditions of exceptionalism towards refugees in modernity, it is 
necessary also to consider both the places where this theory resonates and those 
where sovereignty’s reach is more tenuous and contested. 
First, Agamben does not theorise the distinctions between the different states 
of exception he postulates.156  Whereas the camps represented the paradigmatic 
state of exception emerging from a fundamental either/or decision, the zones 
d’attentes or refugee camps might involve a question of how much to exclude.  The 
decision to exclude in modernity may be far more variegated, permitting individuals 
certain degrees of inclusion based upon their biopolitical or legal categorisation.  
This is particularly evident in how various categories of migrants are tied to different 
forms of restricted protection.  For example, under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, prohibiting torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment, persons may be excluded from refugee protection or deemed irregular 
migrants, yet still remain legally on the territory until the security situation in their 
country of origin enables their safe return.157 
Second, theorising a paradigm rather than historical events, and tracing 
genealogies of structures of thought in order to understand the development of the 
rationalities of the state,158  Agamben focused almost exclusively on the juridico-
political foundations of the state of exception.  The judicial and legislative measures 
undertaken to delimit the scope or parameters of this space were less of a focus in 
his project.  He did point to how the law attempts to encompass the state of 
exception through legislating states of emergency historically, but he did not address 
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further how the state of exception is produced and legitimised as a social space 
through multiple techniques of government, such as legal discourse, institutional 
ordering, and regulation.   
In this sense, Agamben’s theory of sovereignty provides a purely state and law-
centric analysis, which risks losing valuable insight into how the logic of sovereignty 
persists and is reproduced through both laws and norms by those individuals and 
institutions who are subject or beholden to the power and interests of states.  
Agamben’s focus was on how states produce the kinds of subjectivities that conform 
to, support, and enable the conditions that their sovereign authority requires for its 
power.159  However, the spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis were shaped not only by 
state decisions, but also by the practices of UNHCR and refugees themselves, all of 
whom played roles in reproducing or contesting the logic of sovereignty and the 
necessity of the state. 
Third, accepting that the decision on the exception is originary and fundamental 
to the logic of sovereignty, the question still arises as to how the state of exception 
then translates into lived spaces of exception, as Agamben’s reference to the camp 
(in Schmittian terms the new “nomos of the earth”)160 implies a spatial expression of 
the state of exception.  Some Agamben scholars are opposed to the empirical 
application of his philosophy to particular spatial contexts, arguing that his theory 
should only be understood in terms of his larger philosophical project of theorising a 
“coming community”.161  However, Agamben himself noted the importance of 
identifying the legal architectures enabling the state of exception, acknowledging the 
need to investigate the juridical procedures and deployments of power by which 
human beings are so deprived of rights that no violence committed against them 
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could appear as a crime.162  The translation of the state of exception to a space of 
exception, from an “essence” to a spatial “relation”,163  is facilitated by such juridical 
and normative practices. 
Agamben also did not fully investigate what happens when the state of 
exception is translated into lived social space as it is experienced by its inhabitants.  
His theorising of how the state of exception at the same time produces sites of 
experience and contestation is restricted to a citation of the speechless and 
apathetic Musselman as the example of the most abject figure of bare life in the 
concentration camps, exemplifying the absolute expression of the convergence of 
law and life.  No longer able to distinguish between nature and politics, pain and 
power, the Musselman appears immune to the threats of the SS officers against him, 
and therefore comes to exemplify the kind resistance that can only result from 
carrying the state of exception to its extreme logical conclusion.164    
However, beyond this paradigmatic expression of the ultimate convergence of 
law and life, also exist human beings subject to bare life who still struggle to live “in 
the world of men”165 by negotiating and challenging the increasing convergence of 
law and life in the state of exception in multiple ways.  Persons relegated to states of 
exception are neither neutral nor passive, and they continually act to contest or 
legitimise not only their treatment within the space that results, but also the 
decision to place them there.166  The state of exception, when translated into lived 
space, can never be purely anomic, devoid of human agency or sociality, but is 
always a social space where the production of bare life outside of state law can yield 
new forms of life and alternative forms of law,167 producing two laws that do not 
read each other, and creating possibilities for an emancipatory politics.168  The 
repetition of norms of sovereignty in creating social space also risks their 
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misappropriation in their re-enactment, thus presenting possibilities for 
sovereignty’s transformation.169  Hence, in the production of the space of exception, 
the lived experience of such space is fraught with contestation and the production of 
new norms and orders, and as such can never be wholly hegemonic or totalising.  
Examining the practices of law and life in refugee spaces of exception therefore 
reveals not only how bodies are politicised and bare lives produced by state actions, 
but also how refugees in turn negotiate them.  In this respect, the spaces emerging 
from the decision on the exception are arguably far more nuanced.   
In light of these concerns, this thesis investigates the means by which 
sovereignty and state of exception are expressed and contested spatio-temporally.  
Scholars have called for critical examinations of how sovereign exceptionalism 
functions and is socially expressed.  To counter the normative force of sovereignty 
underlying failures in refugee protection, Schramm and Kottow advocated for a 
bioethics of protection that profanes the frontiers between the rule of law and the 
state of exception by revealing specifically how sovereignty and governmentality 
operate to reproduce refugees continually in their bare lives.170  In another project of 
profanation, in Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, Agamben 
investigated the role of witnessing and testimony that can operate as a form of 
memorial. 171  He argued that “speaking Auschwitz” (or bearing witness) provides a 
challenge to the notion that the state of exception is too horrific to be speakable, 
and it exposes the link between the camps and the law, moving the camps from a 
mystical, fetishised realm beyond law’s reach to a sphere where they may be 
articulated and their relation to law exposed.172   
Kennedy also called for an examination of how hierarchy and domination are 
reproduced when the spaces in between the centres and peripheries come to 
construct knowledge of one another, and “walls and will” reinforce differences 
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between them.173  Mapping the terrain of exceptional spaces is critical for locating 
areas for analysis and contestation, rather than rendering them a legal black hole 
and a “site of dogmatic rejection”.174  It is important to understand, as Latour 
advised, how sovereignty is “rooted and routed” in practices, to produce “insides 
and outsides”, to “subjectify and objectify”, to create shared notions of place that 
empower, reinforce, and remake particular economic, political, and social orders.175  
It is necessary to map the spaces that expose how power and knowledge function to 
produce the present.176  Categories of inclusion and exclusion are ultimately spatial 
relationships and “geometries of negativity”177 occupied by figures projected by a 
society attempting to position itself in contrast to those deemed less than human.178 
Perhaps, then, exposing the legal and normative processes at play in asserting  
the logic of sovereignty and statist hierarchies in the spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis 
may serve as a form of human praxis exposing the devices that tie law to life.  
Towards such a project of deconstruction, exposure, and profaning borders, 
subsequent chapters of this thesis examine the practices of the Iraqi refugee 
protection regime as it was enacted in social space.  They consider whether these 
practices reproduced or challenged the logic of sovereignty, created or recouped 
refugee bodies, and normalised the inclusion or exclusion of refugees, and in the 
process whether such contested assertions of sovereignty also revealed 
opportunities to expose and unwork the violence and reach of state power. 
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IV. Reproducing the logic of sovereignty through governmentality 
 
How might one map the workings of sovereignty revealed by interactions of law 
and politics in the social spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis, recognising that these 
spaces were fraught with contestation and populated and produced by multiple 
actors?  Foucault’s theory of governmentality provides an approach to this kind of 
exercise.  He argued that power in the era of biopolitics is not solely state-centred.  It 
is also expressed through a variety of individuals and institutions assuming roles in 
governing and regulating themselves and each other.  Formal techniques of 
government are being displaced by informal techniques, and new actors are 
appearing within the field, transforming constructions of statehood, while preserving 
state power.179  Political techniques of power over life and care of individuals, both 
through state law and individual forms of micropower, infiltrate every level society.  
They develop, sustain, and ultimately normalise specific economic processes and 
constructions of statehood by segregating bodies through the creation of hierarchies 
to ensure relations of domination and hegemony.180  
Schmitt’s constitutional state has thus evolved into Foucault’s regulatory state.  
The state, according to Foucault, is now “nothing more than the mobile effect of a 
regime of governmentality […] It is necessary to […] analyze the problem of the state 
by referring to practices of government,”181 which function as technologies of power 
in the continual constitution of the state and the logic of sovereignty.  Johns similarly 
argued that states do not have a monopoly on all political decisions and that there is 
a much broader range of decisions made by a much wider range of “agents, 
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aggregations or arrogations” than what was envisioned by Schmitt.182  Rabinow and 
Rose also called for a more nuanced account of sovereign power in contemporary 
society in order to understand better the current rationalities and technologies used 
to serve this power.183   
Foucault differed from Agamben in that he tended to treat sovereignty as a 
product of power relations rather than as an originary force, arguing that 
sovereignty also depends upon microphysics of power for its legitimacy.  Rather than 
focusing on how the norm is suspended as Agamben does, Foucault asked how the 
norm is produced through mechanisms operating behind or beneath the law.184    
Butler attempted to reconcile the tension between Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality and Agamben’s theory of sovereignty by proposing that they are 
not mutually exclusive.  Rather, biopolitics expressed in governmentality permit the 
bureaucratic establishment of administrative regulations that obfuscate, under the 
cover of para-legal rules and their discretionary application by bureaucrats,185 the 
hidden sovereign power to decide upon the exception.186  This also permits the 
institutionalisation and appropriation of ideologies of sovereignty through the 
normative practices of individuals and institutions. 
The logic of sovereignty is reproduced and re-emerges within the field of 
governmentality in hidden forms,187 increasingly unhinged from the law intended to 
constrain it as law becomes replaced by bureaucratic and technocratic techniques of 
management.188  In this field, the power of the state is dispersed and decentralised, 
assuming what McRobbie termed “spatial and bodily characteristics”, and 
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sovereignty becomes “embodied, corporeal, and bio-political”.189  Governmentality 
consists of procedures that spatially distribute and make visible and rationalise the 
individual body towards the purpose of increasing its useful force in the production 
of the logic of sovereignty.190  
For example, while the exceptional space of Guantanamo was arguably extra-
legal, once the decision on the exception had been made to detain individuals there 
indefinitely as enemy combatants, they were then subjected to techniques of heavy 
regulation and rules, in which “rightlessness” coexisted with “lawfulness”, and 
inmates became legal objects rather than legal subjects.191  In a related vein, 
Agamben himself described how historically, the state of exception was represented 
by the legal system’s attempt to include its own exception through invoking rights of 
self-defence, inter alia,192 creating a space in which the sovereign power to suspend 
the rule of law became masked by legal rationalities and regulations.  It is at this 
point that the sovereign decides upon the political relevance of life, and when 
finding life without value, subjects it to “the pure exercise of technique”.193  The logic 
of sovereignty is reproduced and normalised through techniques of governmentality 
that transform life into bare life.194   
Butler’s proposition is a useful a way of conceptualising how legal rationalities, 
regulations, norms,195 and administrative processes within the refugee protection 
regime were used as “bureaucratic fig leaves to conceal the raw power of the 
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sovereign to decide” upon the exception and to produce refugee spaces.196  The 
technologies of regulation employed by both state and non-state actors often 
concealed their functions as sovereign decisions on life.  However, at times these 
technologies also produced new configurations of political and legal ordering in 
space, either reproducing the logic of sovereignty as the norm or contesting certain 
expressions of it.  
Subsequent chapters of this thesis therefore examine the legal and normative 
practices, which functioned as technologies of power both producing and 
reconstituting sovereignty in the spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis, as practices of 
governmentality.  They theorise how such practices collectively provided 
rationalities, produced new meanings, fetishised the imaginary of the international 
state system, reproduced the logic of sovereignty, and normalised the state of 
exception.  They then consider how the repetition and re/performance of these 
practices in social, territorial, and bodily space also produced gaps and 
inconsistencies in the logic of sovereignty – suggesting opportunities for its own 
exposure and undoing, as it was contested or appropriated in projects that 
countered the authority of the state. 
 
 
V. Theorising spaces of exception in the Iraqi refugee crisis 
 
Based upon the theoretical framework outlined above, each of the following 
chapters in this thesis begin with a survey of the sets of practices enacted through 
governmentality that functioned as sovereign decisions in the spaces of the Iraqi 
refugee crisis, and then follow with an exegesis on the implications of these practices 
for the workings of sovereignty in the field of refugee protection.  These chapters are 
based upon four primary spaces that emerged in the Iraq war and subsequent 
refugee crisis: the space of the war that produced the initial displacements of 
refugees, the spaces of asylum and exile in host states in the Middle East, the spaces 
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of encampments along the borders of Iraq and its neighbours, and the spaces of 
resettlement from the Middle East to states in the global north. 
Each space of the Iraqi refugee crisis was identified and conceptualised 
according to the theoretical structure of sovereignty:197 There were distinctions 
imposed between law’s inside and outside, the norm and the emergency, providing 
the basis for deciding upon the exception and limiting refugees’ access to the polis of 
their host states to varying degrees based upon the relative threat they posed to the 
security of the state.  These distinctions, grounded in biopolitical categories and 
constructions of refugees and internally displaced persons, both served as devices 
for deciding upon the inclusion or exclusion of bodies and legitimising the 
governance of bodies on either side of the divide.  And the materialisation of legal 
exceptionalism in each of these spaces, as it was realised in biopolitical and 
territorial terms, worked not only to produce the state of exception, but also to 
expose the violence of it.   
These spaces were also characterised by the increasing convergence of the 
norm and exception, which contained the seeds for sovereignty’s own undoing, as its 
logic was undermined, and the violence of its power was exposed. As the line 
between persons as political beings entitled to rights and persons as bodies trying to 
survive began to blur, humanitarian aid began merge with human rights protection, 
and discretion often supplanted obligation in state responses to the forcibly 
displaced.  The refugee crisis could only be viewed as an emergency within the state 
system, and as it became protracted, it represented the increasing convergence 
between the exception and the norm.  Hence, the normal response to it was to 
govern and manage the refugees according to decisions on the exception.  At the 
same time, inherent contradictions were revealed in this merging of law and life, in 
which the refugees, by virtue of their very existence and often resistance, sometimes 
in concert with UNHCR, exposed the violent underside of state sovereignty, 
denaturalised it, and revealed it as an ideology.  Such contradictions also created 
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opportunities for considering the forms of life and political ordering that could 
emerge alongside or even beyond the parameters of a state-centric conception of 
sovereignty and responsibility for refugee protection. 
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Chapter 2 
 
“I am Iraq”: Law, life, and violence in the formation of the 
new Iraqi state
∗
 
 
 
 
Source: Children of Iraq Association-UK™ 
available at: http://www.coia.org.uk/ 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Following the 2003 war in Iraq, the Children of Iraq Association published a 
photograph of a small girl standing in a field of rubble, holding a hand-drawn sign 
stating, “I am Iraq”.1  While evocative in its own right, raising poignant questions 
about the human costs of war, this image also revealed the biopolitical cast of a 
sovereign exceptionalism that led to the invasion of Iraq and its devastating 
                                                                 
∗ Part of this chapter was published as an article by the author in 2011: Ali, P. (2011). “I am Iraq”: Law, Life and 
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aftermath.  International military forces, state actors, and insurgent militias, in their 
violent bids to assert their claims for authority in crafting a new Iraqi state, realised 
their visions of who would belong within its borders in bodily terms.  They conflated 
state with society, categorised citizens according to their ethno-sectarian identities, 
and targeted those deemed unworthy of protection with extreme violence, forced 
displacement, and often death. 
This chapter investigates how law, life, and violence combined to configure 
sovereign power in the spaces produced by the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
subsequent rise of the insurgency, which led to the forced displacement of nearly 4 
million persons, 2 million of whom fled to neighbouring countries.  It considers how 
sovereignty was produced and maintained through political and legal practices – 
technologies of power – which were exercised upon the bodies of the population 
and territory of the state.  Towards this project, the chapter first maps the 
technologies of power that were employed in the invasion of Iraq, its subsequent 
occupation, and the creation of the new Iraqi state.  These technologies worked in 
concert to produce the space of displacement that constituted the Iraqi refugee 
crisis. It next considers how these technologies were also spatial practices of 
territorialisation and citizenship in the formation of the new Iraqi state, as they 
enabled both the spatiotemporal expression and contestation of sovereignty at the 
levels of the international state system, within the context of the state formation 
process, and through decisions on the life of the population.  Finally, this chapter 
reflects upon the challenges that these new configurations of sovereignty posed not 
only for the future of the Iraqi state, but also for sovereignty’s traditional grounding 
in the citizen/nation/state nexus and its legitimation through law. 
 
 
II. Mapping the spaces of exception in the Iraq war 
 
Technologies of power that functioned as decisions on the exception, including 
international law, state legislation, institutional policies, and normative assertions of 
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micro-power by individuals and groups, proliferated within Iraq as international, 
state officials, and non-state actors produced legal justifications and normative 
discourses to legitimise their competing claims for control of the state.  In the 
process, both the logic of sovereignty, located in the power to decide upon the 
exception, and the increasing centrality of the exception to the constitution of the 
political order were replicated, expanded, and refracted across the spaces of political 
territories and human bodies.  In mapping how these technologies translated states 
of exception into political and juridical spaces of exception in the invasion of Iraq and 
its aftermath, the following section identifies and details five categories of 
technologies employed in the Iraq war.  They include normative discursive practices 
and legal justifications for military intervention; the installation of neoliberal 
democratic governance; the imposition of functional states of emergency; the 
violent expression of ethno-sectarian normativity; and the politicisation of 
humanitarian aid.  Following this mapping exercise, an exegesis reflects upon of the 
kinds of spaces produced by these technologies of power and their implications for 
the understanding sovereignty and the state of exception as a theory of space. 
 
A. Legal justifications for the war in Iraq 
 
The normative discourses and legal justifications for military intervention and 
the use of force in Iraq were a key set of spatial practices that produced and 
expanded the logic of sovereign exceptionalism and contested specific relationships 
between states within the international order and the law that governs them.  Both 
the demarcation of outlaw states and assertions of political authority beyond state 
territory in defiance of international law challenged traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty in the international state system. 
The exception of Iraq from equal status with other states in the international 
system started from the time of its creation under a British mandate and appeared in 
various iterations throughout the state’s short history, particularly in its later 
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struggles under a devastating sanctions regime.  Norms that legitimated such 
exceptional treatment were reproduced in the discursive practices employed by the 
Bush administration to build support for the US-led intervention in 2003.  President 
Bush stated that “this is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized 
world”,2 which harkened back to the earlier designation of Iraq as a “rogue state”, 
and in his State of the Union address, he named Iraq as part of the “axis of evil”.3  
This discourse was driven by a neoconservative agenda of using unilateral US military 
and political intervention in Iraq to promote neoliberal democracy and to position 
the US on the side of the “good and virtuous” and Saddam Hussein as the epitome of 
evil,4 a politics characterised by some as “democratic imperialism”.5 
The Bush Administration also capitalised upon the 9/11 terror attacks by 
focusing on Iraq as the primary source of terrorist threats against Americans, linking 
the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq with terrorism.  
In two speeches in August 2002, Vice President Cheney publicly accused Saddam 
Hussein of using WMDs to politically dominate the Middle East and to threaten US 
access to oil.6  In a speech to the UN General Assembly, President Bush stated that 
the US’ “greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions 
when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive 
scale”,7 and US Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested links between the state of 
Iraq and terrorist groups in his remarks to the UN Security Council.8   
What were the productive purposes and effects of such rhetoric?  Zunes argued 
that the focus on nuclear proliferation provided a pretext for ongoing US military 
presence in the Middle East and for attacking any states which challenged its 
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 Office of the Press Secretary, US White House (2002, January 29). President delivers state of the union address. 
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dominance,9 thereby asserting its power as a “world sovereign”.10  This expression of 
expanded sovereign power was the most recent iteration of similar positions 
adopted in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance paper,11 the neoconservative 1997 
Project for the New American Century paper Rebuilding America’s Defenses,12 the 
1998 Iraq Liberation Act stating that the official US policy was to support efforts to 
remove Saddam Hussein’s regime in order to replace it with a democratic 
government,13 and the 2002 US National Security Strategy.14   
This discursive regime framed both the problem and the solutions 
conceptualised by proponents of the military intervention in Iraq.  Therefore, 
although there were neither direct evidence of the alleged development of a WMDs 
program in Iraq,15 nor a founded link between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks,16 the Bush 
Administration still argued that military action was needed to prevent the spread of 
WMDs, cause a regime change, and promote democracy in Iraq for the benefit of its 
population.17  In support of this project, the UK affirmed its commitment to regime 
change in July 2002.18  On 16 October 2002, the US Congress passed the resolution 
P.L. 107-243, authorising the President to use the US military to defend the US’ 
national security from the threat posed by Iraq.19  On 8 November 2002, the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a “final opportunity” to 
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“comply with its disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences”.20  With 
the exception of Britain, however, most states were not ready to agree to a 
resolution calling for military action against Iraq.  The US responded by proposing a 
resolution concluding that Iraq had failed to take the “final opportunity” in 
Resolution 1441, which suggested that the US recognised a further resolution was 
legally required to authorise the use of force, but this was tabled for lack of 
support.21   
Therefore, the US in its “preemptive self-defense” policy,22 and the UK in its 
“revival doctrine”,23 turned to the argument that the use of force was already legally 
authorised.24  Attorney General Lord Goldsmith of the UK issued opinions on 7 and 
17 March 2003, first recommending a UNSC resolution authorising the use of force, 
and then ten days later reversing his position, concluding in a short statement that 
the use of force without a UNSC resolution would be lawful.25  Similarly, the White 
House reported to Congress on 19 March 2003 that the material breach of UNSC 
Resolution 68726 revived the authorisation to use force under its previous Resolution 
678.27  These assertions were further supported by legal scholars Ruth Wedgwood in 
the US and Christopher Greenwood in the UK.28   
The US and the UK then unilaterally declared Iraq to be in violation of Resolution 
1441 and gave Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to give up power and leave 
Iraq.  On 20 March 2003, the Coalition Forces, led by the US, launched Operation 
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Iraqi Freedom with an aerial bombing campaign and ground troop invasion from 
Kuwait.  They secured Iraq’s oil facilities and then entered Baghdad.  The combat 
operations were declared ended on 1 May 2003,29 and Saddam Hussein was 
captured seven months later,30 tried in an Iraqi tribunal in 2005, and executed the 
following year.31 
The Coalition Forces sought recognition by the UNSC post-invasion, successfully 
securing the passage of US-sponsored Resolution 1483, recognizing the UK and the 
US as “occupying powers under unified command” in Iraq and involving the UN in 
post-war reconstruction.32  However, critics argued that this was effectively a 
“legalisation of the outcome of an illegal invasion”,33 giving the appearance of 
multilateralism to a unilateral act, imbuing the concept of democracy with “legal 
sophistry and political manipulation”,34 and providing a “veneer of non-proliferation 
law cover”35 at the least and formal legalism at the most.36  Similarly, the sudden 
about-face in legal opinions adopted by the US and UK governments that the 
invasion was permitted under international law also arguably masked a moment of 
exceptionalism.  In keeping with these contentions, in 2004 the UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan publicly declared that the Iraq war was illegal.37   
 
B. Instilling neoliberal democracy 
 
Following the war, US neoliberal policies of reconstruction, economic 
liberalisation, and sectarian apportionment of Iraq’s government were also 
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technologies that facilitated new configurations of exceptionalism and expressions 
of sovereignty.  They institutionalised the power of the Coalition Forces, debilitated 
the Iraqi population, and deepened the sectarian divisions in Iraq.   
Assuming that most Iraqis would welcome the invasion, embrace democracy,38 
and initiate state-building from within, the Bush administration devoted scant 
resources to planning what would happen after Saddam Hussein was deposed.39  
The initial post-war state-building plan in the US State Department’s “Future of Iraq” 
project40 was severely undermined by bureaucratic rivalry and lack of 
communication across agencies in Washington, D.C.41  The US Pentagon’s Office of 
Special Plans eventually won out over this project in supervising the reconstruction 
of Iraq.42  Leaders were selected from exiled Iraqi and Kurdish political groups allied 
with the US Department of Defense to form the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) 
mandated to draft a new constitution and hold elections.  The process was 
envisioned as a rapid transition to democracy, which would occur within a few 
months, enabling the new government to implement longer-term strategies of state-
building.  Hence, the US Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
(ORHA) dealt more with immediate humanitarian crises resulting from the invasion 
than long-term reconstruction needs.43  
However, this thinking proved to be short-sighted.  The Bush administration 
replaced the OHRA with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in May 2003, 
administered by L. Paul Bremer.  However, the CPA was external to Iraqi society, 
dictating the actions of the IIA.44  The Iraqi exiles installed in the IIA had little political 
legitimacy or reach amongst local Iraqis.45  In addition, the primary focus of the US, 
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prior to the establishment of any democratic process,46 was to radically liberalise the 
Iraqi economy and promote corporate-led privatisation and marketisation by 
abolishing most restrictions on foreign direct investment and permitting foreign 
domination of the banking sector.47  In September 2003, every sector of the state 
economy, except for those dealing with natural resources, was put up for sale, and a 
15 percent corporate and individual gains tax was levied.48  US corporations were 
awarded the most significant reconstruction contracts in infrastructure, public 
services, police and judicial training, and military development, which heightened 
reconstruction costs, crowded out Iraqi companies, and imported cheaper labour 
from South Asia, despite rampant unemployment in Iraq.49  These measures 
displaced the private sector, causing asset stripping,50 and destabilised the Iraqi 
business class which was unable to compete.51   
In addition, many state entities under the former regime were dissolved.52  
More than 30,000 Ba’athist civil servants were removed under the CPA’s de-
Ba’athification policy,53 many of whom came under attack for atrocities committed 
or privileges received under the former regime,54 and 400,000 police and armed 
forces were disbanded.55  In the absence of new forms of government to replace 
them in the immediate term, the state apparatus was destabilised,56 and lawlessness 
began to fill the power vacuum that resulted.57  This compelled people to turn to 
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vigilante and tribal forms of settling disputes,58 motivated many of those who were 
removed from their governmental posts to revolt, and undermined the CPA’s 
reputation, despite its later attempts to rescind some of these measures.59 
As a consequence of the failures in post-war reconstruction planning and its 
promotion of neoliberal market reforms, the project to promote a liberal democracy 
produced “illiberal effects”60 that, in Foucauldian terms,61 themselves became 
instruments of violence against the Iraqi social body.  Structural violence was built 
into everyday life, the economy, political system, and environment,62 reproducing 
inequalities in daily life.63  Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi citizens were forcibly 
displaced as a result of the failures to restore damaged infrastructure in a timely 
manner; criminal gangs proliferated;64 and serious shortages in fuel, water,65 
housing,66 food,67 employment,68 sanitation,69 and electricity70 became protracted 
problems that continued long after the invasion.71  The NGO Coordination 
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Committee in Iraq determined that Iraq had fallen from the status of the most 
developed country in the Middle East to one more akin to a developing country.72   
Herring and Rangwala observed that the state was therefore unable to establish 
itself as the primary service provider, which was critical to the legitimation of its 
sovereign power and the management of Iraqi society by non-coercive means.  Iraqi 
society began to align itself with political groupings that could better provide access 
to these services through systems of patronage.73  These groups were often 
sectarian in nature, and sought state sponsors for their support, such as the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Al-Dawa, and the Islamic Task 
Organisation.74 Patronage, re-emerging from Iraq’s colonial past as the key 
mechanism for structuring power outside of the state and binding individuals to 
specific state personnel, caused political fragmentation, resulting in sectarianism 
beginning to structure politics and society.75 
Faced with these setbacks, the US attempted to assume greater direction of the 
state-building process, a policy presented as necessary until the Iraqis were ready to 
assume control, paralleling the initial formation of the state of Iraq under the British-
administered Mandate established by the League of Nations, and couched in the 
language of eventual sovereign statehood.76  This position was reiterated by the 
UNSC, for example, in its expression of “resolve that the day when Iraqis govern 
themselves must come quickly”;77 its call upon the occupying powers to work 
“towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of 
conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political 
future”;78 and its statement that it looked “forward to the day Iraqi forces assume 
full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in their country, thus 
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allowing the completion of the multinational force mandate and the end of its 
presence in Iraq”.79 
In controlling the state-building process, the US engaged in practices of 
sectarian balancing; limited the authority of state institutions; dispersed power 
between the state apparatus and political parties, local groups, and tribal leaders; 
and remilitarised society.80  The IIA was replaced by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) 
on 13 July 2003,81 again comprised of US-aligned parties in Iraq, including exiles and 
representatives from the Shi’ah Islamists (SCIRI’s Badr Brigades and Al-Dawa), 
secular US allies (the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord), and the 
Kurds (the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan).82  The 
appointments were based upon the relative proportions of sectarian and ethnic 
groups in Iraq.83  Although presented as a “representative government”, the 
structure of the IGC prevented the emergence of a cohesive Iraqi political body to 
administer the state, as each political party represented in the IGC secured control of 
a different government ministry, appointing its own members as staff.84   The US 
constrained the IGC’s powers by retaining financial and military control and 
balancing the IGC’s power against that of regional actors by using tribal structures as 
an alternative power base for the Coalition.85   
Sectarian divisions continued to deepen in this political climate.  On 8 June 2004, 
the UNSC passed Resolution 1546, declaring the end of Iraq’s occupation,86 and the 
beginning of its exercise of full sovereignty and independence to be 30 June 2004, 
when an Interim Government would assume authority87 in accordance with the 15 
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November 2003 Political Agreement between the Coalition Provisional Authority and 
the Iraqi Governing Council and Article 2(B)(1) of the Transitional Administrative Law 
of 8 March 2004.88  It reaffirmed the presence of Multinational Forces (MNF) 
authorised under UNSC Resolution 1511 to ensure Iraq’s security and stability.89  The 
Coalition Forces had already been replaced by the MNF on 15 May 2004, and as of 
May 2005 were comprised of 160,000 personnel from 28 states.90   
On 28 June 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), headed by Prime Minister 
Ayad Allawi, replaced the IGC, two of whose Cabinet members were also members 
of the former IGC,91 and few of whom represented the marginalised Sunni minority.  
The IGC’s ministers were largely technocrats with limited political affiliations.92  UN 
Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi conducted extensive consultations with political 
parties, civic organisations, and tribal, religious, and community leaders prior to the 
transition in an attempt to build consensus for the structure of this non-elected 
body, as it was determined that Iraq would not be prepared to hold “genuine and 
credible” elections by this date.93  An Independent Electoral Commission was 
established to oversee the process of elections for the Transitional National 
Assembly (TNA).  Despite such efforts to avoid reinforcing sectarianism in the 
formation of the IIG,94 many segments of Iraqi society felt excluded and alienated 
from the political process.95  On 30 January 2005, national elections were held for 
the TNA, resulting in a government dominated by religious Shi’ah and secular Kurds, 
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with the notable absence of significant Sunni participation,96 although the US hailed 
the elections as a step forward for democracy in Iraq.97  In April, Kurdish leader Jalal 
Talabani was appointed as President and Shi’ah leader Ibrahim Jaafari as Prime 
Minister. 
The referendum of 15 October 2005 to approve the new Constitution,98 
reinforced sectarianism further, fostering the development of extreme forms of 
sectarianisation and providing fodder for recruitment to opposition militias.99   
Although Sunni Arabs were included in the drafting committee,100 they were 
marginalised in the drafting process and their objections overridden.  The 
constitution set out a federalist structure, but ensured that oil resources would be 
distributed across federalist lines, away from Sunni-dominated oil-rich governorates.  
Except for the Iraqi Islamic Party, no other Sunni Arab political group supported the 
constitution.  A two-thirds majority vote against the constitution in three 
governorates was required to veto it, and Sunni Arab parties unsuccessfully tried to 
use this provision to block the constitution.101   
From 22 April to 8 June 2006, the new constitutionally elected Iraqi government 
was inaugurated, with President Jalal Talabani and a cabinet led by Prime Minister 
Nouri Kamel Al Malaki, a move welcomed by the President of the UNSC as achieving 
a significant benchmark in the political process.102  However, in August 2007, Iraq’s 
main Sunni Arab political party, the Iraqi Accordance Front, withdrew from the 
cabinet following a disagreement about power-sharing.  In response, the Kurdish and 
Shi’ah leaders attempted to form an alliance in support of the government, but were 
unable to bring back the Sunni leaders until the following year.103  Following a split in 
the Shi’ah United Alliance, which had won the 2005 elections, the Prime Minister Al 
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Maliki formed the State of Law, an alliance of 40 political parties.  Then in 2010, after 
a controversy over the banning of candidates with suspected links to the former 
Ba’ath party from participating in parliamentary elections, the ban was overturned in 
court.  However, the elections of March 2010 resulted in a parliament with no 
majority party, and in August of that year, the two main political blocs suspended 
further talks on the formation of the government, thereby resulting in a 
stalemate.104 
Through these architectures that enabled the exclusion of particular sectarian 
groups, Iraq had emerged as the site of competition for sovereign rule, rife with 
political tensions, and producing sectarian aspirations for control of the state-
building process.  Although opinion polls showed that the majority of Iraqis desired a 
strong centralised authority in the state, the institutionalisation of sectarianism, the 
fragmentation of power, the externalisation of the state from civil society, and the 
state’s dependence upon foreign actors for its authority105 resulted in a proliferation 
of claims upon Iraqi sovereignty.   
 
C. States of emergency 
 
The states of emergency that led to the lifting of legal protections, ambiguities 
in the application of the law, and increasing militarisation of Iraq in response to the 
rise of the insurgency were further politico-legal technologies that enabled new 
expressions and iterations of sovereignty and exceptionalism in Iraq.  In the face of 
increasing sectarianism and political fragmentation, a predominantly Sunni Arab 
insurgency emerged,106 pitting their bids for sovereign power against the assertions 
of the Coalition Forces’ control over the political process and the claims of certain 
Shi’ah and Kurdish parties to the authority of the state.  As the police chief of Basra 
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aptly noted in 2007, “Each party believes that it represents the law, and each 
element thinks of himself as a state hero.”107   
Perceiving the government as primarily Shi’ah in composition, the Sunni Arabs 
believed that without US backing, it would collapse.108  The insurgent groups were 
largely nationalist Islamists, all arguing the legitimacy of their cause against an 
illegitimate occupation and government, although they differed in some ways 
ideologically and in the scope of their goals.  They included groups variously 
comprised of former Ba’athist officials and officers of the previous Iraqi Army, 
nationalist Islamist organisations, Iraqi Salafists, Iraqi tribes, and transnational Salafi 
jihadists.109  The primary groups included al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the Islam Front 
of the Iraqi Resistance, the Islamic Army of Iraq, the Partisans of the Sunna Army, 
and nine other smaller militias.110   
Coming from a political culture defined by authoritarian rule and the 
suppression of dissent,111 and very experienced in negotiating the world of sovereign 
exceptionalism and its “topographies of cruelty”,112 many insurgent groups 
appropriated these tactics in their competition for control of statecraft, and saw 
themselves as what Patel and McMichael characterised in other contexts as “sinned 
against and unsinning, demonizing […] the imperial apparatuses of control without 
implicating themselves in its functioning”.113  They engaged in attacks against the 
occupying forces, soon widening their scope to target persons perceived to be 
working in cooperation with the occupiers or the US-backed political process,114 
including international aid and UN agencies, foreign contractors,115 intellectuals,116 
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medical professionals,117 journalists,118 lawyers and judges,119 athletes,120 artists and 
singers,121 police, politicians, and government officials.122   
The rise of the insurgency signalled the prospect of prolonged military 
occupation in the country,123 involving violent counter-insurgency operations, 
increasing militarisation of the country, and derogations from human rights law 
under the auspices of emergency.  On 16 October 2003, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1511 to establish a US-led Multi-National Force in Iraq to help 
“restore peace and stability to a sovereign and independent Iraq”.124  The following 
month, the US military escalated its use of force against insurgents by launching 
Operation Iron Hammer in Baghdad and Operation Ivy Cyclone II in Tikrit, Ba’qubah, 
Kirkuk, and Baghdad,125 and then in 2004, attacking the Mahdi Army (Sadr’s Shi’ah 
militia opposed to the US occupation in Iraq)126 and Fallujah.127   
By referring to the insurgents as “terrorists”,128 the Coalition Forces constructed 
distinctions between authentic and enemy assertions of sovereignty.129  They 
excluded those marked as terrorist from any positive legal status,130 and subjected 
them to unmitigated violence.  Iraqi state sovereignty was functionally “suspended” 
in enemy-controlled areas of Iraq until the Coalition Forces/MNF could bring these 
territories back under state control,131 exemplified by one US Army Colonel when he 
stated that “we still own the people of Samarra”.132  However, given the high levels 
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of civilian casualties that resulted, the violence in the end destroyed many of those it 
was ostensibly intended to protect.   
In Fallujah, for example, insurgents were dehumanised in the project of 
legitimating the use of violence without sanction.  After US forces killed 20 and 
wounded 86 anti-US demonstrators on 23 and 30 April 2003 in Falluja, a move 
characterised by Human Rights Watch as a “disproportionate use of force”,133 
insurgents killed and dismembered four US private security employees from 
Blackwater.  The Deputy Director for Coalition Operations in Iraq, Mark Kimmett, 
stated that the Coalition would take “overwhelming” action to pacify Falluja [...]”.134  
Political dissent in Fallujah was portrayed as terrorist, fanatic, extremist, and 
intended to prevent the democratisation of Iraq.135  Justifying violent counter-
insurgency strategies in Fallujah, the US Army Colonel Horvath stated, “The Nazi’s 
Gestapo and Eastern European communists were best at this.  Without becoming 
tainted or infected by their methods and attitudes, we have picked up some of their 
systems and processes.”136   
The first Fallujah operation resulted in hundreds of people being forcibly 
displaced,137 and over 600 killed within days, a death toll that the US-allied IGC even 
deemed both “illegal and totally unacceptable” and a form of “collective 
punishment”.138  The civilians and combatants were indiscriminately targeted on the 
assumption that by virtue of their position and existence, they were terroristic.  The 
organisation Iraq Body Count estimated that of the 800 reported deaths following 
this operation, 572 were civilians, including 308 women and children.139  After the 
second operation in November, nearly 203,000 people were displaced – 80 percent 
of the city’s population140 – and 1,200 were killed.141  Many Iraqi security forces 
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deserted their posts in protest or in a desire to fight on the side of the insurgency, 
decreasing the size of the forces by up to 80 percent and decreasing the police force 
by 99 percent in various parts of the region.142   
In the absence of reliable security forces, in 2004 the US turned to localised 
militias for support in its counter-insurgency efforts.  Neither fully controlled by the 
Iraqi government nor by the Coalition Forces, these brigades were comprised of the 
personal forces of tribal or sectarian sheikhs and government ministers and included 
the Wolf Brigade by the military leader of SCIRI, Abu Walid, ‘Allawi’s Muthana 
Brigade, Husayn al-Sadr’s Defenders of Khadhamiyya, Shaykh ‘Ali Sha’lan’s Second 
Defenders of Baghdad Brigade, the Iraq Freedom Guard, and the Freedom Fighters.  
The truce that was concluded between the US forces and insurgents in Falluja in May 
2004 also established a Falluja Brigade to control the city, ironically comprised 
mostly of former insurgents, resulting effectively in the US’ recognition of the militia.  
Such brigades worked with the Coalition Forces in alliances of convenience, which 
Herring and Rangwala observed further institutionalised the fragmentation of the 
state through the fragmentation of the use of force.143  However, when the US and 
Iraqi security forces attacked Falluja again in November 2004, most of the insurgents 
simply dispersed to other cities.144  Thus, when the state lost its monopoly on 
violence, it attempted to reconstitute itself through military interventions that 
employed the use of proxy forces, revealing the ambiguities in the meaning of 
resistance.145 
Having little legitimacy amongst Iraqis who viewed the US occupation as the 
proximate cause of most killings in these insurgency and counter-insurgency 
operations,146 the Coalition Forces/MNF and the Iraqi state engaged with the 
population in increasingly coercive and militarised terms.  They promoted the use of 
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force through a surge of troops in 2007,147 the proliferation of private security firms, 
and the strengthening of Iraqi security forces148 at an “accelerated pace”.149  Such 
measures, similar to the rhetoric of preparing Iraq for self-government, were 
couched in the language of increasing the capacity of the Iraqi military to maintain 
security and stability without the assistance of the MNF.150   
The growing militarisation of Iraq was institutionalised by the establishment of 
the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, and Ministerial Committee on National 
Security.151  It was also reflected in the division created between the civilian CPA, 
staffed by less than 1,200 personnel,152 and the military CJTF-7, having over 150,000 
personnel.  In this sense, Herring and Rangwala observed that the US military came 
to control post-war reconstruction and governed Iraq more in accordance with 
principles of fighting the war on terror than with those of administering and 
developing civil society.  The US focused on increased training of the Iraqi security 
forces to counter the insurgency at the expense of its investment in the 
development of Iraq’s civil infrastructure.  Thirty-three percent of the Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund was allocated to security, law enforcement, and prisons – more 
than any other sector of reconstruction.153  Ironically, by 2008, there were over 
580,000 personnel in the Iraqi Security Forces alone,154 1.3 times the size of the 
military under Saddam Hussein.155   
The US and the British forces, often in conjunction with Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) and paramilitaries, employed violent tactics against perceived insurgents with a 
high level of impunity,156 as policing came to represent the convergence of the 
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violence that makes law and the violence that preserves it.157  The CPA set up the 
Central Criminal Court of Iraq to prosecute cases related to terrorism,158 but there 
were reports of defendants detained without due process and tortured,159 practices 
which continued despite Iraq’s ratification of the Convention Against Torture in 
2008,160 and the establishment of the Independent High Commission for Human 
Rights in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution (Article 102),161 which was ratified 
on 14 January 2009.162 
On 6 July 2004, the IIG passed the Order for Safeguarding National Security, a 
state of emergency law containing some provisions for safeguarding citizens.163  
However, despite declarations of states of emergency,164 most arrests were made 
under the auspices of the MNF and therefore were not constrained by such 
legislation.165  Hence, many Iraqis were detained by the MNF and ISF without due 
process of law in Iraqi courts.166  Their detentions did not fall within the ambit of 
state penal law, but were carried out under an ambiguous form of martial law, in 
which pre-emptive arrests and detentions suggested an operation of pure force in a 
space where law’s application was almost completely withdrawn.167  There were 
further reports of operations conducted by the MNF/ISF resulting in mass arrests, 
killings, excesses of violence, torture, and extra-judicial executions,168 one of the 
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most public being the spectacle of torture by US military forces at the Abu Ghraib 
prison.169    
Private actors were increasingly enlisted to carry out acts traditionally within the 
purview of the state.  In its efforts to promote privatisation, the Bush administration 
contracted out the authority to exercise violence to private firms such as the 
Blackwater security firm that killed seventeen civilians in September 2007.170  The US 
declared these firms immune from prosecution in Iraq and subject only to the laws 
of their countries of citizenship.171  It was therefore unsurprising that when US 
combat troops withdrew from Iraq in August 2010, they left behind numerous 
private security firms in their stead, increasing number of these private forces from 
2,700 to nearly 7,000.172 
As the MNF, the Iraqi state, and private contractors became increasingly 
predatory upon Iraqi citizens due to the lack of sufficient constraints on their 
actions,173 the transfer of formal sovereignty to the Iraqi government was not 
automatically accompanied by a strengthened application of the rule of law.  Iraqi 
police and military forces continued to commit human rights violations, including 
arbitrary arrests and detentions, denial of access to legal representation, torture, 
and inhumane treatment ,174 even imposing the death penalty in some cases based 
on confessions gained from torture.175  These violations were routinely perpetrated 
in spite of the Iraqi government’s increased efforts to investigate such abuses, 
enshrine human rights principles within its new constitution, and train its security 
forces on international human rights standards,176 and despite its stated 
commitment in May 2006 to release 2,500 detainees.177  
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D. Ethno-sectarian normativity 
 
The CF/MNF’s heavy-handed military responses to the Sunni insurgency and the 
privileging of the Shi’ah-Kurdish alliance in establishing the Iraqi state deepened 
sectarian tensions to the point that violent competition for who would exercise 
sovereign power within Iraq was no longer restricted to fighting the occupation and 
its supporters.  The emergence of new ethno-sectarian norms of identity and 
belonging also functioned as technologies of power that drove competing claims for 
control of the new Iraqi state by different sectarian groups, particularly following the 
bombing of the Shi’ah Al-Askariya shrine in Sammara’ on 22 February 2006 by Sunni 
Arab insurgents.178  Unlike the criminal gangs that emerged as chaotic or anarchic 
responses to political instability, these parties fought to assert their political 
authority and to promote their respective political visions of a new Iraq along 
sectarian lines.  They enacted a project to instate territorially circumscribed national 
identities179 through the extermination and forced displacement of Iraqis perceived 
as threats to these ideological agendas.  Such attempts to control the state 
formation process not only enacted decisions on the exception, but also fragmented 
sovereign power in Iraq. 
Who were the parties engaged in the violent competition for sovereign power in 
Iraq?  The Sunni insurgency was by this time divided by infighting, and amongst the 
Shi’ah were divisions between the poor (al-Sadr’s movement) and middle-class 
(Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and al-Dawa Party).180  Sectarian violence was 
exacerbated by the control of many local police and security forces by Shi’ah 
sectarian groups, primarily the Badr organization and Al Mahdi Army,181 which 
targeted Sunnis perceived to be supporting the insurgency with arbitrary arrests and 
unlawful detentions, torture and ill-treatment, and extra-judicial executions.182   
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Violence also broke out amongst the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen in 2006, in a bid 
for control over the traditionally mixed areas of the Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, and 
Diyala Governorates, which were previous targets of Saddam Hussein’s “Arabisation” 
policies, and now came under the de facto control of Kurdish parties after the fall of 
the former regime.183  Kurdish parties were accused of trying to promote Kurdish 
settlement in these villages in anticipation of a referendum which would decide the 
final status of Kirkuk.184  Many Arabs living in Mosul and Kirkuk were subjected to 
threats, harassment, discrimination, and arbitrary detention;185 they often fled or 
were forcibly returned to central and southern Iraq by the Kurdish authorities or the 
Peshmerga.186    
In addition, members of ethnic and religious minorities were also systematically 
categorised and targeted in southern and central Iraq by both Islamist movements 
and militias such as the Badr Organization, Ansar al-Sunna, and Al Mahdi Army.  
Christians, comprising eight to twelve percent of the Iraqi population, were 
subjected to discrimination, harassment, violence, murder, kidnappings, 
intimidation, threats, forced taxation for being non-Muslims, and destruction of their 
property.  Churches were bombed; Christian-owned liquor shops were forcibly shut 
down; women were compelled to wear the veil; and some were forced to convert to 
Islam.  This violence was often due to the perception that Christians supported and 
assisted the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, although some were also 
targeted with kidnapping for ransom based on their perceived wealth.187  Sabean 
Mandaeans, a religious group following John the Baptist and viewed as heretics, 
were subjected to extreme forms of violence,188 increasing in 2007 and 2008,189 as 
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their families were often attacked multiple times with kidnapping and ransoms to 
fund insurgent and militia groups.190  Several fatwas, or religious edicts, were issued 
by the Sunni teacher al-Saied al-Tabtabee al-Hakeem and the Information 
Foundation of Al-Sadr Office against Sabeans, calling them “impure” and calling upon 
Muslims to “lead” them to Islam.191  Yazidis, numbering half a million, were another 
significant religious minority not considered “people of the Book” and targeted with 
violence.192  In one attack, 500 Yazidis were killed – one of the highest death tolls in 
Iraq since 2003.193  Following the rise of Islamist and anti-occupation militias, many 
Jews also fled the country, and only around 10 remained in 2008.194  Turkmen and 
Kurds were similarly targeted for their perceived political alliances with the West.195   
In addition, any person not conforming to strict social mores and Islamic 
traditions came under threat of attack by Islamist militia groups.196  Women faced 
severe restrictions in their freedom of movement and access to education, 
employment, and healthcare, and were punished for perceived transgressions or the 
commission of “honour crimes” with kidnapping, rape, forced prostitution, 
trafficking, beating, torture, decapitation, and murder at the hands of both militias 
and sometimes members of their own families.197  Women who were heads of their 
households were at greater risk, having no male family members to protect them.198  
Men and women seen mingling in public places, wearing Western clothing and 
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hairstyles, working in the sex trade, selling “un-Islamic” items such as CDs and 
videos, or perceived as sexual minorities,199 were also targeted with violence.200 
In the context of this violence, the terrain on which these wars for sovereign 
authority were waged became a wasteland of human death and environmental 
decay.  Rates of criminality escalated, leading many to fear the emergence of a full-
scale civil war.201  These fears were reinforced by the lack of a functioning judicial or 
police system, resulting in impunity for crimes committed.202  As of April 2005, nearly 
6,000 civilians were killed and at least 5,000 kidnapped by insurgent groups and 
criminal gangs,203 and in 2006 the rate of violence increased by 51 percent over the 
course of three months,204 with an estimated 5,000 deaths per month.205  People 
were hired to search dumps, river banks, and morgues for the bodies of missing 
family members.206  Ninety percent of persons who died violent deaths were men, 
leaving high numbers of widows and orphans vulnerable to further violence and 
exploitation.207  By 2006, nearly 100 civilians were killed each day, and medical 
facilities struggled to cope with the influx of bodies and the lack of capacity in their 
morgues.208  In 2006, the John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health estimated 
that approximately 655,000 Iraqis had died due to consequences of the US-led 
invasion of the country, deaths referred to as “excess deaths”.209  By 2011, Iraq Body 
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Count calculated that 114,212 civilians had been directly killed since the inception of 
the conflict.210   
The consequences of this violence were further evident in the rates of forced 
displacement both within Iraq and to neighbouring countries.211  Twenty-eight 
percent of internally displaced persons in Iraq were women, many of whom became 
increasingly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence, and 48 percent were 
children, who risked recruitment into militias as child soldiers.212  The internally 
displaced faced increasing problems of food security as they were prevented access 
to the Public Distribution System for rationing unless they returned to their home 
communities to register,213 despite that they fled these communities on fear of 
death.  Those who were displaced sought shelter with relatives in other areas of the 
country, lived in makeshift accommodations, abandoned buildings, and tents,214 or 
went to the Kurdish Northern Governorates.  However, those who did not originate 
from the Kurdistan region or did not have family links there, were often denied entry 
to the Governorates; and even when able to cross the border, they faced challenges 
to achieving physical protection, housing, employment, or legal residency,215 a 
practice replicated in Governorates outside of Kurdistan, as well, violating the right 
to freedom of movement for persons escaping violence.216   
Sectarian violence was spatially realised in territorial fragmentation and the 
seclusion of communities.217  The sectarian ordering of new territories of control was 
evident in the following map prepared by the US military in 2006, demarcating those 
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areas of Baghdad whose ethno-sectarian composition was shifting or “turning” as a 
result of the violence:218 
 
 
Source: US Military (2006). ‘US military’s classification of Baghdad’s ethno-sectarian divide’ 
available at: http://images.thetimes.co.uk/TGD/picture/0,,374645,00.jpg 
 
This displacement was compounded by previous displacements resulting from 
Saddam Hussein’s violent campaigns.219  Although 325,000 dissident Iraqis had 
initially returned to Iraq between 2003 and 2005, the subsequent increasing violence 
led nearly 2 million to flee the country by 2007.220  Nearly 4 million Iraqis remained 
displaced as of 2007,221 including 1.9 million internally displaced and 45,000 non-
Iraqi refugees.  This number increased as 40,000-50,000 Iraqis fled their homes each 
month222 – meaning that one in six Iraqis remained displaced.  In countries in 
Europe, North America, and Asia, Iraqis constituted the largest group of asylum-
seekers, and their asylum applications increased from 12,500 in 2005 to 22,000 in 
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2006.223  Because these human rights violations were related to the grounds of the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and were occurring in the 
southern and central parts of Iraq,224 UNHCR advised UN Member States that Iraqi 
asylum-seekers from these areas should be considered prima facie refugees.225  This 
displacement became protracted as Iraqis were reluctant to return to environments 
rife with political and criminal violence, lack of employment opportunities, escalating 
inflation, and inadequate basic services.226 
Nowhere did statistics, a key biopolitical technology for the writing and 
quantification of life,227 demonstrate so persuasively its evolution into a tool for 
measuring death.  As physical violence destroyed the social fabric of community, 
dignity, hope, and normalcy,228 Iraqis became abject “others”, driven from the 
territories on which they made their homes, and subjected to unrelenting violence 
without recourse to protection or remedies of the law. 
 
E. The politicisation and prioritisation of humanitarian aid 
 
In the wake of the escalating violence wrought by battles with insurgents and 
between sectarian groups, and the forced displacement of 4 million Iraqis, a 
humanitarian crisis emerged on an unprecedented scale.  The provision of 
humanitarian aid was a key means of governing displaced Iraqis, but even this was 
severely limited in scope due to the ongoing violence.  Having no access to 
sustainable legal protection, Iraqis became increasingly reliant on survival aid, and 
the pragmatic primacy of humanitarian aid over human rights projects functioned as 
                                                                 
223
 Ibid., p. 5; Riera, J. & Harper, A. (supra note 212), p. 10. 
224
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 
UNTS 137 (“1951 Convention”). 
225
 UNHCR (supra note 71), p. 3; UNHCR (2007, December) Addendum to UNHCR’s eligibility guidelines for 
assessing the international protection needs of Iraqi asylum-seekers, p. 7; UNHCR (supra note 65), p. 5. 
226
 UNHCR (supra note 65), p. 4. 
227
 Seremetakis, C.N. (1996). In search of the barbarians: Borders in pain. American Anthropologist 98(3), 489-
491, p. 490. 
228
 Bornstein, A. (supra note 62), p. 15. 
Chapter 2. “I am Iraq”                                                                                                                              
 
 
99 
 
a technology of power to reproduce displaced Iraqis in their bare lives, struggling to 
survive, while remaining excluded from political protection. 
Initially, donor countries were reluctant to contribute to humanitarian activities 
in Iraq, as doing so would constitute a public acknowledgement of the failures of the 
reconstruction and nation-building projects, which they had already heavily 
funded.229  John Bolton, who served as Ambassador of the US to the UN, went so far 
as to state that there was no relationship between the Iraqi refugees and the US 
invasion and occupation and that the US had no obligation to compensate them for 
the “hardships of war”.230  However, in April 2007, UNHCR hosted an international 
conference to raise funding for this crisis, eliciting the commitment of funds from 
both Iraq and all of the delegations present in light of their obligations of “burden 
sharing” to promote the protection of internally displaced persons and refugees in 
accordance with principles of international refugee and human rights law,231 a 
principle later reaffirmed by the European Parliament.232  The humanitarian 
assistance programs that followed faced multiple challenges, including perceptions 
of their compromised neutrality and the politicisation of aid, security environments 
that limited delivery of critical assistance, and the challenge of providing legal 
protection in an extra-legal space.   
Perceptions of compromised neutrality, combined with insecurity and attacks 
against aid workers, severely hampered the ability of organisations to distribute aid.  
Although the US armed forces initially led the relief and reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq, many humanitarian aid agencies complained that this was affecting perceptions 
of their neutrality,233 posing increased risks to aid workers who were seen as 
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collaborators and supporters of the occupation,234 as they were subjected to 
multiple attacks.235  With the exception of the UN until 2009,236 they therefore began 
to avoid reliance on the MNF for security as a result.237  Some sectarian groups 
within Iraq capitalised upon these obstacles by providing for social welfare needs 
themselves, thus further politicising humanitarian space within the state.238  Also, 
many political, religious, and military actors, including private companies and armed 
militias, cloaked their activities in the language of humanitarianism, blurring the line 
between military and civilian actors and compromising the perceived neutrality of 
humanitarian organisations.239  As a result, a number of Iraqis, including some 
humanitarian aid workers, found it difficult to distinguish between them.240   
After the 2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, most agencies 
decided to move their international staff out of Iraq for security reasons.241  
Therefore, most humanitarian assistance operations were actually carried out by 
local Iraqi partnering agencies and were remotely managed.242  Expatriate staff 
members were sent to neighbouring countries, while local Iraqi staff members 
remained in the country to assume the risks of providing services.  Risk assessments 
and remote management meant that humanitarian institutions relied upon those 
already relegated to bare life in Iraq to implement their activities, placing local lives 
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at risk in the project of implementing the mandates and ensuring the continuity of 
these institutions, and demonstrating the respective values placed on local lives.243   
These highly politicised yet rightless spaces, in which the state of exception had 
become the norm, foreclosed the possibility of ensuring sustained law-based 
protection of rights, leaving only room for delivering emergency survival aid at best 
to the internally displaced Iraqis.  Although UNHCR envisioned engaging in 
protection activities for IDPs within Iraq, returnee monitoring, and reintegration 
activities, in 2004 it stated that it was unlikely to be able to carry out these activities 
in light of the precarious security situation,244 and noted that the humanitarian space 
within Iraq has narrowed to the point of placing the population in jeopardy as aid 
waned.245   
UNHCR therefore prioritised humanitarian assistance for IDPs, including basic 
assistance, emergency shelter, rehabilitation of homes, and improvements to 
infrastructure and community services.  But it also continued trying to engage in 
protection activities by monitoring the IDP situation, providing targeted protection 
interventions, expanding the capacity of local legal assistance centres, monitoring 
protection, and advocating for improved access to justice and essential services.246 
All of these activities were included in the anticipated Strategic Framework for 
Humanitarian Action in Iraq developed by the UN and its partners.247  However, 
UNHCR stated that providing such protection assistance would only improve the 
protection of Iraqi IDPs if the Iraqi authorities were able simultaneously to promote 
respect for human rights and humanitarian law, reduce the imperatives to flee, 
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provide access to humanitarian assistance, ensure non-discrimination in access to 
public services, and recognise the right of refugees to return.248   
Given the deteriorating security situation and the fragmented and sectarian 
control of the public sector, equal access to basic services and the guarantees of 
protection could hardly be realised, particularly prior to the surge in 2007 and the 
subsequent decrease in violent attacks.  Therefore, by 2007, the legal aid centres 
established by UNHCR in Iraq to assist Iraqis with legal protection matters (including 
obtaining legal documentation necessary for accessing social services, food rations, 
health care, and accommodation) had increasingly become tasked with providing 
humanitarian aid in the way of emergency food and shelter as violence became a 
daily fact of Iraqis’ lives.249 
What were the effects of these technologies of power, as they resulted in the 
proliferation of the exercise of sovereign decisionism across the spaces of Iraqi 
territory and bodies?  By the end of 2007, a US “surge” of additional troops to 
counter the insurgency and growing sectarian violence was claimed a victory by the 
Bush administration, as the levels of violence and civilian deaths began to 
decrease,250 despite that they remained in the view of the UNSC Secretary-General 
“unacceptably high”.251  Sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi’ah insurgents also 
began to wane.  
However, the reality of this victory was illusory given that other factors 
simultaneously and more effectively lessened the violence.  First, the 
neighbourhoods most targeted by sectarian violence had by then been almost fully 
“cleansed” by militias,252 and their once ethnically and religiously mixed composition 
had become homogenous,253 thereby reducing the levels of violence,254 
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reconfiguring space in Iraq along sectarian lines.255   And sectarian violence did 
continue in the remaining religiously mixed neighbourhoods of Baghdad,256 Diyala,257 
Babel, and Wassit.258   Second, in August 2007, Al-Sadr demobilised his militia and 
eliminated many of its “rogue” elements who were involved in the violence.259  
Third, the tribal Awakening Councils created in Anbar, comprised largely of Sunni 
Arab militias who had by then turned against Al Qaeda Iraq and were supported and 
trained by the US,260 were effective in organising against extremists, becoming 
another armed force outside the control of the Iraqi state.261  These intra-communal 
divisions within the Sunnis made possible their increased integration into the state 
apparatus,262 although attacks against the state still continued long after the 
withdrawal of the majority of the US and UK forces from Iraq.263   
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III. Exegesis: Reflections on sovereignty in the Iraq war 
 
The technologies of power that functioned as decisions on the exception and 
produced the spaces of the Iraqi IDP and refugee crisis included justifications for the 
use of force, the installation of neoliberal democracy, militarisation in states of 
emergency, ethno-sectarian normativity, and the politicisation of humanitarian aid.  
What were the implications of these technologies of power for the spatialisation and 
configuration of the logic of sovereignty in Iraq?  What did they reveal about the 
connections between law, life, and violence in the formation of the new Iraqi state?  
This exegesis considers how these technologies both reified and challenged 
configurations of sovereignty in the international order, the state of Iraq, and the 
human body as the sites of sovereignty’s materialisation. 
 
A. Expanding sovereign reach within the international state system 
 
The normative discourses, legal justifications for the use of force, and 
installation of neoliberal governance by the US-led Coalition Forces were all 
technologies of power employed by the US in its attempt to assert its sovereign 
authority and Great Power positionality at a global level.264  They recalled earlier 
discourses of imperialism in their assertions of such sovereign power.  Several 
scholars noted how the rhetoric demarcating Iraq as a “rogue” state and positioning 
it on an “axis of evil” indicated a retreat to an earlier state system dominated by 
discourses of “civilization” and “barbarism”265 – “the (relative) prosperity and peace 
of the ‘civilized’ West […] brought by exporting ruthless violence and destruction to 
this ‘barbarian’ Outside”.266  Žižek commented that the resurgence of the Cold War 
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term “free world” following the 9/11 attacks, which opposed “forces of darkness and 
terror”, recalled the division between Western liberal democracies and all other 
forms of government.267   
In a related vein, Simpson noted the emergence of legal norms that marked Iraq 
not only as a delinquent state in its failure to comply with international law, but also 
as no longer worthy of enjoying the full rights and benefits associated with its 
international legal personality.268  He pointed to the continuity between the early 
Eurocentric system of “civilised states”, which trained other states in the ways of 
civilisation towards the goal of eventual independence, and those “Great Power” 
states at the core of the UN system, which attempted to domesticate “outlaw” 
states into conforming to the international order and demands for liberal democratic 
governance.269  
Within the discursive regime of the “rogue” and “outlaw” state, the juridical 
recognition and protection of Iraq’s sovereignty was suspended unilaterally by the 
US and its allies in just such a project of protecting the international order, despite 
the UNSC’s initial refusal to recognise the lawfulness of the invasion.  Such 
designations marked the points at which both Iraq’s territory and social body existed 
somewhere between uncivilised and civilised, abandoned and protected.  Great 
Power states limited Iraq’s rights of sovereignty associated with its legal personality 
and rendered bare the lives of the Iraqi population before the violence of an 
extended sovereign power.   
Throughout its history, Iraq had been repeatedly positioned in such states of 
normalised inequality within the international state system, from its inception as 
British Mandate to the more recent sanctions and the first Gulf War.  This continued 
in the second Gulf War, despite that the justifications espoused by the US and the 
UK and the legality of the invasion were treated to heavy debate.270  From the 
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perspective of international law governing the relations between sovereign states, 
the invasion was largely viewed as an illegal war.  However, from the perspective of 
the states who were positioning themselves as the “Great Powers” in the 
international state system, the invasion was framed more as a form of legalised 
exceptionalism.  Such exceptionalism both legitimised and normalised the hierarchy 
within this system. 
The legal arguments employed by state proponents of the invasion were used to 
justify the extension of their sovereign reach and the exception of Iraq from the 
guarantees of the international law on the use of force both in the name of 
emergency and in the interest of protecting global civil society from threats of terror.  
Scholars characterised such arguments as an inversion of legal standards governing 
the use of force and as the “exception now becoming the norm, the norm becoming 
the exception”,271 permitting systematic breaches of universal human rights in an 
amoral space,272 and masking the rogue state that the US itself had become.273  
Despite the legal arguments employed to justify the invasion, punishment within the 
confines of international law in the international state system had evolved into 
banishment by a small coalition of sovereigns using justifications of both law and 
emergency to lift the legal guarantees accorded to Iraq as a sovereign state within 
the international state system altogether.   
The neoconservative ideology of ensuring US hegemony through exporting 
liberal democracy in the Middle East was constructed and justified in biopolitical 
terms.  It located sovereign power in the life of populations and argued that the 
security of populations in Iraq and the US and its allies would be maximised as a 
result of these interventions.  Designating the Iraqi people as not fully politically 
qualified humans since they did not exist as democratic subjects, and the Iraqi state 
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as not fully qualified as a legal personality due to its authoritarian regime, the US and 
its allies found justification to assert their sovereign reach beyond their borders and 
for Iraq’s sovereign boundaries to be compromised.   
A new form of “legalised hegemony” was revealed in these justifications,274 
whose rationalities reflected previous incarnations of colonialism.275  Similar to 
racism in the colonies, the social rationality underpinning this imperial project 
regulated how protecting life and putting to death were distributed and made 
acceptable.276  It determined who would be allowed to benefit from the occupiers’ 
goals.277  This rationality was manifested in the designation of whole sectors of Iraqi 
society as inferior political subjects.  Based on claims of the political immaturity of 
the Iraqi state,278 biopower, the state of exception, and the state of siege279 or 
occupation became inextricably linked.  
The life of the Iraqi people in effect was treated as a form of only partially 
qualified animal life, the killing of whom through sanctions, invasion, and counter-
insurgency was rarely recognised by states as murder.280  Constructed as a state not 
organised in forms corresponding to the democratic civilised human world, Iraq was 
perceived as a threat to the coherence of the state system, enabling the creation of a 
space in which the protection and guarantees of the legal order could be suspended.  
Violence was allowed to operate in the service of “liberating” the other, reminiscent 
of previous projects of “civilisation”.281  Towards this end, the power to engage in 
warfare exceeded limitations imposed by the laws on the use of force, and the 
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occupation and resulting insurgency led to an increasing militarisation and violent 
targeting of Iraqi society.  
Following the invasion, once Iraqis began to undergo the process of ostensible 
democratisation through the election of governments and the creation of state 
institutions, they were partially lifted from this animal existence.  The exercise of 
violence without sanction in the initial invasion and destabilisation of the Iraqi state 
(constituting violence282) then became legally constrained through the installation of 
some vision of the rule of law (law-maintaining or constituted violence).  But, as 
Agamben noted, these two forms of violence are hardly distinct, and it is often 
difficult to establish the point at which the violence that constitutes the state 
becomes the legalised violence that maintains the state.283  This is particularly so, 
given that law-maintaining violence includes within itself its own exception, a form 
of constituting violence.284  The sovereign in this sense is he who occupies this point 
of indistinction between constituting and constituted violence.285  In the events 
following the invasion, these two forms of violence passed into one another, often 
becoming indistinguishable. Iraqis remained subject to violent incursions by the 
Coalition Forces, the Iraqi state, and non-state actors who were vying for control of 
the state formation process.   
Therefore, the bodies-becoming-politically-qualified humans of Iraqi society 
undergoing the process of democratisation and neoliberal governance, but not fully 
arrived, were neither wholly protected nor wholly excluded by law.  Under the goal 
of establishing eventual self-rule, Iraqi civil society existed in the zone where law’s 
outside and inside merged, a zone also spatially expressed by both the designation 
of Iraq as an outlaw state and the UNSC’s stated goal of its eventual re-inclusion (a 
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territory-becoming-state with the full rights associated with its legal personality) in 
the ambit of international recognition.  This blurring of the inside and outside in the 
formation of the new Iraqi state finds parallels to Agamben’s conceptualisation of 
the normalised state of exception in which law and its outside become 
indistinguishable.286  In such a zone of indistinction, it became possible to 
simultaneously envision Iraq as eventually promoting nationalism and participatory 
politics and to use authoritarian and violent forms of social control to realise these 
aims.287 
The categorical designations of states and bodies as outlaws, terrorists,288 or 
undemocratic, requiring domestication within the international state system, 
therefore not only served as justifications for the Coalition Forces’ overreaching or 
extension of sovereignty in their decision to invade and occupy Iraq.  They might also 
be characterised as technologies that facilitated decisions on the exception in the 
process of normalising the position of the Great Power states within the 
international state system.  The relegation of citizens to bare life by their sovereign 
state was extended to whole state populations.  Outlaw states could now also be 
relegated to spaces of exception, and the scope of the rights associated with their 
legal personalities truncated or altogether removed before the extended reach of 
Great Power states’ combined sovereign powers. 
Such normative trends legitimising a legalised hegemony occupied an uneasy 
place within the international legal order, however.  Although not formally or 
expressly recognised in international law, they may have exemplified how the law 
attempted to encompass the exception within itself.  Agamben pointed to the 
encompassing nature of law when it encounters human beings reduced to bare life 
in a state of emergency.  Law attempts to embed spaces of exception or lawlessness 
within itself, often through rules of derogation (or as might be argued in the case of 
Iraq, through new norms legalising hierarchical orders).  He theorised that the state 
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of exception is actually a legal fiction used by the law to create those conditions of 
normalcy which it requires for its own validity.  The sovereign creates the exception 
to produce the normal situation required for its legitimate exercise of power and the 
recognition of its law.  Therefore, the law both creates and legalises its own 
suspension, producing a zone of indifference in which the Hobbesian state of nature 
on the outside of law appears in its interior as a state of exception.289  Being neither 
fully internal nor external to the juridical order, the state of exception thus 
constitutes a zone of indifference in which the outside and inside merge and blur 
with one another.  It is here that human beings remain abandoned by law’s 
protection, yet subject to its power – the “force of law”.290   
The Coalition Forces in this respect then may have used the law to embed the 
exception within itself, legitimating their exceptional use of force against Iraq and its 
people through legal justifications and new norms of belonging and global 
citizenship.  The conditions of exceptionality created by these new norms might also 
be considered the legal fictions necessary for the select few states who dominated 
the hierarchical order of the international state system to define their position 
within the hierarchy as the norm so that the extended reach of their power beyond 
their borders could be legitimate.   
However, given the increasingly violent consequences of the invasion and 
escalating militarisation, the asserted hierarchy of the international order that the 
exception was intended to define and legitimise emerged as a highly contested 
space.  Those civilians and militias who were relegated to the space of exception that 
Iraq became sought to assert their own norms and authority to define and control 
the state.  Where the norm and the exception were repeatedly questioned, existing 
in a fraught relationship with one another, it became difficult to identify what 
constituted the norm and what was the exception.  Perhaps, then, the use of 
legalised exceptionalism to promote the normativity of extended sovereign authority 
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became the source of its own undoing, as it succeeded more in revealing those 
spaces where the juridical order and the state of exception began to blur to the 
point of indistinction – where the asserted normality of the hierarchical international 
state system was revealed as an ideology and fiction of power. 
 
B. Contesting sites of sovereign power within the state 
 
Internally the sovereign power of the Coalition Forces and the Iraqi government 
was both contested and refracted throughout the state as it was appropriated and 
claimed by parties seeking to control the direction of the state formation process.  
This was realised through the increasing states of emergency and rise of ethno-
sectarian normativity that were critical technologies of power defining the spaces of 
occupied Iraq.  The demarcation of the parties to this contest was hardly clear, 
however, as some militias served as the armed wings of political parties represented 
in the new Iraqi government.  This blurred the line between state and non-state 
actors and revealed both the multiple ways in which sovereignty was performed and 
how warfare was no longer the sole province of states. 
Also, not simply acting illegally, the insurgents threatened to become laws unto 
themselves, commanding the compliance of their constituencies,291 emerging as a 
source of civil society power in a political vacuum,292 and undermining the US and its 
allies’ visions of the new Iraqi state.  They threatened to “overwhelm the law” by 
challenging the very grounds which it required for its foundation and adjudication, 
denying its legitimacy and reach.293  This provided the justification used by the MNF 
and ISF to banish the insurgents from legal protection and increase the use of force 
in quashing their popular power.294  The suspension of law and the use of force and 
banishment were attempts to restore and assert the US vision of political order 
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when it became clear that its law could no longer check the “chaos” threatening its 
grounds, and there was a threat that a new alternative law could be established by 
its opponents.295 
The insurgents abandoned by the law were therefore in no way passive, but 
responded with the production of new and competing norms and identities.  Laclau 
suggested as much in his critique of Agamben’s conception of law for its 
presentation as a unitary and sole force in determining the relationship of 
abandonment and his presentation of sovereignty as “control by an over-powerful 
state”.  Laclau argued that in many instances, the person abandoned by “the law of 
the city” is not necessarily abandoned by “any law” (his emphasis).296  Rather, a 
position of exteriority within the space of exception from the city may provide the 
impetus to those abandoned to form a new collective identity in opposition to the 
law of the city or to the decision that excluded them.  This produces two laws that do 
not recognise each other, rather than one law against lawlessness, and it facilitates 
the continuous “re-negotiating and re-grounding of the social bond within a 
particular social space”.297   
In such contexts, the politicisation of natural life does not automatically imply 
increasing control by an over-powerful state, but is rather the process of human life 
coming under various forms of human regulation.298  DeCaroli similarly asserted that 
individuals who challenge the very grounds of the political order often experience 
banishment from law’s protection precisely because they threaten to impose a new 
law in place of the old.299  Therefore, relegation to bare life in one space of exception 
might give way to the emergence of a new form of qualified life through new forms 
of organisation that emerge in opposition to the political order that originally 
enacted the exception.  
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This conception of multiple laws that do not read one another is critical for 
understanding how sovereignty is not a sole overarching force.  It is rather is a logic 
that is continuously asserted and contested through opposition, competing claims 
for political authority, and repeated attempts to ground the social bond within 
particularly defined territories.  This may account for how the fragmentation of 
political authority in Iraq and the rise of the insurgency led to multiple assertions of 
sovereign power.  However, rather than the possibilities for an emancipatory and 
oppositional politics that both Laclau and DeCaroli envisioned,300 in the case of Iraq, 
these multiple laws arising from multiple assertions of the right to exercise sovereign 
power within the state produced different effects.  They resulted not only in a 
contestation of the existing formal assertions of the sovereignty of the US or the new 
Iraqi government, but also in the multiplication of opportunities to decide upon the 
exception of individuals from their protection, thereby entrenching the logic of 
sovereignty even further.  Iraqi citizens were excluded from law’s protection, not 
only by the extended sovereign authority of the US and its allied states, but also by 
the parties who competed for sovereign control that developed with the rise of the 
insurgency and sectarian violence.  As militias formed their own political and legal 
orders in opposition to those imposed by the US in Iraq, they defined their own 
normative biopolitical parameters of identity and belonging and enacted their own 
decisions on the exception through violence, forced displacement, and 
extermination.   
 
C. The body as a site of territorialisation 
 
The violent contests for sovereign authority in Iraq were waged on the bodies of 
its population, demonstrating how human life became implicated in process of 
territorialisation and the state formation process.301  As the transition to democracy 
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failed to develop in accordance with US predictions, and insurgent militias and 
sectarian groups co-opted the fledgling democratic process to promote their own 
visions of Iraqi statehood and ethno-sectarian normativity, the violence of the logic 
of sovereignty was exposed.  In the face of political opposition to its occupation of 
Iraq, the US rhetoric of maximising the life of citizen bodies through the imposition 
of neoliberal democracy devolved into a focus on strengthening the violent power of 
the new Iraqi state through the eradication of those “anti-democratic” elements 
within it.302  Simultaneously, militias’ visions for who should constitute the new Iraqi 
social body devolved increasingly into violence against those they believed should 
not.  They created “death worlds” in their internecine struggles for sovereign power 
and nationhood through violence against categorically determined others in Iraq.  
The meaning of being human became intertwined with the meaning of the state, and 
concepts of justice began to hinge on the violent suppression of otherness.303   
The biopolitical consequences of the encounter between these expanded and 
fractured bids for sovereign power multiplied as the management of the Iraqi 
population became predicated on violent practices that were appropriated, 
reflected, and reproduced in new forms by insurgent militias, sectarian state actors, 
and the Coalition Forces/MNF in this highly contested political space.  It was thus not 
a far step for Iraq, an exceptional space subjected to violent military invasion and 
occupation with minimal justification, to become a space where violence emerged as 
the key vehicle for political expression and control.304  The biopolitical stakes of the 
insurgency escalated over time as insurgent and counter-insurgency attacks caused 
more deaths after the declaration of the end of the war than occurred during the 
war itself.305  The increasing use of aggressive-defensive violence by the occupying 
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forces against the insurgents was appropriated by them as critical to realising their 
respective visions of law and political ordering.306 
Violence in this respect derived directly from the logic of sovereignty.  Rather 
than the result of criminal gangs and banditry that often arise in the context of 
conflict, this violence was primarily directed to enact decisions on the exception, 
materialising decisions on who would benefit from political or legal recognition and 
protection in accordance with competing visions of state and national identity.  
While enacted in the name of state formation and security, such normalised and 
escalating violence risked becoming an end in itself.   
Foucault pointed to the critical role that violence plays constituting a 
population, producing a citizen body, and asserting its need for protection.  The 
sovereign power over death serves as a counterpart to the power that administers, 
regulates, and optimises life.307   This was revealed in the war on terror, for example, 
where life was reified into a material object that had to be protected from fears of 
danger posed to society by individuals deemed “terrorists” whose deaths were often 
the price of this security.308  He argued that whereas war was once enacted to 
defend the sovereign, it is now increasingly justified as a means of defending the 
biological existence of the population.  Violence is used against threatening bodies to 
defend the collective body’s interests in managing and optimising its life, survival, 
and racial identities.309  Police become politics as the protection of life becomes 
dependent upon violence towards the enemy.310  As Foucault wrote, “The power to 
expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an 
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individual’s continued existence.”311  “For the first time in history […], at once it 
becomes possible both to protect life and to authorise a holocaust.”312   
This possibility of simultaneously protecting life and authorising death also 
marks that point at which the state defines its conditions of exceptionality from the 
law and “enacts the human in biopolitical terms”.313  Along similar lines, Lefebvre 
noted that sovereignty implies a space constituted by violence, as states are born of 
violence, and their power can only endure through violence directed towards a 
particular space.314  The violence that founds the state operates along new lines of 
deployment to ensure the state’s continued existence.315   
However, when violence deployed along these lines is transformed into the 
primary technique for managing a population, the state of exception can begin to 
coincide with the normal order.  At this point of convergence between the exception 
and the normal political order, the dialectic between the violence that posits law and 
the violence that preserves it is broken.  As the sovereign resorts increasingly to 
violence, bare life becomes the primary ordering principle of the state.316 
This phenomenon was revealed in both the counter-insurgency operations and 
the battles between ethno-sectarian groups in Iraq.  Violence was carried out with 
impunity in the name of emergency, becoming not only the key means of managing 
the population, but also an end in itself.  However, the trajectories of this violence 
and the rationalities that undergirded its justification differed.  In the case of the 
counter-insurgency operations, the intent was to eliminate the predominantly Sunni 
insurgency in order to promote a liberal democracy in which Sunni participation 
could be incorporated according to the rule of law.  However, the many setbacks and 
compromises that occurred in these counter-insurgency operations provided the fuel 
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for escalating violence and created spaces of ambiguity.  For example, in the wide 
latitude given to US forces to kill “military-age males” in counter-insurgency 
operations, such as in Operation Triangle at Lake Thar-Thar in 2006,317 the line 
between the combatant and the civilian was blurred, and an anomic space emerged 
in which decisions were enacted on the political values ascribed to life itself.  
In the wake of this increasing militarisation in the state of emergency posed by 
the insurgency and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq, the extended power of 
the MNF operating in concert with the new Iraqi state was expressed in the exercise 
of a power external to the law.  “Peace” became “more likely to take on the face of a 
‘war without end’”,318 and war became increasingly the foundation of the political 
itself.319  In similar contexts, Agamben noted that when security emerges as the key 
criterion of political legitimacy, the state is at risk of being provoked by terror to 
become itself terroristic.  When politics become reduced to the police, the difference 
between the state and the terrorist begins to blur.  A system emerges in which 
security and terrorism became dependent upon one another, providing justification 
for each other’s actions.320  The decision on the exception is not only produced by, 
but also produces the state of emergency,321 and the subject of the state becomes 
both perpetrator and victim.322   
When the US employed heavy-handed violence to counter insurgents in Iraq, 
resulting in thousands of civilian deaths, it subverted its own programme of cracking 
down on terror,323 by itself become terroristic, its biopolitical goals of security 
turning on practices of unmitigated violence.  As Diken and Laustsen noted, this 
dynamic can open the space for tightened controls that foreclose politics and 
dissent.  It can merge the logics of terror and state power and incite new forms of 
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terror and violence.324  Žižek similarly observed that through the suspension of state 
sovereign rights of control in counter-insurgency operations, the Coalition Forces 
avoided the real emergency or “chaos” of politicisation of the citizen body, 
particularly one prone to popular unrest.325  This was nowhere more pronounced in 
Iraq than amongst many of the Sunni population who were marginalised after the 
fall of Saddam Hussein.   
In the case of ethno-sectarian violence, the extermination of categorically 
determined others became part of a different project of state building in accordance 
with assertions of specific national identities.  Violence in this context was 
performative of national identity, and national identity became premised on 
rationalities of extermination.  In this sense, the ethno-sectarian violence was not 
only biopolitical, in which violence was implicated in the protection of the citizenry 
and production of the citizen body.  It was also necropolitical,326 in which the power 
to decide on the state of exception was transformed into the power to decide upon 
the value of life.327   
More than two years after the invasion, faced with an overwhelming expansion 
of sovereign power beyond the state and the institutionalisation of a new political 
order in Iraq, many groups attempted to recover their autonomy and assert their 
authority through violent drives to integrate their definition of population and 
nation.328  They asserted their ethnic and sectarian identities through expulsion and 
extermination of those designated as foreign to the territory or the nation.329  They 
instrumentalised the four million persons forcibly displaced in the state-building 
process as objectives rather than by-products of the conflict – what Helton would 
call “displacement by design”330 – demonstrating how imaginings of nation and state 
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were spatially realised.331  They dialectically constructed their identities through 
“boundary maintenance” against other identities,332 using forced displacement to 
demarcate territories and political communities as the reach of the state was limited 
by the fragmentation of its sovereign power.  They acted as “ethnopolitical 
entrepreneurs”, performing and invoking ethnic and sectarian identities in order to 
mobilise and justify them and to inform and legitimise their politics.333   
Towards such ends, sectarian militias forged new normative orders based upon 
biopolitical categories of the population, such as Shi’ah, Sunnis, Christians, Yazidis, 
Sabeans, and Kurds.334  They made the decision on bare life their primary political 
principle.335  The biopolitical body displaced the political adversary as the threat 
against the political order.336  It emerged as the new political subject and object, the 
site of the sovereign decision by those asserting and competing for sovereign 
control.  It was also the site where fact and law merged, where the production of 
categorical others was both the application and the result of the rule premising 
specific sectarian identities over others.337  It demonstrated the catastrophic 
consequences of attempting to force a particular political identity to coincide fully 
with human life.338  Militias spatially determined these categories through 
immobilisation, elimination, and forcible displacement, and massacre emerged as 
the primary site of bodily and territorial control.339 
Such violence resulted in a system of “overlapping and fragile sovereignties”, in 
which sectarian militias appropriated property owned by the forcibly displaced for 
their own supporters.  They legitimised their newly defined geographical and 
sectarian communities both through their bodily presence on the land and their 
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demonstrated capacity for violence,340 a means of citizens exerting extra-legal 
control over territory.341  This, combined with assertions of humanitarian 
management in spaces of displacement, created a “patchwork of overlapping and 
incomplete rights to rule”.342  They blurred distinctions between combatants and 
civilians, and between state and non-state actors.  Some armed groups were linked 
in different ways to the state, while others were not, but maintained effective 
control over particular territories.  The ongoing threat of collective violence was 
therefore a way of “performing community” – a strategy for promoting their partial 
sovereignty that allowed them to live on the land despite the illegality of their 
occupation.  This reinforced both the psychological and geographical borders of 
territories within Iraq.343 
The devastating consequences of this sectarian violence for the lives of many 
Iraqis were further exacerbated by the shifting meanings and uses of sectarianism.  
Sectarian violence was not an age-old violence between ethnic groups,344 particularly 
as the scope and meaning of sectarian and ethnic groups in Iraq changed 
significantly over time and were used in politically opportunistic ways by its different 
governing regimes.345  Rather, violence was instrumental in producing, crystallising, 
and polarising sectarian identities, and mobilising certain political aspirations.  The 
violence was framed and constituted as sectarian by the perpetrators, victims, 
journalists, politicians, and international organisations.346  It was undergirded by 
political pundits’ earlier calls for the dissolution of Iraq along ethnic and sectarian 
lines.347  The violence was centred on the competition amongst parties for power 
                                                                 
340
 See Stepputat, F. (supra note 265), pp. 340, 345, 355, 357. 
341
 See Landau, L. & Monson, T. (2008). Displacement, estrangement and sovereignty: Reconfiguring state power 
in urban South Africa. Government and Opposition, 43 (2), 315-336, p. 321. 
342
 Mbembe, A. (supra note 112), pp. 30-34. 
343
 See Stepputat, F. (supra note 265), p. 356; Landau, L. & Monson, T. (supra note 341), pp. 322-323. 
344
 See Brubaker, R. (supra note 99), p. 9. 
345
 Tripp, C. (2007). A history of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-7. 
346
 Brubaker, R. (supra note 99), pp. 9-11, 14, 16-17. 
347
 UNSC (supra note 70). 
Chapter 2. “I am Iraq”                                                                                                                              
 
 
121 
 
and resources, often using and manipulating sectarianism and ethnic identity 
towards these ends.348 
In several instances, this violence was presented as the logical outcome of the 
original schism over the succession to the Prophet Mohammed.  Sectarian violence 
was often characterised as the continuation of an age-old conflict between Shi’ah 
and Sunni Muslims.  It was detached from its roots in political manipulation by the 
US, new state actors within Iraq, and the rise of an insurgency by those marginalised 
in the state-building process.  This imagination of sectarian violence was further 
entrenched by statements that it persisted despite government efforts at prioritising 
reconciliation,349 rather than the recognition that it was largely produced by 
opposition politics to foreign occupation and governance projects that marginalised 
certain groups.  This characterisation understated the exigencies, ambiguities, and 
ethically and legally questionable policies that both led to the invasion of Iraq and 
the post-war state-building process.  It functioned to make war more palatable to 
the perpetrators both internally and externally.  In this process, the body remained 
an unquestioned site of territorialisation, accepted as a space upon which historical 
contests for sovereign power have always been waged.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Normative discourses and legal justifications for the war in Iraq, the instillation 
of neoliberal governance, militarisation in a state of emergency, ethno-sectarian 
normativities, and the politicisation of humanitarian aid were all practices of 
sovereign exceptionalism.  They were violently realised and enacted on the bodies of 
the Iraqi population and resulted in one of the largest IDP and refugee crises the 
Middle East has ever known.  Such practices facilitated the spatiotemporal 
manifestations of the states of exception that proliferated within Iraq, as the US and 
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the UK unilaterally designated Iraq as the exception within the global order, and 
insurgent and sectarian militias reproduced the logic of sovereignty in their decisions 
upon life and death in their competition for control of the state.  At the same time, 
these practices also enabled differing contestations of sovereign power.  The 
sovereign power of the US and its allied Great Power states was both asserted 
beyond their borders and challenged by characterisations of their invasion of Iraq as 
illegal.  The insurgent and sectarian militias challenged not only the sovereignty of 
the occupying forces, but also each other’s claims for sovereign power.  
Similar to Iraq’s creation as a state under British tutelage, the events leading to 
the 2003 invasion were intended to preserve the global order through first its outlaw 
status and then its domestication (through military intervention, occupation, and 
neoliberal state-building).  This was envisioned to enable Iraq’s eventual re-inclusion 
in international society, despite the initial rejection of such rationalities and 
justifications as illegal.  However, following the invasion, the US was compelled to 
engage in a long project of state-building and reconstruction, during which its 
expanded sovereign power expressed through occupation encountered a population 
divided by competing claims for authority in the new Iraqi state.  Claims to sovereign 
power therefore were not limited to recognised state authorities, but were refracted 
throughout the population in the emergence of militia groups and the sectarian 
control and manipulation of different government sectors.  Sovereignty, originally 
expressed in the nexus of citizen/state/territory became de-localised, internationally 
expanded and internally fractured, multiplying across geographic territories and 
populations in Iraq.   
These assertions and contestations of sovereignty in Iraq intersected with often 
deadly consequences.  They located and entrenched sovereignty ever more squarely 
within the realm of biopolitics, as the power to except bodies from legal protection 
was multiplied by those actors who struggled for control of the state. The 
justifications for invasion, the physical and structural violence that resulted, the 
sectarianisation of government apportioned according to ethno-sectarian identities, 
Chapter 2. “I am Iraq”                                                                                                                              
 
 
123 
 
and social categorisation and retributive violence were all practices that enabled the 
proliferation of new legal norms and political identities demarcating the new Iraqi 
state on the bodies of its population.  These practices demonstrated how the violent 
underside of biopolitics became central to the assertion of such sovereign identities, 
as escalating violence and necropolitics emerged in a tenuous relationship with the 
biopolitical projects of democratic government.   
Yet, as the logic of sovereignty, located in the power to the decide upon the 
exception, was revealed in the increase use of unconstrained brute force and 
contested and appropriated by insurgents and sectarian militias, the state began to 
lose its grounding in law necessary for its legitimacy.  The normalisation of the 
exception began to undermine both the legitimacy of the MNF and the insurgents’ 
respective assertions of sovereign control and their visions for the Iraqi state.  This 
was evident in the final withdrawal of US combat forces in August 2010 in spite of 
the stalemate that continued between factions of the current Iraqi government and 
the ongoing insurgency that could potentially instigate new incarnations of civil war.   
Therefore, all inhabitants of Iraq became subject to the violence of sovereign 
politics, not only reduced to fighting for survival in spaces unprotected by state law, 
but also asserting new legal norms and political orders to govern these spaces and to 
challenge the decisions that placed them there.  These assertions of political 
authority and rights to sovereign control multiplied the production of spaces of 
exception, as exceptional spaces gave way to normative orders enacting further 
exceptions.  In staking their claims for sovereign authority, private and state actors 
employed increasingly violent measures and rationalities for asserting their visions of 
who would constitute and control the new Iraqi state.  While they did not contest 
the paradigm of sovereignty, they did contest each other’s claims for sovereign 
control.  They undermined and destabilised assertions of sovereignty at the state 
level, but reproduced the logic of sovereignty in their attempts to control the 
direction of the Iraqi state.   
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Hence the state of exception emerged as a dominant paradigm of governance in 
Iraq, turning ever more on the violent underside of biopolitics and producing 
continuous outflows of IDPs and refugees.  As the exception increasingly became the 
norm, the violence that constituted the state began to merge with the violence that 
maintained it, disintegrating the distinctions between life and politics, fact and law.  
The normalcy that law required for its own validity was therefore rendered almost as 
meaningless as it had been under Saddam Hussein.  Sovereignty  was exposed and 
de-naturalised as an organising principle, as it was revealed as contingent and 
processual, de-localised and de-centred, in this highly contested social space. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Humanitarianism and the displacement of sovereignty:  
Iraqi refugee protection in the Middle East 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Fleeing the ravages of the 2003 war in Iraq, the violence of insurgency and 
counter-insurgency operations, and ethno-sectarian “cleansing” campaigns, nearly 
two million Iraqis sought refuge in host states in the Middle East (see Figure 1).1  
Their arrivals in increasing numbers led to growing fears and restrictions imposed by 
these states struggling to accommodate them.  They were construed as a burden 
threatening states’ internal security,2 infrastructure, economic stability,3 and political 
relationships in the region.4  These states also largely lacked international or 
domestic legal protection frameworks for refugees on their territories.  Hence, Iraqis 
were at some times permitted entry, yet provided with only a limited form of 
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residence and economic and social rights, while at other times they were barred 
from entry or deported to face once again the violence they had fled in Iraq.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Iraqi refugees in the Middle East region
5
 
 
UNHCR recognised that in the context of this crisis, consolidating refugee 
protection space solely through pressuring host states to abide by principles of 
international refugee law might prove counterproductive in the short-term and 
undermine the goodwill and positive political relationships it had forged with 
government authorities.  However, as a purely pragmatic approach would also 
undermine its mandate to uphold international standards of refugee protection, 
UNHCR adopted a third approach that attempted to promote protection in the face 
of these states’ asserted sovereign prerogatives to deny it.  This strategy included 
combining diplomatic agreements, training and capacity building, and outreach and 
advocacy to civil society and refugees; expanding the definition of protection to 
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address economic and social vulnerabilities; and mobilising international solidarity 
through resettlement, bilateral support, and humanitarian assistance.6   
This chapter explores the tensions that emerged between host state and UNHCR 
responses to the Iraqi refugee crisis in the region and asks how they both produced 
and contested particular configurations of sovereignty.  It maps the legal 
topographies of the protection spaces that resulted from these negotiations and 
considers their implications for the location and exercise of sovereign power and 
authority.  Towards this end, it first traces the practices functioning as decisions on 
the exception that were enacted by Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon (which were hosting 
the largest numbers of Iraqis) to contain and manage the refugee population.  It also 
delineates the strategies employed by UNHCR in its attempts to counter the 
devastating effects of many of these practices.  It then theorises how the 
interactions between state and UNHCR responses revealed new configurations of 
political space and forms of de-localised and contingent sovereignty, contesting the 
reach of both the sovereign power of the state and the authority of UNHCR as an 
international organisation within the state system.  It argues that although state 
sovereignty was mediated and partially displaced by UNHCR’s structures of 
humanitarian governance, the location of sovereignty in decisions on the life of 
populations nonetheless persisted.  However, this new configuration of sovereignty 
also suggested directions for the future of refugee protection beyond the sole 
parameters of state responsibility. 
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II. Legal practices governing Iraqi refugees in the Middle East 
 
Host states’ legal practices governing Iraqi refugees in the Middle East 
effectively restricted their access to protection in the name of emergency.  At the 
same time, these practices were continuously countered by UNHCR in its efforts to 
expand protection space.  The lack of state juridical structures for managing refugee 
populations constituted a de facto state of exception in which protection strategies 
were more a product of political discretion and good will than legal obligation.  The 
kinds of protection regimes that resulted turned on decisions on inclusion or 
exclusion from legal recognition.  As exclusion resulted in an Iraqi having no legal 
status at all, it functioned as a decision on the exception.   
These regimes may be grouped into four broad categories which are addressed 
below: frameworks for the legal recognition and management of Iraqi refugees, 
border controls and shifting visa regimes, strategies for facilitating and managing 
access to economic and social rights, and re-emplacement/re-territorialisation 
through durable solutions (voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement).  
The following sections outline the contours of each of these regimes by tracing the 
practices of states towards Iraqi refugees, UNHCR strategies to counter them, and 
the compromises and contests that emerged.  This mapping exercise makes it 
possible to develop a more nuanced understanding of the interactions of refugee 
law and sovereign power as they were materialised in the spaces of Iraqi refugees’ 
daily lives. 
 
A. Frameworks for legal protection and management of Iraqi 
refugees 
 
The first regime for protecting and managing refugee populations included legal 
and diplomatic frameworks that were crafted to govern refugees on host state 
territories.  In the Middle East, in the absence of state accessions to the 1951 
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Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,7 these frameworks were the product 
of negotiations between host states and UNHCR in which responsibilities for 
protection and assistance traditionally assumed by the state were shared between 
states and the agency.  These frameworks offer insights into how sovereignty was 
reconstituted in the context of the Iraqi refugee crisis, making way for UNHCR to 
assume increasingly state-like roles and sovereign responsibilities in decision-making 
regarding the inclusion/exclusion, protection, and management of refugees on these 
territories. 
The primary international legal instruments governing the protection of 
refugees are the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol,8 and guidance and 
interpretation provided by the UNHCR Executive Committee.  Within the Middle 
East, the only countries that have acceded to the 1951 Convention include Turkey,9 
Yemen, and Egypt, each of which maintained certain reservations.10  The remaining 
countries in the region hosting Iraqi refugees are not signatories to the 1951 
Convention, although they do have the obligation not to refoule refugees to 
countries where they risk persecution.11     
This reluctance to accede to the international refugee protection regime may be 
attributed to both political and ideological factors.  States wished to avoid 
obligations for hosting refugees for protracted periods of time as happened with the 
Palestinians.12  Also, notions of citizenship based upon affiliations with kin or 
religious groups limited immigration possibilities for foreigners primarily to 
                                                                 
7
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 
UNTS 137 (“1951 Convention”). 
8
 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) 606. 
9
 Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Optional Protocol, but it retains a geographical 
limitation of recognising refugees only of European origin.   
10
 See UN Treaty Collection Database (2011), at  
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2
&lang=en#Participants. 
11
 However, since they are members of the UN, they would still be bound under the 1950 Statute for the UNHCR. 
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (3 December 1949) UN Doc. 
A/RES/428.  Also, under the Convention Against Torture, the ICCPR, international customary law, they are still 
obligated to respect the principle of non-refoulement, meaning that they should not return persons to situations 
where they may face serious human rights violations, such as restricting entry at the border or deporting persons 
facing such abuses. 
12
 Zaiotti, R. (supra note 2), p. 344. 
Chapter 3. Humanitarianism and the displacement of sovereignty                                                           
 
 
130 
 
sponsorship for work, such as the kefala system, rather than naturalisation.13  In 
keeping with this reluctance, host states lacked domestic refugee legislation14 in 
accordance with international instruments, mentioning asylum more as a matter of 
principle.15  Instead, they enacted ad hoc measures towards refugees not grounded 
in principles of human rights, treating them more as illegal migrants and foreigners 
under each state’s immigration law.16   
In this environment, these governments tended to perceive UNHCR’s role 
primarily as one of providing short-term humanitarian relief in times of emergency.17  
However, UNHCR attempted to secure limited protections for refugees within these 
otherwise exceptional spaces by negotiating alternative legal regimes for the 
protection and management of refugees on these territories.  These regimes 
attempted to blend some key aspects of international refugee law, particularly non-
refoulement by host states,18 with political and diplomatic assurances by UNHCR, 
resulting in arrangements to share responsibilities for protection, although they 
remained contingent on states’ consent.  They included Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) with states, the Temporary Protection Regime for Iraqi 
refugees, the declaration of prima facie refugee status for Iraqis from the southern 
and central areas of Iraq, and mass registration campaigns for Iraqi refugees. 
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The key legal frameworks forged between UNHCR and host states were MoU 
that codified a division of responsibilities for refugee protection between the agency 
and the state, referred to at times as a “shadow legal regime”.19  Although in 
practice they have been treated more as “statements of cooperation”, in theory in 
some contexts, such as Egypt, they are legally binding and subject to judicial 
supervision.20  MoU were developed with the Governments of Jordan,21  Lebanon,22 
Egypt,23 and Turkey,24 and they contained provisions that host states would not 
refoule refugees recognised by UNHCR, on the condition that UNHCR would provide 
for the resettlement or repatriation of these refugees within a specified time frame.  
They also contained provisions obligating UNHCR to provide economic and social 
support for refugees on these territories.25   
However, despite these diplomatic assurances, the durable solutions of 
voluntary repatriation and resettlement were nearly impossible to realise in the 
majority of cases.26  UNHCR maintained a policy against refugee return to Iraq, and 
resettlement benefited less than five percent of the Iraqi refugee population.  Failure 
to secure a solution in a timely manner translated into renewed threats of detention 
and deportation for illegal residence in these host states.  This often constituted 
refoulement to persecution,27 as refugees were returned to the violence that forced 
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them to flee in the first place.  As a result, they were often compelled to turn around 
and flee Iraq once more.28  
In April 2003, UNHCR implemented its second strategy for increasing refugee 
protection in anticipation of a large exodus of Iraqis following the war.  Having 
limited resources for refugee status determination and initially few options for Iraqi 
refugee resettlement,29 the agency devised a Temporary Protection Regime (TPR), 
which was previously used as a practical means of addressing urgent protection 
issues in situations of “mass influx”.30  Although not providing refugee status per se, 
the TPR provided for many similar protections accorded to recognised refugees: it 
stated that Iraqis did not require individual refugee status determination unless a 
particular protection problem warranted it, and it called upon Syria, Jordan, and 
Lebanon not to forcibly return any Iraqis to Iraq.31   
The TPR remained in place until 2006,32 and the majority of Iraqis during this 
time were issued with temporary protection letters by UNHCR, which were valid for 
six months and could be renewed.33  But like other iterations of temporary 
protection regimes, it did little to lift refugees from positions of legal ambiguity.34  
The UNHCR letters were not widely recognised by host governments, particularly in 
Jordan, which argued that UNHCR had exceeded the scope of its undertakings in the 
MoU.  Hence, Iraqi refugees continued to face arrest, detention, and sometimes 
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deportation.35  This strategy, borne more out of assertion than negotiation, revealed 
how state sovereignty was challenged by UNHCR.   
Due to the escalations in violence that led to the increased flight of Iraqis to 
neighbouring states starting in 2006, UNHCR implemented its third strategy for legal 
protection – a strategy that, like the TPR, was more a product of the agency’s 
assertions that host states must recognise the growing need and obligation to 
protect Iraqi refugees.  Starting in February 2007, UNHCR began recognising all Iraqis 
from the southern and central areas of Iraq as prima facie refugees.36 Prima facie 
refugees are presumed to be recognised refugees “on the basis of the readily 
apparent, objective circumstances in the country of origin giving rise to the 
exodus”,37 and therefore do not have to undergo a full refugee status determination 
procedure.  However, this move was not welcomed by host states for reasons similar 
to their reluctance to recognise the earlier TPR.38  
Partially to temper both these host states’ and resettlement states’ concerns, 
and also in order to prevent the recognition of Iraqis who may have committed acts 
that would render them excludable under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention, UNHCR 
simultaneously devised a regional exclusion policy.  This included the early 
identification and direction of cases presenting such issues through channels where 
their exclusion could be formally assessed.  The agency identified certain profiles of 
persons who might be excludable based upon past acts or particular affiliations with 
the previous Iraqi regime or military, reflecting to a large extent the inadmissibility 
criteria of major resettlement countries.39  Around two to three percent of Iraqis 
registered with UNHCR had such profiles.  These persons were issued asylum-seeker 
certificates, interviewed, and generally had their cases decided upon only where 
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there was an identified need for a protection intervention, such as release from 
detention or preventing deportation.  UNHCR did later recommend augmenting this 
process with substantive reviews of such cases before determining that no action 
would be taken.40  The result, however, was that very few decisions on exclusion 
were ever actually issued early on, and most of these cases remained on hold for a 
considerable period of time. 
The fourth regime crafted by UNHCR to expand refugee protection space was a 
mass campaign to register Iraqi refugees – another responsibility typically attributed 
to the state, but assumed by UNHCR in order to fill in the gaps in state protection.  
UNHCR argued that registration served multiple purposes: to counteract the 
dehumanising experience of displacement by providing refugees with identity cards 
representing a recognition of their humanity; to provide a means for separated 
families to reunite; to allow the agency to develop demographic profiles of the 
refugee population; and to provide a system for identifying vulnerable persons in 
need of additional support.41   
Registration was key not only to ensuring that refugees had some form of 
documentation and legal recognition, but also to the biopolitical management of 
service delivery.  In Lebanon and Syria, only refugees who were registered with 
UNHCR and then categorised as having specific needs or vulnerabilities were 
prioritised for social welfare assistance.  But in Jordan, certain types of assistance 
were available even for refugees who were not registered as they were considered 
prima facie refugees regardless of whether they were registered with UNHCR.42   
However, in most host states, the numbers of Iraqis who registered with UNHCR 
were relatively low in comparison to the size of the overall Iraqi refugee 
population.43  This was due to problems with UNHCR capacity prior to 2007, 
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misinformation amongst refugees about the registration process, and fears by 
refugees that their registration might trigger the state’s attention and lead to their 
eventual deportation.44  In addition, amongst some refugees from the middle 
classes, there was a stigma attached to registration with a humanitarian 
organisation.45  All of these factors hampered to varying degrees UNHCR’s efforts to 
identify, classify, and manage the population. 
 
B. Shifting border controls and visa regimes 
 
The legal techniques of border controls and restrictive visa regimes enacted by 
host states towards Iraqi refugees comprised the second set of practices used to 
manage, contain, and decide upon the lives of the Iraqi refugee population.  The 
reasons for these restrictions were primarily economic,46 religious,47 and political.48  
The hardships imposed in obtaining and renewing visas resulted in many Iraqis 
opting to live illegally in their host states, placing them at risk of detention and 
sometimes even deportation, unless UNHCR was able to intervene.  Increasingly 
draconian in nature, these practices were contested by UNHCR and human rights 
organisations in their attempts to prevent detentions and deportations, thereby 
contesting the sovereign power of states to except Iraqi refugees wholly from legal 
recognition or protection.   
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In Syria, visas were initially available to Iraqis for three months, but by 2007, 
were limited to one month.  After their visas expired, Iraqis were then required to 
leave.  If they wished to re-enter Syria, they had to obtain a new visa.  This resulted 
in Iraqis travelling every month to the Syrian border, obtaining an exit stamp in their 
passports, and then immediately turning around and re-entering the country.49  In 
October 2007, visas were restricted further to include only Iraqis who were from 
certain professional categories, whose children were attending school in Syria, or 
who needed medical treatment.50  Visas had to be obtained from the Syrian Embassy 
in Al Mansour area of Baghdad – a neighbourhood rife with sectarian violence,51 but 
later, Iraqis were permitted also to obtain them at border posts.52   
Due to the practical and security concerns involved in renewing visas, many Iraqi 
refugees overstayed their visas in Syria.  The Syrian authorities largely tolerated their 
presence, although they were reported on occasion to demand bribes to prevent 
their deportation.53  In cases where Iraqis were detained or threatened with 
deportation, UNHCR would try to intervene with the authorities to prevent their 
passports from being stamped in red, which would prohibit their re-entry to Syria for 
five years.54 
In Jordan, most Iraqi refugees were treated as any other foreigners.  However, 
under the Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners' Affairs [Jordan] of 1 
January 1973, the Minister of Interior was empowered to waive immigration 
requirements in cases “connected with international or humanitarian courtesy or of 
the right to political asylum”.55  Iraqis could extend their visas to a three-month 
residency permit, but were not permitted to engage in paid work.56  They could also 
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obtain longer permits upon the recommendation of the Director of Public Security, 
through the deposit of USD 150,000 in a Jordanian bank account, by securing 
employment contracts certified by the Ministry of Labour,57 or as children either 
enrolled in Jordanian schools or whose only caregiver resided legally in Jordan.58   
However, following the 2005 bombings in Jordan by Al-Qaeda-Iraq,59 Jordan 
introduced emergency measures restricting the entry of Iraqi refugees, including 
closing the border to males between the ages of 17 and 35, deporting refugees,60 
issuing visas valid for only two days,61 asking Iraqis at the border whether they were 
Sunni or Shi’ah, involving the Ministry of Interior and Secret Service in decision-
making related to Iraqi immigration applications,62 and arresting Iraqis who were 
working without a permit.63  Refugees were also required to carry the new G-series 
passports, which were difficult and expensive to obtain in Baghdad due to the 
security situation.64  Entry was further restricted in 2007 to those who had residency 
permits or invitations for medical treatment, education, or to attend conferences.65 
Given these difficulties, most Iraqis resided and worked in Jordan illegally and 
thus lived in fear of arrest, detention, and deportation.  In one concession, in 
February 2008, the Jordanian authorities announced a two-month amnesty for Iraqis 
without legal status, requiring that they either regularise their status by paying 50 
percent of their visa overstay fines (USD 761/year) or leave the country.66  Iraqis who 
were detained were required to pay fines of JD 1.5 per day for each day of their visa 
overstay or be deported and banned from re-entering the country for five years.67  In 
such cases, UNHCR would intervene by providing the authorities with a letter 
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certifying the detainee’s refugee status.68  If the detainee was an asylum-seeker, 
UNHCR would conduct refugee status determination.  If rejected, the detainee often 
would be deported, despite letters from UNHCR requesting that the detainee be 
permitted to remain given the security situation in Iraq.  Such letters, while 
sometimes preventing immediate deportation, were also often used by the 
Jordanian authorities to pressure UNHCR to resettle the detainee as a condition of 
her or his release.69 
In order to enter Lebanon,70 Iraqis were required to obtain tourist visas at the 
Lebanese embassy in Iraq or at the Beirut airport.71  Those who were unable to enter 
the country legally often resorted to paying smugglers up to USD 6,00072 to assist 
them to cross the border.73    Lebanon’s 1962 Law of Entry and Exit, Articles 32-26, 
provided that foreigners who illegally entered the country could be detained for one 
to three months, fined, and deported.74  Therefore, Iraqi refugees faced increasing 
rates of detention and deportation on account of their illegal residency or 
employment without a work permit.75  As of January 2008, there were 600 Iraqi 
refugees in detention in Lebanon, 323 of whom were registered with UNHCR.76  They 
were usually fined and sentenced to at least one month in prison.  Often unable to 
pay the fines, they would agree to remain in detention for one day for each LL 
10,000 they owed.77  Although Lebanon’s Directorate General of General Security did 
not regularly enforce deportation orders against Iraqi detainees, as this would 
constitute refoulement, he usually instead detained Iraqi refugees indefinitely.78  He 
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refused to release them after their prison sentence had been served, citing Article 18 
of the 1962 Law on Entry and Exit, which permits their continued detention until 
their deportation procedures are finalised.79  These refugees were released when 
they either obtained a work permit through the sponsorship of an employer, or they 
signed a statement agreeing “voluntarily” to be deported to Iraq80 – a measure that 
Human Rights Watch referred to as constituting refoulement in light of the poor 
prison conditions and indefinite detention that were their main alternatives to 
repatriation.81    
A concession was made for Iraqi refugees in February 2008, when they were 
given three months to regularise their status by paying a fee of LL 950,000, finding a 
sponsor who would make a USD 1,000 deposit for them as a guarantee, and 
obtaining a residency or work permit.82  However, Iraqis who entered Lebanon 
legally using tourist visas, but then overstayed, were not permitted to regularise 
their status.83  Under this scheme, UNHCR negotiated with the Lebanese authorities 
to release between 460 and 480 of the 600 Iraqi refugees in detention,84 by agreeing 
to have their fines paid through UNHCR’s partners, provided that upon their release, 
they would obtain a sponsor and a work or residence permit within three months.  
However, arrests and detentions of Iraqis also continued during this time.85  In this 
respect, Kagan observed that UNHCR was de facto acting as a third-party “sponsor” 
for refugees in ways similar to the work sponsorship systems for foreigners common 
in Arab states.86 
UNHCR also established agreements with the NGO Caritas and the Lebanese Bar 
Association’s Legal Aid Commission to provide legal aid to Iraqi refugees in 
detention.  Lawyers advocated that prosecutors not file charges, refugees not be 
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sentenced to detention or deportation, and refugees be released from detention.87  
They brought a test case on the grounds of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,88 but the judge postponed the hearing and ordered the refugees’ 
release on the condition that UNHCR agree to resettle them.  However, the General 
Security did not permit their release.89  Two other test cases, argued as violations of 
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,90 were also 
declined by the judges and referred to General Security.91 
States in the Gulf hosted significantly smaller populations of Iraqi refugees, but 
nonetheless also implemented restrictive legal regimes to govern them.  Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia limited Iraqis’ access to meet the needs of the labour market, while 
providing some financial assistance to Iraq as a means of containing the problem.92  
In 2003, Kuwait announced that it would not permit any Iraqis to enter the country, 
but would instead create a 15-kilometre-wide demilitarised zone on the Iraqi side of 
its border where it would provide humanitarian assistance.93  In 2007, the Saudi 
Arabian government refused admittance to Iraqi refugees and announced that it was 
building a wall along its border for security reasons.94 
Although Egypt, Yemen, Iran, and Turkey are all parties to the 1951 Convention, 
Iraqi refugees faced difficulties in these host states similar to those in Syria, Jordan, 
and Lebanon.  In Egypt, Iraqis were often prevented from accessing the country, 
lacked legal status,95 were prohibited from employment96 and access to public 
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schools,97 and had only limited access to public health care.98  In 2004, Yemen began 
requiring visas for Iraqis ostensibly as a measure to combat trafficking in women.99  
Iraqis wishing to enter Turkey were required to obtain a visa from a Turkish 
consulate abroad or at an airport in Turkey.100  And Iran, one of the most hospitable 
countries towards refugees in the region, expressed its frustration at the failure of 
the international community to share its burden in supporting some of the largest 
refugee populations in the region prior to 2003.  Faced with a new influx of Iraqi 
refugees, the Iranian government stopped recognising newly arriving Iraqis as 
refugees, leaving most unregistered and at risk of deportation.101   
 
C. Facilitating and managing access to economic and social rights 
 
Refugee access to economic and social rights in the Middle East was in 
continuous flux, as at the same time that states imposed legal restrictions on such 
rights, UNHCR attempted to secure these rights for refugees in practice if not in law.  
As such, these measures functioned as decisions on whether to include refugees in 
those systems critical to their survival.  The 1951 Convention’s attention to the 
economic and social rights of refugees physically present on state territories does 
not address their access to food, water, health care, and shelter, instead focusing 
more on the rights to social security,102 fair taxation,103 education,104 and intellectual 
property.105  However, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),106 to which Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon have all acceded, provides for 
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the protection of rights to food, clothing, and housing in Article 11, and healthcare in 
Article 12.  Such rights inhere in “everyone”107 and must be applied without 
discrimination to national origin or other status,108 including citizenship or refugee 
status.109  This protection is arguably constrained by Article 2(3) of the ICESCR, which 
permits “developing countries” some discretion in determining the extent to which 
they will guarantee economic rights for non-nationals, without providing a definition 
of the economic rights to which it is referring, thereby opening a possible loophole 
for some poorer states to argue their exemption from requirements to protect such 
rights for refugees.  In response, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights stated that this exemption does not apply to “core rights” (food, water, 
clothing, shelter, and health care).110 
Despite having such obligations under the ICESCR, host states in the Middle East 
were reluctant to accord refugees even these core rights.  Economic reasons were 
commonly cited, as the large numbers of refugees placed stresses on overburdened 
state infrastructures, social services, housing, and labour markets.111  The costs cited 
by host governments for supporting Iraqi refugees ranged from USD 1 billion in 
Syria,112 to USD 2.2 billion in Jordan.113  In addition, increases in fuel and food prices 
due to economic liberalisation and deregulation coincided with the large-scale influx 
of Iraqi refugees who were then often mistakenly blamed for causing inflation and 
unemployment in their host societies.114   
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The protection of Iraqi refugees’ economic and social rights was also shaped by 
their status as an urban refugee population.115  This forced UNHCR to re-focus its 
efforts from providing assistance within the discrete and contained spaces of 
traditional refugee camps to dispersed locations throughout urban centres, where 
refugees often faced difficulties accessing UNHCR’s offices due to distance, health 
issues, economic limitations, or family or work commitments.116  UNHCR’s Assistant 
High Commissioner (Operations) further noted that in urban centres, the agency also 
needed to consider “the full challenge of operating in cities, where displaced 
populations are intermingled with other urban residents and where the activities of 
humanitarian agencies must evidently be supportive of – rather than separate from 
– those of the authorities and development actors”.117   
Operationally, UNHCR made efforts to decentralise its services,118 employing 
strategies for achieving more substantial economic and social rights protections in 
practice for Iraqi refugees.  This involved financial and in-kind assistance for 
refugees, development funding directed to public education and health care; 
reframing aid in the language of rights, and strategically promoting durable 
solutions.  In these respects, UNHCR began to bridge what Beyani termed the 
“unhealthy chasm” that has grown between human rights protection and the 
protections in the 1951 Convention, which have been narrowly construed by states 
as merely being commensurate with the rights accorded to nationals or foreign 
nationals.119 
UNHCR’s provision of financial or in-kind assistance to refugees was a key means 
of attempting to alleviate some of the burdens and risks associated with state 
prohibitions on formal employment.  The right to employment and livelihoods is 
recognised in international human rights conventions.  Article 11(1) of the ICESCR 
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recognises the right of “everyone to an adequate standard of living”, which implies 
the entitlement of refugees to support either in the form of the right to work or 
alternative assistance.120  Article 17(1) of the 1951 Convention states that refugees 
lawfully staying on a state territory should be accorded the most favourable 
treatment accorded to foreign nationals on the territory with regards to wage-
earning employment.  Article 6(1) of the ICESCR recognises the right of everyone to 
the opportunity to earn a living through voluntary employment.  However, most 
human rights bodies and states have been reluctant to critique any exclusions based 
on non-citizenship.121 
Given this general reluctance, it is unsurprising that in host states throughout 
the Middle East, Iraqis faced significant restrictions and limitations on employment 
in the formal sector, from outright prohibition to requirements of employer 
sponsorship.122  This led many to work illegally for minimal pay,123 risk exploitation, 
detention, and deportation,124 live off of rapidly dwindling savings and money 
transfers from Iraq,125 or return to Iraq to sell immoveable property or find work in 
order to support their families.126  In Syria, some Iraqi women and girls also engaged 
in survival sex work.127  Unable to legally counter such restrictions on formal 
employment, UNHCR devised strategies for providing in-kind, food, or financial 
assistance and informal job training programmes.128  UNHCR’s provision of cash 
through ATM cards in particular was regarded as more empowering than other 
forms of assistance.  It gave refugees the autonomy to determine and prioritise their 
own financial needs and expenditures and was perceived as less stigmatising than 
receiving items such as food.129   
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UNHCR also employed strategies of providing funding for education and health 
care that would support both refugees and local populations wherever possible, 
which demonstrated how the agency tried to connect refugee concerns with the 
material interests of states in order to expand refugee protection space in urban 
centres.130  Regarding the right to education, the right of refugees to the same 
elementary education afforded to nationals is recognised in Article 22(1) of the 1951 
Convention.  The right to free primary education is set out in Article 13(1)(a) of the 
ICESCR, and although it recognised as a “core” entitlement, states may seek to justify 
any breach of the obligation by demonstrating a true lack of resources.131  Secondary 
education for refugees should not be of a lesser standard than that available for 
“aliens generally in the same circumstances” under Article 22(2) of the 1951 
Convention, and it should be made “generally available and accessible to all” under 
Article 13(1)(b) of the ICESCR, in accordance with the principle of non-
discrimination.132   
Iraqi refugee children’s rights to primary education were generally recognised in 
host states’ law, although they were difficult to realise in practice.  As the refugee 
crisis grew, some host states began implementing restrictions in breach of their 
obligations under the ICESCR.  UNHCR responded by helping to strengthen state 
educational infrastructures.  In Syria, due to overcrowding in the schools,133 UNHCR 
began building six schools that year,134 and contributed USD 3.8 million towards the 
education of 33,000 Iraqi children.135  In Jordan, access to education was initially 
restricted to persons who were legally resident in the country,136 but by 2007, non-
legally resident Iraqi children could also attend public schools.137  UNHCR signed an 
agreement with the Jordanian government to provide USD 10 million to improve 
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schools, and in cooperation with UNICEF designated another USD 40 million for 
education in Jordan.138  In 2008, the Lebanese authorities issued a circular to all 
private and public schools encouraging them to register refugee children.  UNHCR 
supported this measure by providing the children with uniforms, school fees, and 
supplies.139   
Access to health care was also critical for Iraqi refugees who had 
disproportionate rates of stress-related illnesses, heart disease, diabetes, congenital 
defects, sight and hearing impairments, psychological trauma, and injuries received 
in Iraq.140  The right to health is recognised in international law: Article 12(1) of the 
ICESCR provides for “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health”.141  As the right to essential 
primary health care is one of the four core rights, regardless of a state’s status as a 
developing country,142 states are obligated to give immediate effect to this right by 
taking steps towards its “full realization” and ensuring that it is “exercised without 
discrimination of any kind”, including for “asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants”.143   
In the Middle East, refugee access to essential primary health care was generally 
recognised in law, but also subject to legal restrictions and practical obstacles that 
constituted derogations from these state obligations under the ICESCR.  In 2005, 
Syrian authorities tightened restrictions on access to health care for Iraqis, limiting it 
to emergency cases and requiring payment for certain kinds of treatment.144  In 
response, UNHCR provided USD one million in funding to the Syrian Ministry of 
Health, which purchased nine ambulances for health centres located in 
neighbourhoods with high concentrations of Iraqi refugees.145  Also, in concert with 
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the Italian Red Crescent Society, the agency also provided funding for the Syrian 
Arab Red Crescent Society health clinics.146  In Jordan, Iraqi refugees had access only 
to emergency health care,147 and they were required to have legal residency to 
receive any additional treatment.148  As an alternative, UNHCR funded partnering 
NGOs to provide refugees access to free care in private clinics and mobile health 
clinics.149  The UNHCR also negotiated with the Jordanian Red Crescent to provide 
limited health care to Iraqis not registered with UNHCR.150  In Lebanon, although 
permitted access to public health services, Iraqi refugees were often compelled to 
seek expensive private health care due to greater availability.  UNHCR and its 
implementing partners, such as Caritas,151 funded full medical assistance costs for 24 
percent of Iraqi refugees having acute health care needs.152 
 
D. Re-emplacement through durable solutions 
 
In keeping with UNHCR’s mandate to secure durable solutions for refugees,153 
and as a part of its MoU with host states in the Middle East, the agency also 
employed strategies of re-emplacement/re-territorialisation in state territories, 
primarily in the form of resettlement.  However, given that the other durable 
solutions of local integration and voluntary repatriation were not viable in most 
cases, and resettlement was available to less than five percent of the refugee 
population, decisions on access to durable solutions were also decisions on the 
exception as the majority of Iraqi refugees were left living in conditions of bare life 
and protracted legal liminality with no solution on the horizon.  In this respect, the 
traditional three durable solutions were largely untenable in the face of the 
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increasingly protracted nature of the refugee crisis.154  UNHCR therefore attempted 
to navigate the vagaries of these exceptional spaces by promoting these durable 
solutions more strategically in an attempt to secure a wider impact for the whole of 
the Iraqi refugee population.  Strategic resettlement and the concepts of safety and 
voluntariness in repatriation were used to push sovereign boundaries – pressing host 
states to increase their inclusiveness of those refugees who remained within their 
borders.  In this respect, UNHCR not only shored up the sovereign state system 
through re-territorialisation of refugees, but also used the system’s own tools to 
contest their exclusion.   
When UNHCR appealed to donor states to increase their resettlement quotas in 
the spirit of “burden-sharing” and widening “protection space” for Iraqi refugees, 
states responded positively, facilitating the resettlement of more than 100,000 Iraqi 
refugees from the Middle East to the US, Canada, Australia, and states in Europe by 
2010.155  As a demonstration of international solidarity,156 resettlement was 
intended to alleviate burdens on host states and to encourage them to increase 
protections afforded to the refugees remaining on their territories,157 a project 
which met with varying degrees of success. 
However, the identification of 100,000 Iraqi refugees according to categories of 
vulnerability for resettlement to some extent also functioned as a decision on the 
exception of 1.9 million who were either not registered or not prioritised in the 
process.  The heavy emphasis on resettlement and the significant funding allocated 
to the programme,158 led to some concerns voiced by UNHCR staff members that the 
amount of resources allocated to resettlement was disproportionate to the numbers 
of refugees who directly benefited: they argued that while resettlement may have 
had some strategic effect in increasing protection space, it may also have diverted 
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focus from the economic and social assistance required to support the vast majority 
of refugees remaining in the Middle East.159 
UNHCR also advocated for safe and voluntary repatriation to Iraq.  Iraqis faced 
considerable uncertainties in returning to Iraq, particularly in relation to their 
property: they had to contend with the ethnic cleansing of their neighbourhoods,160 
the destruction, looting, and occupation of their homes,161  the sale of their property 
in Iraq, and the lack of effective restitution mechanisms.162  Limited employment 
opportunities, distrust of government institutions, loss of public services such as 
electricity and potable water,163 unequal access to public assistance,164 and profound 
psychological trauma also posed challenges to the sustainability of their return.  This 
placed them at risk of further displacement to squatter settlements inside Iraq, 
where, as of 2011, they would join the nation's 1.3 million internally displaced 
persons living in destitution, lacking access to basic services, and fearing eviction.165 
UNHCR therefore called upon host states to refrain from forcibly returning Iraqi 
refugees to situations in Iraq where they might face threats to their human rights 
and safety or overburden and destabilise the country’s fragile infrastructure.  The 
agency strove to increase its presence and activities within Iraq to promote safe 
conditions of return.166  It also provided Iraqi refugees who wished to return with 
counselling, assistance packages of USD 500, and follow-up calls to monitor the 
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safety and dignity of the repatriation process.167  The Iraqi government likewise 
initiated a voluntary repatriation programme.168   
Iraqis were slow to take advantage of the repatriation programme, primarily 
only doing so when facing severe economic hardship or having expired visas in their 
countries of asylum.169  Many were also reluctant to repatriate with UNHCR’s 
assistance because this required that they de-register, which they feared could pose 
problems should they need to flee Iraq again and gain access to UNHCR in the future.  
They therefore largely chose to repatriate independently; nearly 220,000 returned to 
Iraq in 2008170 and 29,000 in 2009.171  However, such figures were complicated by 
the fact that rather than returning permanently, the majority of Iraqi refugees in 
Syria and Jordan travelled back and forth from Iraq, sometimes voluntarily and other 
times due to repeated forcible displacements, engaging in what Zetter referred to as 
“twin-tracking to explore the grey area between the two poles of displacement and 
durable solutions”.172  Reasons for these temporary returns included going to assess 
the security situation, see elderly parents, attend funerals, collect pensions, borrow 
money, or sell property.173  A 2010 UNHCR survey revealed that the majority of Iraqis 
who did attempt to repatriate permanently reported having insufficient resources to 
meet their needs in Iraq and being subjected to bomb explosions, kidnappings, and 
harassment in the areas to which they had returned.174  
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III. Exegesis: Sovereignty and the production of refugee protection 
space in the Middle East 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The exclusion of Iraqi refugees from the full protections of international refugee 
and human rights law, arbitrary and shifting regimes of border control, restrictions 
on economic and social rights, and limited available durable solutions reduced many 
to struggling to survive with limited or no legal status.  They lived to varying degrees 
in a state of exception where, under the auspices of emergency rooted in political, 
economic, and security concerns, host states often prevented their full access to 
fundamental forms of protection.  They were subjected to state laws which excluded 
them, but existed nonetheless on state territories where they enjoyed limited, if any, 
legal recognition and were subject to the exigencies and violence of sovereign 
power.175  They lived the bare life of the exile rather than the qualified political life of 
the citizen, where uncertainty functioned as another technology of sovereign 
power.176  Although not living in the ubiquitous refugee camps that symbolise the 
persistence of bare life in modernity,177 their existence within the city suggested that 
Agamben’s camp-like spaces assumed new forms as they became imbricated in the 
contours of the polis itself.  They exemplified his contention that “the camp, which is 
now securely lodged within the city’s interior, is the new biopolitical nomos of the 
planet”.178   
At the same time, the extent to which state decisions relegated Iraqi refugees to 
bare life was mediated and mitigated by the intercession of UNHCR as it shared not 
only in decision-making on their lives, but also assumed state-like roles in their 
governance.  The topography of refugee protection in the Middle East suggested 
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that complex and contested state and organisational practices produced spaces that, 
while not wholly resistant to sovereign exceptionalism, did enable greater and more 
variegated forms of de facto inclusion than would be recognised by a purely state or 
law-centric theory of sovereignty.  At the same time, the normalisation of shadow 
regimes, such as the MoU, while intended to provide some provisional forms of 
protection, also indicated that the exception has always been the norm in these 
spaces.  Nonetheless, the de facto forms of protection actually achieved suggested 
that there was not a wholesale failure of refugee protection simply because host 
states refused to accede to international protection instruments or to recognise 
Iraqis as refugees.  Rather, the protection space that was forged was enabled by 
political compromise, a degree of tolerance or neglect by host states, and the 
crafting of alternative legal regimes and regulatory systems by host states and 
UNHCR.  
The following sections reflect upon the legal topography of refugee protection in 
the urban centres of the Middle East outlined above by examining their implications 
for how one might conceptualise the exercise of sovereign power.  They first 
consider how state sovereignty was mediated and displaced by UNHCR’s 
humanitarian governance in its efforts to expand protection space.  They next 
question the extent to which the logic of sovereignty, located at the intersection of 
biopolitics and decisions on the exception, was altered by this new configuration of 
sovereign power.  They finally consider the possibilities for global governance 
created by this reconfiguration of sovereignty, as emerging shared governance 
structures suggested new ways of conceptualising responsibility for refugee 
protection beyond the confines of the state. 
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B. Delocalising sovereignty through humanitarian management 
 
State-centric critiques of the failure of refugee law179 have treated UNHCR’s 
quasi-governmental role as an anomaly and an example of the incompatible tension 
between state sovereignty and international law,180 or as international law’s direct 
challenge to a state’s “national security and good governance”.181  As a 
consequence, they have on occasion overlooked the actual topography of the 
protection space that has resulted from UNHCR’s negotiations with host states to 
allocate responsibilities for governing refugee populations.  UNHCR’s strategies for 
increasing protection space in the Iraqi refugee context in different respects de-
localised, contested, and appropriated the sovereign powers of the state. 
 
1. The allocation of sovereign responsibilities 
 
How did humanitarian governance come to partially displace state sovereignty 
in the Iraqi refugee crisis?  The legitimation of responsibility-sharing arrangements in 
the Iraqi refugee context was rooted in UNHCR’s initial discursive construction of 
Iraqi displacement as an emergency requiring donor funding and UNHCR 
intervention.  In this respect, the agency inverted the use of emergency usually used 
to justify exceptional treatment by instead employing emergency to invoke the need 
for increased protection of rights.  Although UNHCR does emphasise the primacy of 
state responsibility for refugees,182 humanitarian crises are assumed to be better 
managed by UNHCR, to be temporally limited, to have donor state support, and to 
permit states in the region to resume governance functions upon their cessation or 
resolution.183  Despite the political factors implicated in producing this crisis,184 this 
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construction of the crisis as humanitarian, in combination with UNHCR’s mandate to 
monitor state compliance with international standards of refugee protection,185 
positioned UNHCR as a political actor,186 enabled its entry as a humanitarian 
organisation to govern the refugee population, and legitimised the increasingly 
state-like functions that it assumed.  Some critics argued that UNHCR also may have 
been motivated by a desire for institutional survival,187 blackmail by host 
governments, or the interests of its funders.188  However, this obscures the assertion 
by UNHCR that if host states refuse to provide protection, refugees would be 
abandoned unless the agency steps in and plays a quasi-governmental function in 
ensuring their protection.189  This contention is in keeping with continuity theorists’ 
arguments that the agency is more autonomous, pragmatically responding to the 
pressures of the environments in which it operates.190   
While responsibility-sharing arrangements did challenge state sovereignty, host 
states in the Middle East may have acquiesced to UNHCR’s governance roles on their 
territories for several reasons.  Kagan noted that although states are often reluctant 
to relinquish sovereignty or state decision-making to “first UN” bodies, such as the 
Security Council, they may be less so in regards to “second UN” agencies, such as 
UNHCR.  In so doing, a balance may be struck between interests of state sovereignty 
and those of global governance through cooperation with international 
organisations,191 promoting a shared set of human rights norms that can legitimate 
the international order.192   
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This balance may be facilitated by the express reference to UNHCR’s “non-
political” character in its Statute,193 permitting it to carry out its protection activities 
as a form of humanitarianism rather than as a direct or overt threat to host state 
sovereignty, despite the governmental functions that the agency has on many 
occasions assumed.  It also enables what Cuellar called global refugee policy’s “grand 
compromise”,194 in which states in the global north can channel aid aimed at 
containing refugee crises in the global south.195  As the US, Japan, and countries in 
the EU provide some of the most significant funding for UNHCR,196 they are able to 
exercise considerable influence towards this end.   
Kagan argued that this balance also enables states in the global south, which 
host more than 80 percent of the world’s refugees,197 to contend with this “burden” 
by deflecting responsibility for persons on their territories onto an international 
organisation.  In this way, they can pressure the international community to funnel 
aid towards their support in the absence of any formal burden-sharing mechanisms, 
permit long-term residence of refugees without local integration, and avoid political 
sensitivities arising from finding neighbouring states to be persecutors when directly 
conducting refugee status determination.198  This legitimises state actions on both 
domestic and international fronts.199   
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This balance was evident in the Iraqi refugee crisis, when it proved politically 
advantageous for states to permit UNHCR, in the process of refugee status 
determination or even in designating Iraqis as prima facie refugees, to make 
decisions on whether the Iraqi state was unable or unwilling to protect its citizens 
from persecution.  This allocation of responsibility removed states in the region from 
having to assume a direct position on Iraq, thereby playing to pan-Arabist 
sentiments, and perhaps also explaining why host states did not object to the prima 
facie recognition of Iraqis as strongly as might have been expected in the context of 
how this designation stretched the meaning and limitations of the MoU. 
Kagan observed that this grand compromise usually follows the pattern of states 
protecting negative liberties, such as the right not to be refouled, and UNHCR 
protecting positive liberties, such as the rights to health and education, thus enabling 
host governments to “protect” refugees by “literally doing nothing” and maintaining 
“a policy of benign neglect”.200   The MoU signed between host states and UNHCR 
were indicative of this pattern, as they made the protection of negative liberties by 
the state (refraining from refoulement) contingent on the promotion of positive 
liberties by UNHCR (securing a durable solution and providing support for economic 
and social services).  Although UNHCR was not always able to secure resettlement 
places for refugees under the MoU within the agreed-upon timeframes, these 
refugees were not routinely deported from Syria or Lebanon.  Rather more 
frequently, as in the case of Lebanon, they remained in indefinite detention while 
UNHCR attempted to secure a solution.   
The marginal tolerance of refugees in this liminal situation permitted states to 
retain the impression of sovereign authority through threatened deportation, while 
largely allowing refugees to remain on their territories in practice.  Even in Jordan, 
where deportation was more frequent, the MoU allowed UNHCR to intervene while 
ensuring that Jordan retained its sovereign authority by having the final say 
regarding the release of detainees recognised as refugees.  This general tolerance of 
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long-term, albeit illegal, residence of Iraqi refugees without permitting their full local 
integration demonstrated a “benign neglect”201 that occupied the grey area between 
full protection and outright exclusion.  While not relegated fully to Agamben’s state 
of exception, Iraqi refugees were in fact subject to the many exigencies of life in 
exile.   
As Iraqis became increasingly reliant upon UNHCR for their survival in such 
spaces, they also acknowledged the role of UNHCR in protecting their positive 
liberties in the forms of social support and durable solutions.  The state-like roles 
that UNHCR has assumed were previously alluded to by other refugee populations 
when they spoke of “the country of UNHCR”.202  They demonstrated the shifting role 
of the UN more widely from that of an intergovernmental organisation to a supra-
governmental one in cases where it assumes direct responsibilities for governance, 
thereby altering the shape of its mandate.203  These arrangements demonstrated 
that the space of exception of the Iraqi refugee crisis was neither anomic nor void, 
but a place where new forms of life and law204 emerged. 
However, as UNHCR’s mandate to promote protection and durable solutions for 
refugees was not always in keeping with state interests, these responsibility-sharing 
arrangements were also politicised and contested.  Although appropriating certain 
forms of sovereign responsibility, UNHCR could not fully displace the sovereign 
state.205   UNHCR could not in whole play a substitute role for the state, or act 
entirely as a “surrogate state”,206 as its power to govern was constrained by the 
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political will and consent of host governments.207  The agency’s TPR and prima facie 
recognition policies were not the result of political compromise.  While promoting 
protection in keeping with UNHCR’s mandate, they also sparked the ire of some host 
governments which felt that the agency had exceeded the scope of its 
responsibilities under the MoU, leading them to tolerate more than respect these 
declarations.  Also, under the MoU, UNHCR’s decisions on refugee status were 
constrained by sovereign state interests: recognition implied a temporally limited 
form of protection – a right to remain for a short period of time until a durable 
solution could be found.   
Sovereign power was no longer confined to states, but was contingent and de-
localised as UNHCR began playing quasi-state roles,208 at times in concert with, in 
challenge to, or in parallel with host states.  UNHCR not only negotiated with states, 
but overlapped with them in providing services and protection.  At the same time, 
however, states continued to assert their sovereign authority by constraining the 
scope of UNHCR’s actions. 
 
2. Expanding legal protection through the deployment of space 
 
The topography of Iraqi refugee protection revealed not only the existence of de 
facto forms of protection secured through allocations of responsibility between 
UNHCR and states, but also a significant expansion in the scope of protection.  This 
was enabled by UNHCR deploying spatial concepts of protection, vulnerable bodies, 
urban refugees, and the strategic use of resettlement to expand both the meaning 
and location of protection beyond their traditional purview within the state.  Law 
was made material through space, as expanded principles of protection were 
realised in the bodies and territories of refugees. 
UNHCR first did this discursively in its policy of increasing “protection space” for 
Iraqi refugees in their host states.  “Protection space” was conceptualised as an 
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environment that enabled the optimal provision of internationally recognised rights 
protection for refugees.209  Protection evolved from a focus on its linkage to the legal 
asylum process and security of states to include the larger paradigm of the security 
of refugees and UNHCR operations – what Adelman suggested was not a departure, 
but built into the agency’s potential functions from its inception.210  Benchmarks for 
measuring protection space for Iraqi refugees included: 
 
(a) access to safety and non-refoulement;  
(b) non-penalisation for illegal entry;  
(c) permission for temporary stay under acceptable conditions;  
(d) registration and the identification of protection vulnerabilities;  
(e) access to durable solutions including resettlement;  
(f) availability of humanitarian assistance to persons with specific needs; and  
(g) access to essential services and opportunities for self-reliance.211   
 
Economic and social rights were not explicitly mentioned, but effectively 
subsumed within the references to more traditional terms of humanitarian 
assistance and essential services mapped in the preceding section of this chapter.  
Although there were few changes in law that resulted,212 UNHCR concluded that its 
activities had increased protection space in practice.213  This expanded the focus of 
protection from an obligation for non-refoulement to persecution in Iraq to 
recognising that it encompasses the heightened security of refugees in their host 
states. 
Second, UNHCR’s legal classification of refugee bodies as spaces of vulnerability 
was also a means deploying space to expand notions of protection.  Vulnerability of 
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the body became a key marker for determining the legal treatment of each refugee – 
whether to recognise them as refugees, to provide them with assistance, or to 
prioritise them for resettlement to a third state.  The body was the space that 
determined both the extent and application of the law; it served as the site of both 
regulation and decisions on life. 
Third, UNHCR’s approach to Iraqis as urban refugees also expanded their 
protection space through new forms of humanitarian management.  Traditionally in 
refugee camps, UNHCR was recognised by state authorities as the leader and 
coordinator of the camp’s management, described as a “surrogate state, complete 
with its own territory (refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public services (education, 
health care, water, sanitation), and even ideology (community participation, gender 
equality)”.214  However, in the context of the Iraqi refugee crisis, host states in the 
Middle East decided that refugees would be treated as guests and provided with 
access to public services, rather than being provided with services dedicated only to 
refugees that could engender local hostility or competition.215  Jordan, for example, 
stated that it would not tolerate a parallel system of social service provision to 
refugees that did not also serve Jordanian citizens.216  UNHCR’s 1997 urban refugee 
policy had already noted the preference of providing assistance to national service 
structures in order to increase their capacity to serve refugees as well as their own 
nationals rather than creating parallel services only for refugees.217    
Therefore, rather than acting as a surrogate state, UNHCR engaged more 
intensively with state structures to increase their capacities to accommodate 
refugees and citizens alike.  It provided funding for development of schools and 
health care that would benefit the local population and Iraqi refugees.  Also, the 
provision of assistance was often tied to requirements that Iraqi refugees be 
registered, making the agency a de facto quasi-governmental institution that 
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managed and coordinated refugee access to certain services.  In addition, UNHCR’s 
traditional engagement with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) acting as the 
agency’s “partners” in the provision of social services, shifted as a part of this 
strategy.  Three NGOs in Syria218 and 16 in Jordan219 were contracted with UNHCR to 
provide direct social, health, and economic support for Iraqi refugees.  These NGOs 
began to functionally overlap with governmental agencies responsible for particular 
aspects of social service provision as they often worked to provide services to 
citizens and refugees alike, which located them in a grey area between civil society 
and state government. 
UNHCR therefore moved from governing separately from the state (in camps)220 
to governing in concert with the state.221  Although the dictates of these host states 
still limited the refugees’ possibilities for protection, UNHCR’s strategies pushed 
against these constraints, providing greater possibilities for social acceptance and 
inclusivity within refugees’ host societies. 
Also, by focusing its funding for refugee protection on structures created by host 
states to carry out their responsibilities to their citizens, UNHCR moved humanitarian 
assistance from the ad hoc and provisional spaces of the refugee camp to a formal 
system dictated by notions of state responsibility and citizens’ rights.  This material 
shift in resources was accompanied by a discursive shift as humanitarian assistance 
became imbricated in discussions about protection space, and economic and social 
rights were implicated in the expanding definitions of refugee protection space 
articulated by the agency. 
Finally, UNHCR’s resettlement of Iraqi refugees to states in the global north, 
although a discretionary form of aid, was also framed in the language of rights as a 
protection tool and was used strategically to contest state practices of 
exceptionalism and expand the availability of protection.  The “strategic use of 
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resettlement” policy produced a conceptual shift in the spaces of rights protection 
for Iraqi refugees.  Rather than posing refugee protection as a solution to be 
obtained only upon the refugees’ departure from the region, refugee departures to 
resettlement states now became critical factors in strengthening protection within 
the region.  The policy also revealed a shift in the role of UNHCR as it employed 
resettlement more forcefully as a bargaining chip in its advocacy with host states to 
increase refugee protection space.   
While the heavy emphasis, support, and funding for the resettlement 
programme may have served the political interests of resettlement states in utilising 
UNHCR to manage Iraqi migration out of the region, the transformation of large-
scale resettlement operations as a strategic tool for protection for those remaining 
within the region was a nonetheless significant factor in the spatialisation and 
materialisation of expanded concepts of refugee protection.  This shift was 
instrumental in conceptually moving resettlement from the realm of purely 
humanitarian and ad hoc discretionary assistance for a fortunate few to an arena in 
which it was conceptualised as critical in negotiating and crafting greater human 
rights protections for the many in the Middle East.  In this respect, UNHCR was able 
to move from its role as simply a mediator between host states in the region and 
resettlement states further abroad to that of a strengthened advocate for refugee 
protection. 
 
C. The persistence of sovereign decisionism 
 
UNHCR assumed state-like roles222 and adopted governance strategies that both 
enabled the expansion of Iraqi refugees’ protection space and contested, 
appropriated, and de-localised sovereign power as it began to migrate from the state 
to international actors.  But was this de-localisation accompanied by any shifts in the 
paradigm of sovereignty itself as located in the intersection of biopolitics and the 
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power to decide upon the exception?  Or was the logic of sovereignty reproduced in 
new forms?   
UNHCR did forge greater protection space for Iraqi refugees in their host states 
through alternative legal and assistance regimes that provided variegated forms of 
protection.  But Iraqis obtained neither the full protections enshrined in the 1951 
Convention nor recognition by their host states.  Instead, they moved from being 
treated with indifference and some degree of tolerance as foreigners on these 
territories, to having some level of protection from refoulement through UNHCR 
registration and intervention, and some social security through UNHCR’s provision of 
funding aimed at realising their economic and social rights.   
In this ambiguous environment, the move towards increased protection was 
accompanied by complex regulatory regimes in which UNHCR assumed the role of 
decision-maker, identifying who would be included within the ambit of its concern.  
Decisions normally enacted by sovereign states as to who qualifies as a refugee, who 
is permitted to remain on state territory, and who may benefit from state protection 
largely fell to UNHCR.  UNHCR’s decision-making on refugee status was a system for 
international legal protection in the absence of domestic mechanisms.  The agency 
already had long history of assuming such responsibilities.223  In the Iraqi refugee 
context, this was no different, as UNHCR assumed governmental functions of 
reception, registration, and asylum adjudication in the absence of state laws and 
asylum procedures.224   
Also, as a part of its agreement with both host and resettlement states, UNHCR 
forged greater protection space for the many by promising to exclude the few who 
did not meet the legal criteria of the refugee definition.  The use of exclusion 
categories to determine who was or was not a “legitimate victim”, whether the 
individual or the state was the “deviant”,225 helped sustain UNHCR’s prima facie 
recognition policy in the face of opposition from host states.  Although protection 
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space was increased by prima facie recognition, the policy still turned on decisions 
on exclusion, and as such was a new expression of the logic of sovereignty. 
Additionally, the selection and submission of five percent of Iraqis for 
resettlement according to criteria based upon specific needs and vulnerabilities 
resulted in the designation of the majority as a lower priority, in effect functioning as 
an exclusion based upon limited available resettlement country quotas and 
established hierarchies of need.  The assumption of such decision-making roles was 
largely pragmatic – the result of both political compromise and the need to identify 
who from amongst the large refugee population would be prioritised for protection 
and assistance, given the limited available resources.   
These roles remained tied to the decision on inclusion of refugees that 
constitutes and maintains the state system226 and functions as a bordering practice.  
In assuming such roles, UNHCR had the power to decide upon life – whether one 
would have access to legal recognition or would remain in a state of “bare life”, living 
at the political margins of the state, unprotected by its law, but subject to the 
violence of its power.227  The power to decide upon life implicit in these processes 
therefore reproduced the logic of sovereignty.   
This turn, from promoting the protection of refugees to deciding upon whether 
they would receive protection, institutionalised the move of UNHCR from a position 
of advocating for a sovereign state to make decisions commensurate with 
international refugee law to a position of making such decisions itself.  In this 
respect, UNHCR functioning according to the logic of sovereignty may have created 
conflicts with its own mandate to promote refugee protection.  The agency was 
compelled to serve as both judge (on refugee status or vulnerability) and advocate 
(for refugee protection or assistance), posing a potential conflict of interest in 
assuming both roles within its institutional context.   
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This conflict was further evident in UNHCR’s apparent hesitance to issue any 
decisions on exclusion from refugee status at the outset, despite the agency’s 
agreement to do so.  Instead, UNHCR identified categories of potentially excludable 
persons who would require further interviewing.  Many of these persons’ files were 
put on hold, deprioritised in the refugee status determination queue, or deemed 
“not eligible for resettlement”, rather than being finalised with an actual decision on 
their exclusion.  This development of excessive proceduralism around the exclusion 
of refugees enabled UNHCR to initially avoid in the majority of cases having to make 
a decision on the exception, confront the dangers of deportation to persecution, risk 
the anger of persons excluded, and face the uncertainty that such decisions entail.   
Such practices are reminiscent of the increasing regulatory mechanisms at 
Guantanamo Bay discussed by Johns.  She argued that the proliferation of 
procedures and governance structures “in excess” in what would otherwise be an 
exceptional space indicated a desire to domesticate, eviscerate, and avoid the 
experience of actually making a decision on the exception, thereby removing room 
for doubt, possibilities, or responsibility.  Such liberal proceduralism actually had a 
norm-producing effect, undermining any “sovereign or non-sovereign forms of 
political agency under radical doubt”.  These normative processes had the effect of 
reproducing rather than contesting governmental violence.228   
Similar to Guantanamo Bay, the creation of excessive administrative procedures 
that resulted in avoidance of legal decision-making on the exclusion of Iraqi refugees 
created spaces where these refugees existed in a protracted state of legal liminality 
– not quite relegated to a state of exception, but prevented from inclusion in the 
polis.  The violence of this system was normalised as it worked to negate the 
exception by cloaking it in legal formalism and administrative bureaucracy.  The 
proliferation of procedures that resulted in initially making few or no decisions on 
exclusion at all foreclosed other possibilities for action and accountability.  It masked 
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the “danger and difference”229 associated with making such decisions and removed 
the responsibility for the overt violence of exclusion from the decision-makers, as 
placing cases on hold or at the back of the queue was perceived as lesser form of 
violence preferable to outright exclusion and possible deportation. 
The logic of sovereignty was also reproduced in UNHCR’s development of 
vulnerability categories to enable the allocation of limited resources to those 
deemed most in need.  These categories of vulnerability were pragmatic devices that 
regulated access to limited resources for health care, livelihood assistance, 
education, and resettlement.  However, the mobilisation of funds by UNHCR to 
support the most vulnerable refugees also risked providing incentives to host states 
to maintain the very conditions that contributed to these refugees’ vulnerability.230   
As such, Iraqi refugee bodies were subject to a form of decisionism that 
determined whether they would be included within certain service programmes.  
But similar to the procedures used to avoid issuing a decision on exclusion from 
refugee status, Iraqi refugees were rarely rejected outright for assistance by UNHCR.  
They were rather deprioritised on the basis of lack of sufficient resources (another 
form of de facto emergency) or need, thereby allowing the agency to avoid the 
potential responsibility for their destitution by leaving open the possibility for their 
future inclusion – again the normalising the lesser violence of potential or 
threatened poverty chosen in lieu of outright impoverishment.   
Linked to this biopolitical project of locating decisions on assistance squarely 
within the bodies of refugees was also the initial requirement that Iraqi refugees be 
registered with UNHCR in order to access certain forms of assistance.  They had to be 
made visible to the law – marked and measured by legal classificatory processes – 
before being permitted access to economic and social rights.  However, this shifted 
somewhat as some UNHCR staff argued that Iraqis’ mere presence as prima facie 
refugees in their host states should be sufficient for them to access services.   
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Yet Iraqi refugees did not always reproduce the logic of sovereignty in their 
interactions with either their host states or UNHCR.  Kagan observed that refugees in 
some cases may find an “extra-legal existence”, in which they are ignored or merely 
tolerated by the state,231 preferable to the restrictive immigration laws in place in 
many host states.232  In this regard, some Iraqis feared registration with UNHCR 
based upon the erroneous belief that they then would be forced to resettle to a third 
country and also due to the reality that UNHCR documents were not consistently 
respected by state authorities.  They further feared that registration would alert the 
state authorities to their presence and thus set in motion the timeframe within 
which they could remain on the state territory under the MoU.   
Such fears led many Iraqis to choose not to register with UNHCR and become 
visible to the disciplinary state.  They instead opted either for the limited migration 
options that were available or to live in a state of prolonged extralegality.  This 
reluctance generated concerns by UNHCR, as registration was a key tool for initiating 
refugee protection procedures.  However, it may have had the productive effect of 
also confronting both host states and UNHCR with the fallibility and contingency of 
their own governance structures – exposing the potential violence that such 
decision-making powers may unwittingly entail. 
In reproducing the logic of sovereignty in adopting these decision-making roles, 
UNHCR operated in concert with host states to shore up the state system, as the 
inclusion or exclusion of refugees was a means of drawing boundaries between the 
nation and the other continuously throughout the state and at the border.233  
However, UNHCR’s adoption of such roles was also fraught as they often conflicted 
with the agency’s own mandate.  While UNHCR did negotiate greater forms of 
protection, its pragmatism in the face of limited resources also reproduced forms of 
exile and extralegality through its decisions in spaces that were already characterised 
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by exceptionalism.  UNHCR acted as kind of “quasi-sovereign”,234 as it was 
empowered through the MoU to make decisions on refugees’ relative escape or 
relegation to these territories and spaces of exception.  In most cases under the 
MoU, with the exception of Turkey, UNHCR was the final arbiter of this decision as it 
lacked an external appellate system.235  Both the decisions to exclude from refugee 
status or assistance and the legal proceduralism that often resulted in avoiding 
making such decisions left many Iraqi refugees in states of legal liminality and fearing 
destitution, thereby placing UNHCR at risk of reproducing state violence.  Unless 
UNHCR finds a way to disentangle its mandate to promote protection from its 
decision-making and regulatory structure, the violence of sovereign exceptionalism 
always risks being built into any state responsibility-sharing system. 
 
D. Legitimising and formalising global governance 
 
While UNHCR’s strategies to assume some state decision-making roles shored 
up the logic of sovereignty that undergirds the state system, in other ways they also 
may have contested and pressed the boundaries of this logic.  The agency’s 
interventions with host governments in the form of alternative legal arrangements, 
assumptions of certain responsibilities, development funding, and reframing of aid in 
the language of rights both countered the totalising experience of exceptionalism 
and provided openings for critiquing state practice and considering the legitimacy of 
other forms of shared governance.   
As sovereignty emerges from the interactions between individuals and groups 
that produce boundaries between them, it is possible to imagine how such 
interactions might also produce possibilities for their transgression.  New actors may 
contemplate the possibility of state responsibilities, and not simply state powers.  
The concept of state responsibility makes it possible to question the legitimacy of 
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sovereign state actions.  No longer legitimate simply on account of sovereign 
authority, such actions may be deemed unlawful, thereby opening the space for 
both new meanings of legitimate sovereign power and for international human 
rights law and its rejection of absolute sovereign state power.236  
In this respect, UNHCR’s responsibility-sharing arrangements, emerging from the 
agency’s interactions with state and civil society actors, did increase de facto 
protection space for Iraqi refugees by testing the definitions and limits of state 
sovereignty, envisioning alternative forms of shared governance, and making way for 
the entrance of international human rights and refugee protection norms.  But these 
arrangements were nonetheless criticised for their failure to secure more formal 
protections for Iraqi refugees, as they were more heavily reliant on politics than on 
law.  Yet perhaps these initial arrangements provided the groundwork for 
considering how law could re-enter the picture, moving refugee protection further 
from the realm of political compromise and closer to that of legal obligation. 
Many scholars have called for responsibility-sharing in refugee and human rights 
protection, suggesting ways that this might be accomplished by formalising and 
institutionalising certain systems of shared responsibility that may already exist in 
practice.  They predominantly have approached the question from one of two 
perspectives: either shifting certain state responsibilities onto international 
organisations or extending the concept of responsibility beyond states to include 
international organisations.  Within both of these approaches, while the state still 
serves as the starting point for finding responsibility, other actors such as UNHCR 
assume more formal obligations and duties.  However, whether the allocation of 
fragmented responsibilities translates into accountability and sustainability remains 
another question.  There are also implications for whether refugee protection will 
continue to be grounded in state responsibility and whether such expanded roles will 
compromise or strengthen UNHCR’s mandate. 
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Proponents of the shifting responsibility approach argue that responsibility 
should turn upon whether there exists effective, not just theoretical, control over 
persons and territories.237  Mégrét and Hoffman called for the test of “control”, 
which is manifested through “functional sovereignty” or the UN’s “interstitial 
management of state shortfalls” as a means of determining when the UN is bound to 
promote or respect human rights.238  Wilde called for a formal recognition that 
UNHCR’s mandate also contains human rights governance functions in cases where 
the organisation is exercising de facto control, in order to hold the agency more 
accountable for its actions and to prevent it from deflecting responsibility for 
violations onto the host state.239  Kagan suggested that while states should retain 
ultimate responsibility for refugee protection, the de facto practice of governance-
sharing should be more formalised de jure and acknowledged as a legitimate tool of 
refugee protection that can simultaneously address sovereign interests and ensure 
protection space.  Duties could be assigned to the actor (state or UNHCR) best 
equipped to carry them out, reconciling sovereignty with the “demands of human 
survival and decency”.240   
Other scholars have approached the question of shared responsibility from the 
perspective of extending rather than shifting responsibility to new actors.  Such 
conceptions of responsibility recognise the duties born not just by states, but by 
other actors such as intergovernmental organisations in the context of the 
globalisation of the political economy and the emergence of political arrangements 
that exceed the boundaries of traditional territorial sovereign states.241  Salomon, et 
al, argued that a complementary obligation of organisations beyond the state to 
protect human rights might be found in cases where the state is unable to protect 
human rights, particularly given that the international economic order may 
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undermine a state’s ability or willingness to protect human rights.242  This would 
extend responsibility to international organisations, rather than substitute state 
obligations under international law,243 and it would address fears that UNHCR may 
have about formalising its responsibility-sharing arrangements beyond what has 
already occurred. 
Rajaram and Grundy-Warr suggested the need to de-link protection from 
territory, making the protection of humans, rather than citizens, the goal of refugee 
policy.  They argued that as long as states retain the ultimate responsibility for 
implementing and respecting human rights, human rights will always be limited by 
sovereign interests; hence the need for a re-definition of human rights protection 
that does not rest solely within the state.244  In the refugee context, it would be 
necessary both to de-link state responsibility from the moral obligations of 
international law and the duties of other actors in the system, and to de-territorialise 
notions of refugee rights protection.  Where the state is no longer the sole arbiter 
and enforcer of protection, and rights are no longer contingent on territory, human 
rights can be revived, and responsibilities for protection may be found in 
international organisations or other actors.  Finding complementary responsibilities 
of UNHCR and host states might provide an avenue for separating the concept of 
protection from that of state responsibility and would not ground refugee protection 
exclusively within the ambit of the state. 
Refugee protection efforts in this sense could be strengthened by moving them 
beyond the concept of ultimate state responsibility and locating them more squarely 
within the realm of global governance or a transnational law of refugee protection.  
Complementary responsibilities provide an avenue for formalising such global 
governance without undermining UNHCR’s capacity to advocate for state 
responsibility for refugees.  They also provide the agency with greater leverage in 
representing refugees before host states.   This may point to the need to recognise 
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more formally the responsibility and obligation of UNHCR to step in where states fail, 
not to take the place of the state, but to promote refugee protection.  In the process, 
more protections for refugees may be secured,245 although their sustainability is 
subject to debate.  Such formalisation of responsibilities may also give rise to 
apportioning greater accountability to UNHCR, which has long been involved in 
governing refugees in practice, but has always been able to deflect responsibility for 
protection failures or consequences of exclusion to the state.246  The normative 
result of such a move could be an increasing recognition internationally of UNHCR’s 
responsibility towards refugees – and not just the states that host them. 
Otherwise, the formalisation of responsibility-sharing arrangements, whether 
apportioned or complementary, could be fraught with pitfalls.  Refugees might 
secure protection from UNHCR, but could continue to remain in an ambiguous space 
in terms of their legal status and access to public services on state territories.  Reliant 
upon UNHCR protection and assistance, they could comprise a vast underclass within 
host states and be forced to navigate the vagaries of state violence and UNHCR 
intervention, should states choose not to respect UNHCR decisions or 
representations.   
Responsibility-sharing arrangements could also compromise the UNHCR’s 
mandate, which could be undermined or further expanded beyond the agency’s 
capacity.  Assuming state-like decision-making roles, the agency may have fewer 
resources to dedicate to monitoring and advocacy.  UNHCR could also risk becoming 
complicit in practices of state violence, particularly through decision-making 
structures that produce legal exclusion and political exceptionalism in territories 
where human rights are not respected.  In recognition of this possibility, the agency 
may work to develop systems of greater institutional accountability to refugees, but 
such moves towards legal closure, if they fail to address the violence inherent in the 
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constitution and maintenance of regulatory orders,247 also risk depoliticising refugee 
spaces and institutionalising the logic of sovereignty even further.   
Also, should UNHCR assume apportioned rather than complementary roles, 
state responsibility could be inverted, placing a higher or ultimate responsibility 
upon the agency, as happened in its designation as the “first authority” charged with 
refugee protection in the MoU between Egypt and UNHCR,248 for example.  The 
danger that results lies in fears that states will draw upon such formalised 
obligations to deflect their responsibilities for persons on their territories onto 
UNHCR, undermining any leverage or negotiating room that the agency currently has 
in pressuring states to assume greater responsibilities for refugee protection.  
Perhaps maintaining such arrangements in more ad hoc, de facto, and less 
formalised ways has provided UNHCR with the room to call for state responsibility in 
accordance with its mandate, while at the same time trying to prevent refugee lives 
from becoming further compromised in the process. 
In light of these considerations, although UNCHR was unable to supersede state 
sovereign authority in its quest for maximising refugee protection space in the Iraqi 
context, the agency’s strategy to develop responsibility-sharing arrangements may 
have been a first step towards formalising frameworks of global governance and 
transnational law.  Within the Iraqi refugee crisis, UNHCR attempted to overcome 
the commonly perceived incommensurability between state sovereignty and 
international law,249 through its strategies to assume some of the positive legal 
obligations associated with sovereignty; to provide support for state services for 
Iraqi refugees; to draw selectively upon human rights and refugee law to craft 
alternative legal frameworks; and to acknowledge sovereign state interests250 in 
containing refugee problems in the global south and regulating refugee entry to the 
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global north.  This delicate balancing act raises ethical questions about the agency’s 
perceived neutrality.  At the same time, it may allow for the entry of new 
international norms and governance structures for refugee protection. 
Also, UNHCR in effect assumed some sovereign roles in the interest of 
alleviating the suffering of the vast majority of Iraqi refugees remaining in spaces of 
exception in their host states.  Not only mediating between states and refugees in 
spaces of exception, UNHCR was also instrumental in shaping these spaces, lifting 
them from the threat of pure exception and exile to something more variegated, and 
trying to create law in the very spaces where law had been lifted.  As an 
international organisation, it far exceeded the scope of its interstate responsibilities.  
The violence of state power over refugees, whether expressed through expulsion or 
indifference, or tempered by compassion and pity, was both reproduced and 
mitigated to some extent by UNHCR’s interventions to reformulate this power in 
terms of legal obligation. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The strategies employed by UNHCR in its negotiations with host states in the 
Middle East suggested new ways of securing Iraqi refugee protection that contested 
the traditional grounding of sovereign power solely within the state.  Critical forms 
of de facto protection were achieved in the absence of formal legal protections or 
institutional change.  At the same time, in assuming a quasi-sovereign role in 
securing such protections, UNHCR shifted from a paradigm of rights promotion to 
that of rights protection based upon its regulatory systems and biopolitical 
categorisations of vulnerability and decisions on inclusion and exclusion.  In so doing, 
although reconfiguring the space of sovereignty, the agency continued to reproduce 
the logic of sovereignty as it at once both governed refugee spaces and tacitly 
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supported sovereign interests, placing the agency at risk of reproducing structures of 
state violence.   
At the same time, the expanding and increasingly state-like roles of UNHCR may 
also have revealed possibilities for imagining new forms of transnational governance 
that, while not contesting the logic of sovereignty, might at least provide some ways 
for recognising and protecting not just the citizen, but the “human” in human rights.  
In using funding, resettlement, and diplomacy strategically to counter state 
restrictions imposed on refugees on their territories, UNHCR’s new powers of 
governance may also have created opportunities for contesting and influencing the 
exercise of state sovereignty, making way for conceptions of sovereign responsibility 
and not just sovereign power, as it encouraged greater inclusivity and flexibility and 
attempted to counter the normalcy of sovereign state exceptionalism towards 
refugees in the region. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Refugees in the ‘No-Man’s Land’: The spatial politics of 
displacement in Iraq’s border zones 
 
 
“I would like to be resettled somewhere that recognises us as citizens.  
I was born in one country, I grew up in another country, and now I live 
between two countries.  I am nobody – a zero in the Arab nation.”  
 
− Palestinian refugee in Al Tanf camp1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Forty-thousand Palestinian, Iranian, Kurdish, Syrian, and Sudanese refugees in 
Iraq were forcibly displaced by militias who filled the power vacuum in the aftermath 
of the 2003 war.2  Resented for favourable treatment they received under the 
former regime and targeted with violence, they attempted to flee to neighbouring 
states, but were often construed as threats and denied permission to cross the 
borders.3  As a result, they were compelled to reside in ad hoc camps in or near the 
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“no-man’s lands” along Iraq’s borders with Syria, Jordan, and Iran.  These camps 
were not sustainable, however; often as soon as the refugees settled in one, they 
would be displaced and settled in another.  Caught up in a cycle of displacement and 
re-emplacement, exclusion and inclusion, their movements along the borderlands 
themselves became bordering practices.  They not only traced the spatial divisions 
between states, but also marked the geopolitical definitions of who belonged within 
them. 
This chapter examines the operations of sovereignty and refugee protection in 
Iraq’s border zones.  It first maps their topography by tracing the legal and normative 
practices that turned on the decision on the exception and the biopolitical 
management of the refugee population, bringing into relief the operations of 
sovereignty at the sites of its greatest contestation − the borderlands of states.  It 
argues that these practices functioned as technologies of power, facilitating the 
materialisation of the state of exception,4 and transforming it into a geographical, 
political, and social space.  They instrumentalised the border in the project of 
producing specific forms of spatiality, time, and agency.5  The spaces which the 
refugees occupied in turn served to further except, alienate, and isolate, shaping 
processes of state-making and discourses of citizenship within the region,6 and 
materially affecting the refugee population7 − what Pettman termed “devastating 
combinations” of “bodies, boundaries, violence, and power”.8  Yet in the translation 
of the state of exception to a lived social space, something happened to the 
operations of sovereignty.  Positioned along the borders, the disciplinary spaces 
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produced by practices of exceptionalism also may have become the sources of 
sovereignty’s own undoing.  In the slippages that occurred in the production of these 
spaces, refugees, humanitarian organisations, and resettlement states also mobilised 
them to contest both the legitimacy of their exclusion and the reach of state power. 
 
 
II. Bordering practices and the creation of abject space 
 
The practices exercised towards refugees in Iraq after 2003 that functioned as 
technologies of power in producing and contesting the logic of sovereignty may be 
grouped into three broad categories: violence and expulsion, displacement and re-
emplacement, and humanitarian management and resettlement.  The following 
sections map the spaces created by these practices for the three major groups of 
refugees in Iraq: refugees recognised by UNHCR, former members of the People’s 
Mujahadeen of Iran (PMOI), and Palestinians.  The PMOI and Palestinians are treated 
separately because these groups faced unique legal and political challenges in that 
one was a formerly listed terrorist organisation, and the other was stateless. 
 
A. Technologies of violence and expulsion 
 
Technologies of violence and expulsion were the first set of legal practices that 
displaced refugees in Iraq and drove them to the country’s borders.  Emerging norms 
that legitimised the exception of these refugees from state protection gained 
increasing legal significance as the Iraqi government enacted proclamations and 
administrative orders discriminating against and excluding them, and acquiesced to 
the perpetration of violence against them. 
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1. Recognised refugees 
 
Prior to the 2003 war in Iraq, Iraq was not a signatory to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees9 or the 1967 Optional Protocol.10  However, it did 
generally protect refugees recognised by UNHCR from refoulement,11 and Saddam 
Hussein provided support particularly to those whose political interests were aligned 
with his own.  For example, Iranian refugees of Arab ethnicity (Ahwazis), who were 
opposed to the government of Iran, received land, houses, and farms in Iraq.12  
Syrian refugees were granted refugee status due to their membership in dissident 
factions of the Syrian Ba’ath Party, and were provided with protection and 
assistance.13 
Following the 2003 war, the Coalition Provisional Authority placed responsibility 
for refugees under Iraq’s Ministry of Displacement and Migration.  The Permanent 
Committee for Refugee Affairs, established under Iraq’s 1971 Refugee Act, was 
reactivated in 2005, but lacked the capacity to conduct refugee status 
determination, leaving this responsibility to UNHCR.14  Despite such measures, the 
protection space refugees had previously enjoyed became constricted by 
bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining and renewing their residency, travel, and identity 
documents.15  They were also targeted by militias with exploitation, violence,16 and 
expulsions for perceived preferential treatment under the former regime and in the 
violent demarcations of community in the new Iraq.  For example, some Ahwazis fled 
to Syria, but eight were arrested there in May 2006, and five were deported to Iran, 
thus discouraging them from seeking asylum outside of Iraq again.  Syrian refugees 
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faced abductions, harassment, murder, arbitrary arrest, and accusations of 
involvement in terrorism.17  Having no place to flee from Iraq, the majority were 
displaced to camps along its borders. 
 
2. Former PMOI/MEK 
 
Bordering practices towards former members of the PMOI or the sāzmān-e 
mojāhedin-e khalq-e irān (Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization – the “MEK”) vacillated 
between inclusion under the Geneva Conventions and the 1951 Convention and 
exclusion as members of listed terrorist organisations, reflecting the political 
ambitions of both the Coalition Forces and the newly emerging Iraqi state.  These 
practices were realised in the emplacement and displacement of the former PMOI in 
Camp Ashraf (now “Camp New Iraq”).  As such, both the practices of violence and 
expulsion and of emplacement and displacement are addressed together in this 
section.  
The PMOI were members of the military wing of the National Council of 
Resistance of Iran, which began as an Islamist leftist opposition group against the 
Shah of Iran, but then clashed with Shi'ah clerics who assumed power following the 
1979 revolution.18  They were harboured under Saddam Hussein’s regime starting in 
1986 during the Iran-Iraq war and launched an attack against Iran from this base in 
1988.19  Numbering nearly 4,000, they were housed in Camp Ashraf, 120 kilometres 
from the Iranian border20 for more than 25 years.21   
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Following the 2003 war, under a series of protocols signed with the US forces, 
the PMOI were recognised as “protected persons” under Article 27 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, were disarmed and renounced the use of violence,22 and were 
protected by the Multi-National Forces (MNF).  Despite this, they feared human 
rights violations in Iran,23 as Iran requested they be either extradited to Iran to stand 
trial for terrorism or turned over to the Iraqi government, which was expected to 
comply with Iranian desires.24   
Many members of the Shi’ah-dominated Iraqi government, who had suffered 
under Saddam Hussein, had been granted exile in Iran and maintained close ties 
there.  Hence they were unsympathetic to the anti-Iranian regime position of the 
PMOI,25 and threatened to cut off their access to fuel and drinking water, expel 
them, and close the camp.26  On 17 June 2008, the Iraqi Council of Ministers adopted 
a directive to expel the PMOI from Iraq.27  Several Iraqi officials also demanded their 
expulsion within six months.28  On 21 December 2008, the Iraqi government 
announced that Camp Ashraf would be closed.29 
These demands raised fears that any PMOI returned to Iran would be subjected 
to detention, torture, and possible execution, as they would be unlikely to receive a 
fair trial.30  The International Federation for Human Rights argued that this would 
constitute refoulement to torture, in violation of international customary law, and 
since the US remained in de facto control of the camp, it was obligated to protect 
them.31  On 15 October 2008, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urged 
the Iraqi government to protect the PMOI from forced deportation and refrain from 
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actions that would endanger their life or security,32 a position reiterated by the 
European Parliament in April 2009.33  
The US found itself in a tricky position, as extraditing the PMOI to Iran could 
provide some leverage in its influence over Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, yet 
protecting them would acknowledge the role they played in turning over information 
about this same programme to the US.  Also, despite being “protected persons”, the 
PMOI were listed as a terrorist organisation by the US State Department due to their 
alleged support for the 1979 takeover of the US Embassy in Iran.  Both British and 
European courts called for their de-listing,34 and although they were removed from 
the EU list in January 2009,35 they remained on the US list36 until 2012.   
In addition, the US feared that turning the camp over to the Iraqi authorities 
before they were able to guarantee the protection of the PMOI would place the 
residents in jeopardy.37  Responsibility for the protection of Camp Ashraf was only 
transferred to the Iraqi government on 1 January 2009,38  upon the conclusion of the 
Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the US,39 in which Iraq assumed 
greater authority over its internal affairs.  Although no explicit mention was made of 
either the PMOI or their “protected persons” status, the US withdrew its forces 
protecting the camp.40   
On 12 March 2009, fighting broke out when the camp residents blocked access 
of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to one of the camp buildings.41  The ISF surrounded 
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the camp to prevent residents from entering or exiting,42 and to prevent the entry of 
supplies.  They threatened and beat some residents before US forces intervened.  
This was ostensibly ordered by the Iraqi National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-
Rubaie, although he denied it.  In January, he had stated that Camp Ashraf would be 
made “part of history within two months”, and then the day after the raid, he 
announced that the camp would be closed, and its residents would have to return to 
Iran or relocate to another country.43  
In April 2009, the Iraqi and Iranian governments called for the expulsion of the 
PMOI and closure of the camp.44  These threats were realised on 28-29 July 2009 
when clashes again broke out within the camp as the ISF entered to establish a 
police station.45  The ISF used bulldozers, grenades, tear gas, pepper spray, batons, 
and water cannons against the residents.46  Thirteen residents were killed, 450 
injured, and 50 arrested in the raid.47  Those in detention were beaten and tortured, 
and none initially were granted access to counsel.48  However, the Iraqi Governor of 
Diyala did announce they would be tried in an Iraqi court and not returned to Iran.49  
When eight journalists attempted to cover the story on 1 August 2009, they were 
denied entry, and some were detained and their equipment confiscated.50   
The raid raised fears that many PMOI would be expelled to Iran.  The Iraqi State 
Security Minister stated on 4 August 2009 that none of the PMOI in Camp Ashraf 
would be granted political asylum.  That same month, the Iraqi authorities denied 
allegations by UN expert Jean Ziegler that they were blocking the camp’s access to 
food, water, and medical supplies, stating that they were only blocking building 
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materials.51  Advocacy organisations called upon the Iraqi government to avoid 
expulsions, arguing that refoulement would constitute a violation of customary 
international law.52  On 11 December 2009, the remaining residents in camp Ashraf 
were given an ultimatum by the Iraqi authorities to either leave the camp or be 
forcibly removed and possibly subject to expulsion from Iraq, and Prime Minister 
Nuri Al-Maliki stated that plans were underway to relocate most of the PMOI to the 
southern province of Muthana in Iraq, which Amnesty International argued would 
place them at risk of detention, torture, and death.53 
 
3. Palestinians 
 
“They lived off our blood under Saddam. We were hungry with no food and [they 
were] comfortable with full bellies.  They should leave now, or they will have to 
pay.”  
− Sheikh Mahmoud El Hassani, spokesman for the Mahdi Army 54 
 
Palestinians have sought refuge continuously in Iraq since their first 
displacement from Palestine in 1948.55  Although they were never recognised as 
refugees or granted citizenship, as this was argued to undermine their right of return 
to the Occupied Palestinian Territories,56 they received protection from successive 
Iraqi governments due to resolutions made by the League of Arab States and the 
1965 Casablanca Protocol.57  They were generally treated well, given residence 
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permits, the right to work, access to social and health services, and housing.58  They 
were politically useful to the Ba’ath Party in its projects of pan-Arabism, were 
exempted from military service, and were allowed more freedom to travel than the 
average Iraqi citizen.59  They were entitled to apply for Iraqi travel documents called 
"Republic of Iraq: Palestinian Travel Document[s]”, but not full Iraqi passports.60  
Saddam Hussein called upon Palestinians to migrate in the thousands to Iraq, 
promising to provide them with jobs and special treatment.61  He conscripted Iraqis 
(but not Palestinians) into the Jerusalem Army fighting for the liberation of Palestine.  
He offered USD 10,000-25,000 to the families of Palestinian martyrs and USD one 
billion to assist Palestinians in the Middle East.62 
However, the absence of human rights frameworks and the exclusive provision 
of aid in governing the Palestinians exacerbated their social exclusion, providing the 
foundations for later iterations of discrimination and violence against them.  Having 
no rights to speak of, they had few options but to accept the assistance offered, but 
this was at the expense of the Iraqi population during an era when Saddam Hussein 
was committing atrocities against the Kurds and Shi’ah in Iraq,63 and the country was 
crippled by sanctions.   
Therefore, much of the violence targeting Palestinians post-2003 was motivated 
by resentments toward the preferential treatment that they had received.  Being 
Sunni,64 and perceived as allied with Saddam Hussein, some were also suspected of 
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terrorism committed by the Sunni-dominated insurgency.65  In 2005, the Iraqi 
Minister of Displacement and Migration called for the Palestinians’ expulsion to 
Gaza, claiming they supported terrorism.66  And both Kurdish and Shi’ah groups (e.g. 
SCIRI’s Badr Organisation and Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army) increased their threats against 
Palestinians, assuming that they were allied with the Sunni insurgency.67 
Also, landlords harboured resentments for having had to house Palestinians at 
artificially low rents under the former regime when many were paying less than USD 
one per month in rent, resulting in the effective deprivation of the landlords of their 
property.68  No longer receiving even minimal government subsidies for renting to 
Palestinians,69 they demanded higher rents,70 and began to evict them.   
In this climate of resentment, Palestinians faced arduous bureaucratic processes 
for renewing their residency.71  They were re-classified as “non-resident foreigners” 
and were required to approach the Ministry of Interior’s Department of Residency to 
obtain or renew their residency permits, or risk deportation.72  They reported poor 
treatment by the authorities, long waiting periods, fines for expired residencies, 
confiscation of identity documents, deportation orders, and forced bribery.73   
Palestinians were also targeted with violence in the form of arbitrary arrests, 
detentions, kidnappings, torture, and extra-judicial killings, which intensified with 
the rise in sectarian violence.74  Several militias issued death sentences against 
them,75 and abducted and killed them even when a ransom was paid.76  Palestinians 
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were found dead on the streets or in morgues, mutilated and bearing marks of 
torture, including drill holes, their teeth removed with pliers, electric shocks, 
cigarette burns, and beatings − visceral assertions of new national identities on 
bodies now deemed outlaws to the state.  They were arbitrarily detained by the 
MNF or the ISF,77 and forced under duress and torture by beatings and electric 
shocks to their genitals to confess to terrorist acts in which most were not complicit.  
Some family members paid bribes to the ISF to prevent their torture or secure their 
release.  Their neighbourhoods were raided and alleged terrorist suspects rounded 
up, most of whom were held without charge or trial or disappeared in custody.  They 
were threatened by both ISF and sectarian militias to leave their homes or face 
death.78  They also fled their homes on threat of violence by militias, armed Shi’ah 
landlords, or Iraqi civilians seeking to appropriate their homes for themselves.79  In 
March 2006, the “Judgment Day Brigades” militia distributed leaflets in Palestinian 
neighbourhoods, warning the residents that if they did not evacuate within ten days, 
they would be “eliminated”.80  Nearly 500 were killed from 2003 to 2007.81   
In April 2006, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani issued an order forbidding 
attacks on Palestinians, a move welcomed by UNHCR,82 and one similarly undertaken 
by a few other Shi’ah clerics.83  However, attacks by the more militant armed militias, 
particularly those associated with Muqtada Al-Sadr, continued unabated.84  In 
October 2006, militias threatened the Palestinian families in Al Hurriya district of 
Baghdad, causing nearly 300 to flee.85  Militias attacked the Palestinian 
neighbourhood of Al Baladiyat in Baghdad with mortars that killed four and 
wounded dozens more.  Following this attack, more than half of the 8,000 
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Palestinians living there fled.86  Some reported that the ISF participated in the 
violence, throwing out the residents’ furniture and telling them to leave within two 
days.87  As of 2008, there were 237 families displaced from Baghdad, and 600 deaths 
of Palestinians in this area.  In the absence of government services, the NGO “Haifa 
Club” provided basic assistance.88  
Although the targeted attacks against Palestinians began to wane by the end of 
2007, there were still reports of ongoing violence by militias and criminal gangs.  The 
Iraqi authorities and the MNF were either unable or unwilling to protect the 
Palestinians,89 particularly in light of the allegations that members of the ISF 
tolerated, encouraged, and participated in some of the violence.90  Many 
Palestinians fled as a result of the violence; of the 34,000 Palestinians who had lived 
in Iraq immediately prior to 2003,91  less than 12,000 remained by 2009.92 
In this climate, Palestinians tried to find ways to survive, recoding their bodies in 
ways that rendered them invisible,93 as their bodies became “mobile checkpoints” 
and sites of state control.94  One young man, arrested on suspicion of insurgency, 
avoided carrying his Iraqi identity card which noted his Palestinian ethnicity; he also 
tried to hide his identity by speaking in the Iraqi dialect.95 Another was advised to 
always say he was Christian when asked his religion, and to change his name in order 
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to avoid being targeted.96  Another obtained a fake Iraqi identity card and name for 
himself and his family to avoid being singled out for violence.97   
 
B. Practices of displacement and re-emplacement 
 
Forcible displacement and re-emplacement of refugees within Iraq were 
practices that excepted them from state protection.  Despite the violence that drove 
them to flee, they were unable to cross international borders to seek asylum.98  They 
therefore found themselves trapped in camps along Iraq’s borders.  Within these 
spaces, they rarely enjoyed physical protection, remained dependent upon 
humanitarian aid, lived in situations of legal liminality, and were subjected to further 
violence and displacement.  Their emplacements in these border zones became 
visceral markers of sovereign exceptionalism, as bare life was spatially realised 
within the confines of the camps. 
 
1. Recognised refugees 
 
Recognised refugees in Iraq included Sudanese, Ahwazis, Kurds, and Syrians.  In 
2005, 150 Sudanese fled Iraq for Jordan,99 but their entry was prevented by the 
Jordanian authorities.  Stranded at the border, they were relocated by the Iraqi Red 
Crescent to Camp K70 near the military Camp Korean Village in Iraq’s Al Anbar 
desert.100  Living and security conditions in the camp were rife with problems due to 
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nearby insurgent activity.  Two Sudanese were murdered by insurgents, three died, 
and two attempted suicide.101   
Fear of violence also led 80 Ahwazi families to flee to UNHCR transit centres on 
the outskirts of Basrah.  They were then relocated by the Iraqi authorities to areas 
throughout the southern governorates.  In 2007, four were assassinated by Iranian 
agents, leading 100 to flee to the Trebil border camp.102  The number living in Iraq 
decreased from 2,500 in 2006,103 to 1,700 by 2008.104  Several attempted to return 
to Iran, but were met with hostility, harassment, and sometimes detention; they also 
faced difficulties in reintegrating after more than two decades in exile.105  In Iran, 
some were accused of being members of the Ahwazi Liberation Organization and 
faced imprisonment, torture, and even execution.106  As a result, the number of 
Ahwazis at the border grew, reaching 105 in Al Waleed camp by 2010.107 
Approximately 12,000 Iranian Kurds were housed in Al Tash camp in the 
governorate of Al Anbar prior to the 2003 war.  During the invasion, due to insecurity 
caused by ongoing fighting, several thousand fled north, but 1,200 were blocked in 
the “no-man’s land” on the Iraqi border.108  After Al Tash camp closed, they resided 
in the Kawa settlement in Erbil established in 2006 by the Kurdistan Regional 
Government.109  They were also placed in the Barika settlement in Sulymaniyah,110  
where they were provided with housing.111   
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2. Palestinians 
 
On 20 April 2003, UNHCR and ICRC established the Al Awda refugee camp in 
Baghdad for displaced Palestinians, but it provided inadequate shelter from extreme 
temperatures, and an unexploded bomb remained buried in the centre of the 
camp.112  In November 2003, 1,500 evictees were also forced to live in tents in the 
Haifa Sports Club.113  Escalations in violence subsequently led to the flight of 
Palestinians towards Syria and Jordan, but these states refused their entry, claiming 
to be already overburdened,114 and attempting to balance their political and 
economic priorities with those of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).   
The Palestinians were also prevented entry due to the lack of documentation 
recognised by neighbouring states,115 many of which refused to issue them visas.116  
The Jordanian authorities denied them entry, stating that having only Palestinian 
travel documents from Iraq, stamped by the Iraqi authorities with “right to exit, no 
right to return”, they would be unable to return to Iraq in the future, a position 
reaffirmed by the Iraqi Minister of Interior.117  Syria denied them entry, claiming it 
already hosted more than 450,000 Palestinians,118 despite that 1.4 million Iraqis 
were permitted to enter.119  The European Parliament admonished Iraq’s neighbours 
for keeping their borders closed to Palestinians and condemned the Iraqi Minister of 
Displacement and Migration for calling for their expulsion.120  Many fled using forged 
Iraqi passports, with some even fleeing to Asia.121   
Hence, the protracted encampment of Palestinians in the border zones of Iraq 
began, resulting in a long series of emplacements in ad hoc camps, displacements 
from these camps, and re-emplacements in new camps (see Figure 1 below): 
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Figure 1. Palestinian camps in Iraq’s borderlands (not to scale): 
“No Man’s Lands” are areas shaded in dark grey. 
 
In 2003, Palestinians and Iranian Kurds from Al Tash camp near Ramadi 
attempted to flee to Jordan, but were refused entry and left stuck in the two-
kilometre-wide “no-man’s-land” between the Trebil and Al Karama border posts,122 
many in the makeshift Al Karama camp.  This “no-man’s land” was a transit zone 
between the Iraqi border post they exited and the Jordanian border post they tried 
to enter (see Figure 2 below).    
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Figure 2. Detail of Al Ruwayshed and Al Karama camps (not to scale) 
 
Later that year, the Palestinians were permitted to enter Jordan on a one-time 
basis, but they were placed in Al Ruwayshed refugee camp 85 kilometres inside the 
Jordanian border.  Al Ruwayshed had been established by the Jordanian authorities 
and UNHCR on 15 April 2003 in anticipation of the forced displacement of Iraqis 
following the war.123  Palestinians had very limited freedom of movement outside of 
the camp.  Some were prevented re-entry to the camp after going to the border to 
meet relatives.  Those requiring hospital treatment needed permission from the 
Minister of the Interior to have any relatives visit them.  Based upon marriages with 
Jordanians, 386 were admitted into Jordan in August 2003 under a Royal Order, but 
they were prohibited from employment.124   
Due to the difficult living conditions in the camp, 250 Palestinians elected to 
return to Baghdad,125 hoping that the security situation had improved.  However, on 
19 March 2004, 89 were compelled to flee again.  When they reached the border, 
they were prevented from crossing until authorised by the Iraqi Minister of Interior.  
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As soon as they tried to enter the Jordanian border post, the Jordanian authorities 
closed it for four days, refusing to reopen it until they returned to Iraq.  They had to 
sleep on a bus next to Al Karama camp and later to return at the order of Iraqi 
soldiers to the Iraqi side of the border.  They were housed in an abandoned horse 
stable and provided with humanitarian assistance by UNHCR and the Iraqi Red 
Crescent Society (IRCS).  As more fled central Iraq, they joined this group, increasing 
its size to over 200.  On 23 April, Iraqi soldiers refused any more persons entry and 
ordered 54 new arrivals to return to Baghdad.  However, given a sandstorm, the 
women and children were allowed inside, and the men were forced to sleep in an 
abandoned trailer nearby.126   
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) initially supported such 
restrictions as they opposed the resettlement of Palestinians to other Arab states, on 
the ground that this would undermine their right of return to Palestine.  Until 2006, 
the PLO’s position remained that the Palestinians either be transferred to the PNA 
territories (a move blocked by Israel), remain at Iraq’s borders, or return to 
Baghdad.127  This position, combined with Syria and Jordan’s reluctance to host any 
more Palestinians, exacerbated the plight of the Palestinians at the borders.  It 
demonstrated Barkan’s contention that privileging of right of return as a utopian 
ideal over Palestinian refugees’ immediate welfare furthered their suffering.128 
However, in 2006, following negotiations between Syria and the new Hamas-led 
PNA, the PNA reversed its earlier position and called for Arab states to accommodate 
Palestinian refugees from Iraq.129  On 22 April 2006, the Syrian authorities, in 
cooperation with UNHCR and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), agreed to receive the refugees who 
were in the border camps in Jordan.  They housed them in Al Hol camp near Hasaka 
in Syria’s north-eastern border zone, which was originally constructed for Iraqi 
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refugees fleeing the first Gulf War.130  The refugees’ numbers had grown to 305,131 
and the next day, an additional 37 arrived from Baghdad and were also permitted 
entry.132  The refugees in Al Hol depended upon humanitarian assistance, and their 
legal status and prospects for integration remained unclear, particularly for those 
having relatives already residing in Syria.133  They were restricted from work and 
travel outside of the city, and their travel documents were confiscated by the Syrian 
government.134   
In May 2006, more Palestinians arrived at the Syrian border, but were denied 
entry.135  They then began self-settling in the ad hoc Al Tanf camp in the seven-
kilometre stretch of “no-man’s land” between the border posts in Iraq and Syria (see 
Figure 3 below).  Although part of Syrian territory, this was a legally liminal zone 
where the Syrian authorities exercised jurisdiction only when they deemed it 
politically expedient to do so.  At times they exercised state authority by preventing 
new arrivals from residing there.  The camp accommodated 389 persons when it was 
established,136 and by August 2009, its population had reached 900.137   
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Figure 3. Detail of Al Tanf and Al Waleed Camps (not to scale) 
 
Due to Palestinians’ insecurity, threats of violence they faced in Iraq, 
deportations from Syria, and hopes for resettlement, they continued to flee to Al 
Tanf.138  However, starting in December 2006, new arrivals were blocked access to 
the camp or prevented by the Iraqi authorities from leaving Iraq.  They therefore 
self-settled in a new ad hoc camp, Al Waleed, three kilometres inside Iraq near its 
border post (see Figure 3 above), bordered on one side by a highway and located in 
close proximity to a MNF military base.139  By 2007, Al Waleed’s population was 
1,550,140 rising to 1,750 people in 2008.141  In July 2009, a group of 186 Iranian 
Kurdish refugees who were stranded in the no-man’s land on the Jordanian-Iraqi 
border also were relocated to Al Waleed,142 pushing the total population to 2,000.143 
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The living conditions in these camps were extremely harsh, as they did not have 
adequate infrastructure to support such large numbers.144  Residents contended 
with strong winds, sandstorms, extreme temperatures, flooding,145 snakes and 
scorpions,146 accidents on nearby highways, 147 lack of water, 148 and inadequate and 
expired food supplies.149  Fires were amongst the worst problems in the camps,150 as 
the tents could burn completely within 20 seconds, forcing families to sleep with 
knives under their pillows to cut holes to escape.151  UNHCR provided education 
assistance,152 and the Iraqi government sent some food and other necessities.153   
Due to the security situation in Al Waleed, for the first two years, UNHCR and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) maintained a limited and 
sporadic presence there, and only the Italian Consortium of Solidarity was able to 
distribute humanitarian relief regularly.154  Al Waleed also lacked adequate health 
care facilities, and many refugees had serious health problems, including diabetes, 
birth defects, kidney disease, cancer, and psychological trauma.155  The closest 
medical facility, Al Qa’im, was 400 kilometres away, and patients had to risk traveling 
this distance on one of the most dangerous highways in Iraq.156  Also, Syria restricted 
entry for Palestinians with urgent medical needs,157 allowing in only four in 2007,158 
and as a result three had died of treatable illnesses by May of that year.159   
On 24 May 2007, the Iraqi government offered to facilitate the return of the 
Palestinians to Baghdad and to create a camp for them in Al Baladiyat.  Most 
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rejected this offer, fearing that the government would not ensure their protection.160  
Their security within the camps, however, also was compromised as women were 
sexually harassed, and violent confrontations occurred between the MNF and 
insurgents nearby.161  And in 2006, three men and two minors in Al Tanf were 
abducted and tortured by the ISF for ten days.162 
Thus Palestinians fled to the border camps in increasing numbers as they were 
either displaced from one camp to another, or as they occupied new ad hoc 
settlements when previous ones were closed to them.  In these camps, existing in 
the border zones where legal and physical protection were negligible or impossible, 
they remained dependent upon humanitarian aid, living in harsh desert conditions 
and a climate of insecurity, and waiting for durable solutions to unfold, primarily in 
the form of resettlement.163  In 2007, a combined total of 2,100 refugees occupied 
these camps,164 a number which grew to nearly 3,000 by 2008.165 . 
 
C. Humanitarian management and resettlement 
 
The reluctance of states to assume full responsibility for the protection of 
refugees in these border camps led UNHCR and aid agencies to step in to fill in the 
gaps.  In the process, these agencies assumed governance functions in the camps 
that were more in keeping with their traditional approaches to governing refugees 
separately, unlike their approach towards Iraqi refugees in urban areas.  Governance 
included UNHCR’s provision of humanitarian aid and securing durable solutions – 
primarily resettlement.  These practices turned on decisions on life, and in 
re/presenting the refugees’ vulnerability, both reified and mobilised it, not only 
reproducing but also contesting the logic of sovereignty. 
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1. Recognised refugees 
 
UNHCR facilitated the repatriation or resettlement of Sudanese, Turkish Kurds, 
and Syrian refugees from Iraq.  The ability of the Sudanese Darfurian refugees to 
access humanitarian aid was hindered by the ongoing fighting between the MNF and 
insurgent groups near the camp and the arrest of a Mercy Hands team by the ISF.166  
Having no prospects for safe and voluntary repatriation to Sudan or local integration 
within Iraq, they were finally relocated by UNHCR to a new Emergency Transit 
Centre in Timisoara, Romania, starting in December 2008, where their applications 
were processed for onward resettlement to another country.167  By January 2009, 
138 were evacuated.168  Many Turkish Kurdish refugees wished to return to Turkey, 
provided they were guaranteed protection and granted amnesty.169  As of 2008, the 
UNHCR, Turkey, and Iraq were negotiating a Tripartite Voluntary Repatriation 
Agreement and a Local Settlement/Resettlement Protocol to repatriate and 
integrate Turkish Kurds.170  By 2010, many resided in Makhmour Camp in Ninewa.171  
In 2006, Syrian refugees expressed the wish to return to Syria, provided that they 
also would be given amnesty and guarantees of protection.  Noting that their 
affiliation with the former Ba’ath Party hampered their prospects for local 
integration, UNHCR also recommended their resettlement,172 resettling 18 by 
2010.173 
 
2. Former PMOI/MEK 
 
Having left Iran for political reasons, the PMOI were already entitled to 
protection from refoulement to conditions where they had serious reasons for 
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believing they would face torture.  UNHCR also recognised those who renounced 
violence as refugees and argued for their continued protection.174  Finding them not 
to be excludable from refugee status enabled UNHCR to advocate for states to 
protect them.175  However, the PMOI’s renunciation of violence in hopes of obtaining 
a durable solution largely fell on deaf ears.  The possibility of providing them with 
refuge in the US required de-listing them as a terrorist organisation, a decision which 
Hughes noted, pitted “principle, humanitarianism, and national self-interest against 
one another”.176  Also, despite UNHCR’s recognition of their refugee status, they 
were characterised by many states as security threats or inadmissible based on past 
activities.  Hence, states showed reluctance to extend any form of sustainable 
protection outside of Iraq in the form of resettlement or to provide for their 
humanitarian assistance within the country.177   
 
3. Palestinians 
 
UNHCR and NGOs’ humanitarian governance of the Palestinians in the camps 
and their resettlement to states outside of the Middle East were practices that 
reproduced the Palestinians’ refugee status.  But they also worked in concert with 
Palestinians’ own contestations of their status to problematise and expose the 
protracted nature of their displacement and to call for their inclusion in the 
international state system. 
Palestinians who do not fall within geographical scope of UNRWA,178 fall within 
the mandate of UNHCR,179 under Article 1D, paragraph 2 of the 1951 Convention.180  
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Although Jordan and Syria were within UNRWA’s areas of operation, most 
Palestinians in Iraq had never been registered with UNRWA.  It was also unclear 
whether those housed in the camps, which were technically under Syrian or 
Jordanian jurisdiction, but located in the “no-man’s lands”, were entitled to 
registration by UNRWA.181  Therefore, in practice, promoting legal protection and 
providing humanitarian assistance to refugees in these camps fell to UNHCR.182  The 
Palestinian Hamas, the Syrian Red Crescent Commission, and the World Food 
Program also provided essential aid and food rations.183  Syria permitted UNHCR to 
bring some Palestinians temporarily across the border for emergency medical 
treatment.184  UNRWA also provided health and social services,185 and established 
with UNICEF a primary school and kindergarten.186   
The lack of a clear legal status, ongoing resentments towards Palestinians in 
Iraq, absence of a viable internal relocation alternative, politics surrounding the right 
of return, and interests of states in the region, however, hampered prospects for 
solutions beyond the provision of aid.187  Therefore, UNHCR stated that in light of the 
extreme security threats to the Palestinians’ lives, it was critical that their 
humanitarian and legal protection be de-linked from the larger question of 
Palestinians in the Middle East, and that new refugee flows should be prevented that 
might further complicate this question.188   
In light of this, UNHCR maintained that the responsibility for the protection of 
refugees inside Iraq was that of the Iraqi government.189  It recommended that the 
Iraqi authorities clarify the legal status of Palestinian refugees in the country, issue 
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and renew their residency and travel documents, and make clear and consistent 
statements that they are lawful residents whose rights under international law 
should be protected.  UNHCR called upon Iraq to ensure their physical security, 
restore law and order to their neighbourhoods, and ensure they are entitled to leave 
and be readmitted to Iraq as their country of habitual residence.190  In 2008, the 
Palestinian chargé d'affaires in Baghdad noted that there were discussions between 
the Iraqi government and Palestinian authorities regarding how to assist Palestinians 
with repatriation to their homes or relocation to other safe areas within Iraq, and to 
arrange for their protection and assistance.191   
UNHCR also called for greater regional coordination to protect Palestinians 
stranded at Iraq’s borders,192 through increasing their temporary local integration 
possibilities,193 or facilitating their relocation194 − a position reiterated by some 
NGOs.195  It proposed cross-border relief for refugees in the border regions, 
enhanced resettlement, and temporary relocation outside Iraq as an exceptional 
measure.196  It recommended that Palestinians be provided with temporary legal 
residence in neighbouring states, opportunities to work and access basic services, 
and assurances that they would not be refouled to Iraq.  The agency also called upon 
Arab states, which previously issued Palestinians travel documents, to re-admit them 
in accordance with the 1965 Casablanca Protocol and resolutions of the League of 
Arab States.197  It further appealed to Israel to facilitate the return of Palestinians 
having direct ties to the West Bank and Gaza.198  Although Israel previously rejected 
such appeals,199 it finally agreed in July 2007 to admit 41 Palestinians originally from 
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northern Israel, but now stranded in the border camps along Iraq, to be reunited 
with relatives in the West Bank.200 
UNHCR initially also noted resettlement to third states as a possibility for the 
Palestinians, but called it “an option of last resort”.201  However, given the 
considerable obstacles to realising its other recommendations, resettlement to 
countries outside of the Middle East, rather than relocation to countries within the 
region, soon emerged as the only solution for most refugees in the border camps – 
an option to which Palestinians, through generations of multiple displacements, had 
become well accustomed.   
Many Palestinians also appealed to the public for assistance, using their 
vulnerabilities in the camps to emphasise the need to recognise their rights.  One 
woman spoke of the frailty of the elderly in the harsh winters, the mental health 
problems developing amongst the children, and her inability to meet her children’s 
basic needs.  After asking why the international community was not more alert to 
their situation, she argued, "We have suffered enough. We have been rejected 
wherever we go. People don't realise that we are educated and will fit in anywhere 
given the chance."202  Another woman stated, “"My son is especially suffering 
serious psychological problems after seeing his father killed in front of his eyes."203  
Another said, “We ask international organisations to save the people of this camp 
from the desert [...] Believe me; these words come from our hearts.  Here even men 
cry, I swear by God, I swear by God. It is as if we died every hour and every 
minute.”204  The Palestinians further noted that if each country in Europe accepted 
10 families, then the border camps could be closed.205  Advocacy groups also called 
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for resettlement,206 highlighting the Palestinians’ vulnerability as a minority ethnic 
group and stateless population.207 
In 2008, UNHCR aimed to resettle 2,500 Palestinians from Iraq and 900 from 
Syria to third countries,208 where they would be entitled eventually to apply for 
citizenship, despite the objections by some states that this would undermine their 
right of return.209  UNHCR argued that resettlement would in no way hamper any 
Palestinian’s right to return,210 a position by then endorsed officially by both Syria 
and the PNA who agreed that resettlement should be promoted on a voluntary basis 
for individual refugees.211   
In response to this growing advocacy for resettlement, both traditional 
resettlement countries such as Sweden, Norway, the US, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, and new resettlement countries such as Chile, Brazil, and Iceland, offered 
places for the Palestinians in these camps.212  On 10 May 2008,213 in cooperation 
with the PNA, Sudan also offered to take 2,000, and the Palestinian chargé d'affaires 
in Iraq requested USD 30 million for this project.214  However, Palestinian camp 
residents largely resisted the offer, fearing the security situation there,215 a proposal 
which Refugees International also criticised as simply shifting the refugees “from one 
marginalized situation to another”.216  Al Ruwayshed was closed after all of the 
refugees were resettled to Canada, New Zealand, or Brazil or were transferred to Al 
Hol.217  In February 2010, UNHCR announced it had also closed Al-Tanf Camp.  Of the 
1,300 persons who had lived there at different periods in the four years of its 
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operation, over 1,000 were finally resettled to third countries.218  By November 
2010, 2,044 Palestinians were referred for resettlement, reducing their numbers in 
Al Waleed to 264.219  The resettlement of such a large percentage of Palestinians was 
a significant feat in light of the fact that only five percent of the nearly two million 
Iraqi refugees were able to benefit from resettlement.220 
Concomitant with these resettlement operations, UNHCR advocated for the 
increased registration and protection of Palestinians within Iraq.  In 2008, the Iraqi 
Ministry of Displacement and Migration’s Humanitarian Directorate agreed to 
register Palestinians who entered Iraq between 1948 and 1967 (and their 
descendants) to ensure they would be able to access government benefits. It 
registered 10,500 by August, and continued registration in Nineva, Basra, and Al 
Waleed.221  Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in 2009 requested that Iraq issue 
Palestinians with passports rather than travel documents; however, the Palestinian 
chargé d'affaires in Baghdad noted they were already entitled to either an Iraqi 
passport, an Iraqi passport noting their Palestinian origin, or a PNA-issued 
passport.222   
As of 2009, there were a total of 11,000 Palestinians living in Baghdad, Mosul, 
and Basra,223 a marked increase from previous years.  With the establishment of an 
Iraqi military base nearby providing some modicum of security, 5,000 lived in 
Baladiyat. However, they contended with poor infrastructure and governmental 
neglect.  In response, the Iraqi Immigration Minister noted this was similar in Iraqi 
neighbourhoods and stated that financial assistance was now available to Palestinian 
families who had lost their head of household.224  In this sense, although 
resettlement and enhanced protection space in Iraq were not overtly linked, 
resettlement may have had the effect of widening protection space for the 
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Palestinians remaining within Iraq in keeping with UNHCR’s larger goal of using 
resettlement strategically to increase “protection dividends” for refugees remaining 
in their host countries.   
 
 
III. Exegesis: Sovereignty, law, and space in Iraq’s borderlands 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The positioning of refugees in the border regions of Iraq through practices of 
violence and expulsion, displacement and re-emplacement, and humanitarian 
management and resettlement raises questions regarding the kinds of spaces that 
emerged.  What happened when the space produced by the sovereign state was not 
one of social closure, but rather, one of ambiguity, exclusion, and exile?  How did law 
and geography function at the margins of the political territory between Iraq and its 
neighbouring states?  Such questions devolve upon the mutually constitutive nature 
of law and space,225 in the process of ongoing state formation.   
This section considers how the practices towards refugees outlined above were 
implicated in the state formation process as they spatialised both the production and 
contestation of sovereignty.  First, it theorises that the refugees became outlaw 
bodies whose exclusion became the object of sovereign decisionism.  The spaces to 
which they were relegated were the materialisation of the state of exception − that 
space of anomie against which the state defines its law as legitimate and its 
authority as the norm.226  These practices shaped the refugees’ geographical spaces 
and “bodies as space”.227  Law functioned as a spatialising agent through the 
creation of camps and asserting the boundaries of states on the bodies of refugees, 
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and space in turn acted as a kind of law used to confine, displace, regiment, and 
exclude.  The logic of sovereignty persisted as refugees used their abject status and 
mobilised the spaces of their containment to negotiate state-centric solutions, and 
UNHCR both governed and engaged these spaces in its calls for their re-inclusion in 
the state system.  The exception became the normalised mode of governance in the 
borderlands, where bare life was managed through the provision of humanitarian 
aid, and law was understood as a series of arbitrary decrees and decisions on entry.  
In the process, however, the logic of sovereignty and the violence of state decisions 
to except refugees from protection were both de-naturalised and exposed. 
 
B. Spatialising the state of exception in the borderlands 
 
The practices of violence, expulsion, and denial of entry to refugees in Iraq 
functioned as decisions on the exception, which were spatialised in the 
encampments along Iraq’s borders.  They were critical to the constitution of the 
citizen body within, tying identity to territory in the process of legitimating state 
power.  Law and norms produce both boundaries and connections between 
geographical spaces and social groups.228  In maintaining the tie between a social 
group and a defined territory, law ensures that citizenship is something beyond 
being simply human, but is imbricated in processes of territorialisation and state-
making and legitimation.  Questions of political order frame legal questions within a 
particular imaginary of space.229  In this sense, the legal categories of citizen or 
refugee can have no meaning without the concomitant spatial categories of “state” 
or “territory”.230  Hence, non-citizens are often deemed “out-of-place”, or in the case 
of refugees, “displaced”, demonstrating how spatial orderings are also legal 
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orderings.  Refugees then pose a problem for states231 – one of “disorder” (political 
order) caused by “displacement”.232  
Law produces such boundaries and ties through signifying and differentiating 
the “other”, which unifies the community inside.  The identity of the group included 
in the state – the citizen – is therefore contingent upon those excluded, i.e. those 
who cannot be captured within the categories of belonging.  The excluded are the 
bodies both threatening, but necessary to the logic of the polity, against whom 
citizens perceive themselves as autonomous and self-determining,233 and from 
whom the state protects them.  Towards a statist project of social closure, legal 
practices at the borders work not only to decide upon inclusion in the polity,234 but 
also to shape social space by removing competing meanings that might reveal the 
relationship between the exclusion of certain bodies in the production of the citizen 
body235 – the human remainder in the constitution of the citizen.   
In the process, justice emerges as a set of legal norms intended to preserve the 
borders of the group236 and the myth of the group’s determinacy, freedom, and 
unity.237  Such social relations between groups, when ascribed to a particular 
territorial space through law, assume legal meanings that can institutionalise 
relations of power, such as when the refugee is constructed as the crisis against 
which the state may assert its necessity.  Rather than static phenomena, states must 
continuously make themselves felt – shoring up their borders and asserting their 
legitimacy through the continuous exercise of making bodies legible within the logic 
of statism.   Therefore, states use the problematisation of bodies and regimentation 
and policing to continue to assert their political legitimacy.  When humans are 
displaced in the process of creating new state orders, they become problems to 
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those states where they seek refuge; the disorder that they represent is signified 
through the label of “refugee”, and they are brought to heel, corralled, governed, 
and policed through regimentations such as encampment. 
The exclusion and encampment of the refugees once harboured in Iraq in this 
way became central to the new state-building process and constitution of the Iraqi 
citizen body, as emerging Shi’ah and Kurdish actors began to define Iraqi state 
identity in opposition to those who were favoured by Saddam Hussein.  The re-
classification of Palestinians as “non-resident foreigners”, for example, referenced 
both space and citizenship, signifying them as outside the new political order – as 
the counterpoint to emerging concepts of citizenship and belonging in Iraq.   
However, the refugees marked not only the “others” against which the Iraqi 
citizen body began to define itself, but also a status against which it had to protect 
itself from becoming.  In the process of moving from being simply human to 
becoming a full citizen, the citizen emerges as a contingent legal status, whose rights 
can be lifted in times of emergency − a “state of exception”238 – in which the citizen 
may be stripped of legal protection, expelled, and relegated to “bare life”.  This is 
often the case of persons who become refugees − those former citizens who are 
relegated to the status of being human without protection of state law, but subject 
as human beings to the violence of state power.239  Practices critical to the 
constitution and expression of state identities are also necessary to the concealment 
of the radical relationship between the refugee and the citizen, the human and the 
political being.  In this sense, exclusion functions as a limit concept, demarcating the 
social space of the normal political community and concealing not only the 
possibility of bare life, but also the irregularity and processuality of the excluded 
others who continue to remain in the border zones.240   
In order for a state to preserve its legitimacy in the face of the possibility of this 
raw power to exclude any person from its protection, it attempts to deploy law in 
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ways that mask the point at which law may devolve into an exercise of 
unconstrained power.  It may create bureaucracies of migration control aimed at the 
continuous differentiation and protection of the citizen from the threat of the 
refugee or terrorist, such as the arduous bureaucratic procedures that prevented 
many Palestinians and Ahwazis from renewing their residency documents, and the 
listing of the PMOI as a terrorist organisation that prevented their admission to third 
state territories.  Such bureaucracies drawing on rationalities of “otherness” conceal 
the state’s sovereign power to except all bodies from political protection.  In the 
guise of law they promote the myth that there is no “defenceless” human remainder 
to which the citizen is always at risk of being relegated. 
The border zones were the areas where practices of distinction were most 
frequently exercised and visible, as these spaces were populated by illegible bodies 
whose relationship to the state had to be determined at the moment of physical 
crossing.241  States problematise borderlands and make them the objects of 
governmental and legal regimentation and control through activities of border 
demarcation,242 and techniques which register and categorise life, recognising 
humans as signs, numbers, and “words without bodies”, blurring the space between 
subjects and objects.243  At the borders of both identity and territory, bodies become 
sites of discipline as they are subjected to practices to distinguish and ascertain their 
legitimacy and place in the social hierarchy − in the “territorial ordering of 
humanity”.244  Procedures of examination, inclusion, and exclusion at the border are 
forms of this discipline, controlling and targeting what must remain outside of state 
protection, thereby performing the spatial and legal fictions of sovereign 
territoriality and sovereign subjectivity.245   
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Both immigration inspectors and agents at the border posts who refused 
admittance to Palestinian refugees, and resettlement states who refused admission 
of former PMOI members, performed such disciplinary practices,246 making the 
illegible legible within the rationality of statism.  The refugees’ subjection to 
inspection, border checkpoint screenings, and often arbitrary decrees regarding their 
entry was a submission of their bodies to the processes of territorialisation.   
Such legal ambiguity led to creation of outlaw bodies and dangerous spaces,247  
facilitating the emergence of the rightless spaces of exception to which refugees 
were repeatedly relegated – the camps where they were isolated from access to the 
centres of power, subject to state and military surveillance, left dependent upon 
humanitarian organisations, rendered vulnerable to continued attacks, and 
compelled to struggle with extreme environmental conditions and lack of resources 
for their survival.  Refugees denied the rights of free movement in a world defined 
by sovereign territorial states, are often forced to live in camps.248  And in the zones 
of undecideability that characterised the spaces of Iraq’s border zones, emplacement 
in camps also functioned as a bordering practice.  Because the power of the state in 
borderlands is often contingent on the actual presence of the state in the 
borderlands,249 the camps, like checkpoints, played a structural role in both control 
and surveillance by the state.250  They contained illegible bodies that could not be 
accommodated within any state, asserted the sovereign identities of Iraq and its 
neighbouring states, and re-produced refugees in new configurations of 
displacement, transforming states of exception into spaces of exception.251  They 
revealed the state of exception at its extreme − a spatial expression of the violence 
of inclusion and exclusion,252 and unification and separation.253   
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The border camps and the refugee bodies subjected to legal exceptionalism 
hence became geographical and physical spaces of exception that enabled the 
operations of sovereign power of the Iraqi state and its neighbours.  The use of law, 
regulation, and norms of violence to except refugees from admittance, recognition, 
or protection provided the fiction against which the nascent Iraqi state could define 
its emerging political condition and national identity as legitimate and the norm.   
 
C. Contesting the exception through space: Sovereign power at the 
margins of the state 
 
Yet, as these encampments both created and contained bare life at the margins 
of the state, they also exposed the reach of sovereign power that often remains 
hidden beneath bureaucratic regulations and state law. The normalisation of the 
exception that resulted from these encampments along the borders of Iraq exposed 
the logic of sovereign power, providing the foundation for its later contestation, 
appropriation, and de-legitimation by refugees, resettlement states, and 
humanitarian organisations.    
  
1. Normalising the state of exception through space 
 
The exception of the refugees through extreme violence and expulsion, 
discriminatory bureaucratic processes, exclusion from refugee status, rejection at 
the borders, and encampment were ways of asserting raw state power when 
confronted by persons whose identities threatened state order and imaginaries of 
nation.  However, such operations of law to produce the refugee in counterpoint to 
the citizen in the ambiguous spaces of the “no-man’s lands” were not always able to 
maintain this clear distinction or insistence upon the myth of social closure.  The 
practices aimed at recouping the forms of statism that the refugees’ very presence 
called into question, were decisions exercised in spaces where state control and 
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jurisdiction were subject to debate.  While cloaked in a veneer of immigration 
regulation, these practices were also continuously and arbitrarily shifting, revealing 
the point of indistinction between law and political power as the refugees were 
provided with protection only when it was politically expedient to do so.   
The irrationality and illegibility of the masses of these refugees worked to 
destabilise the idea of the state as legible, rational, and orderly.254  The border was 
not so much a solid line delineating the division between geographical territories or 
between discrete categories of population, but more a zone of undecideability 
where discretion and law were simultaneously exercised upon bodies in the 
projection of state power.  Thus at the checkpoints along the borders of Iraq, 
attempts at legibility revealed more often than not how the law was constantly 
under negotiation,255 as the checkpoint produced a demand that was illegible and 
illegal,256 where decisions, their objects, and their rationalities were never entirely 
clear.257  As border inspections were conducted by state agents who exercised 
discretion, refugees were subjected to those unspoken laws of the state that operate 
between written law and its application.  Within such spaces, doubt or suspicion 
became operative and were expressed in such policing as the state’s attempt to 
“incorporate margins of uncertainty”.258  Decisions at checkpoints oscillated 
between threats and guarantees.259  Violence in this unclear space underlined the 
arbitrariness of the political practices that occurred there, be they interrogation, 
body searching, detention, permission to cross the border,260 expulsion from the 
camps, or deportation amounting to refoulement.   
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It was at this very moment of crossing from one polity to another that the zone 
of indistinction was most evident; it was the site where the decision was yet to 
occur, where processes of inclusion and exclusion were dependent upon one 
another, and where the limits of the application of state law could devolve into an 
exercise of pure sovereign power.261  The borderlands were zones of undecideability 
that blurred the categories of disinterested and corrupt, just and coercive,262 as 
sovereign decisionism was hidden within legalised discretion and bureaucratic 
regimes governing the refugees’ attempted crossings.263  At the moment of border-
crossing, all persons became potentially refugees, as they waited in the zone 
between citizen and non-citizen for their legal identities to be authenticated.264  This 
was the space in which all persons became objects of sovereign decisionism, and 
which, as Salter suggested, also may have provided an opportunity for solidarity with 
those for whom liminality had become a permanent feature of everyday life.265   
The refugees’ limited and vacillating access to justice and physical presence in 
the borderlands contested the mythology of closure in the state system.  The border 
camps and legal categorisations could only partially provide the spatial fiction 
against which each state could define the identity of its population as the norm and 
the legal order and boundaries of its territory as legitimate.  The refugees in the 
border camps of Iraq existed at the territory’s edge, neither fully included and 
protected nor wholly excluded and expelled by the state.  States were confronted 
with the presence of these outlaw bodies, who either having no place within any 
state or rejected outright by most, shattered the myth of the all-encompassing 
utopic spaces of unity and justice envisioned within the state system.  The abject 
border camps to which the vast majority were relegated disrupted the myth that 
state borders, their authority, and the protection they provide to those deemed to 
                                                                 
261
 See Das, V. & Poole, D. (supra note 241), p. 6.   
262
 See Stevenson, L. (supra note 252), pp. 140-141. 
263
 See Salter, M. (supra note 245), p. 377. 
264
 Ibid. 
265
 Ibid., p. 378. 
Chapter 4. Refugees in the “No Man’s Lands”                                                                                                 
 
 
215 
 
belong within, represented the full scope of justice and were capable of exhausting 
all manifestations of human need.266   
Rather, they resided in the grey zones between and along borders, where law 
and state power began to blur, and their bodies, targeted with violence through 
expulsion, emplacement, depravation, and legal regimentation, became quite 
literally the sites of this indistinction.  Existing in the borderlands of Iraq, they came 
to embody the exceptional spaces to which they were relegated, but over which 
states exercised a contested form of control.   
Also, the positioning of Al Waleed and the K70 camps near MNF military bases 
highlighted in an ironic form the very powerlessness that collectively was ascribed to 
the refugees.  The camps reflected in inverted form the violence of the militarised 
practices that were viewed as the proximate cause of the refugees’ displacement,267 
thereby interrupting the routinised violence of militarisation.268  The landscape that 
resulted was an effect of the tension created by this spatial arrangement, as the 
refugees’ bodies and the physical positioning of the camps next to military bases 
unmasked the workings of their own de facto “incarceration”.269 
Subjected to the operations of sovereign decisionism, the borders and the 
camps therefore also marked its limits − the points at which the raw power of the 
state to supersede the limits of its law was unmasked and revealed.  Existing at the 
intersection of law and politics, where refugees could as easily enjoy legal protection 
as they could be subject to the whims of sovereign power, the borderlands became 
the zones of indistinction between bare life and juridical rule270 that emerge when 
the state of exception becomes the norm.  The checkpoints and the camps, as spatial 
markers of this point of indistinction between law and the power to decide upon the 
exception, brought into relief the operations of a sovereign power unmasked and 
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unleashed from the constraints imposed by law and regulation intended to 
domesticate and contain it.  The ambiguous legal status and treatment of refugees in 
the border zones exemplified how the decision on the exception became not only 
spatialised and normalised, but also an expression of a political power unconstrained 
by law.   
Not belonging to any state, Palestinian refugees in Iraq were illegible within the 
state system.  They were first protected and included under Saddam Hussein, but no 
longer serving the anti-Israeli cause or useful in deflecting attention from the 
internal brutalities of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, 271 they evolved from political 
resources to political threats as they represented the arbitrariness of the former 
Iraqi regime, engendering rivalry, hostility, and resentment amongst many of the 
Iraqi populace.  Through “discourses of disposal”272 and legal ambiguities in their 
residency rights, Palestinians were recast as exceptional bodies and forced into these 
exceptional spaces.  When fleeing to the border, they were permitted neither entry 
nor return to any state and were compelled to live in the grey zones of changing 
politico-legal categorisations.   
Also positioned as threats to neighbouring states who perceived their presence 
as a burden and potential security crisis, the Palestinians were relegated to the 
margins, where sympathy and not law was their only resource for survival.  They 
demonstrated  Hanafi’s contention that for as long as they have been displaced, they 
have been caught in the interstices between the extremes of humanitarianism 
(sheltered and fed as bodies without protected rights) and the politics of the right of 
return (arguing that legal status or local integration would undermine this cause).  In 
this space, he argued, their voices, rights-based approaches to their protection, and 
their “rights to the city” have been lost.273   
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The practices of exceptionalism exercised against the PMOI included not only 
their physical encampment, but also their categorisation as either threats or allies.  
Such practices were first evident in their listing as a terrorist organisation, preventing 
their access to international protection.  They were then subjected to control and 
monitoring through physical and geographical containment in camps – a form of 
emplacement that excepted them from the protections of the polity.  Although they 
were provided with an initial modicum of protection by the MNF which secured their 
camp, their original exclusion was re/performed in the removal of MNF protection 
and threats of their expulsion by the Iraqi authorities.  Such threats were spatialised 
in the ISF violently surrounding, targeting, and attacking their camp, and blocking 
their freedom of movement.  Once a form of protection, their encampment became 
the source of their displacement, as many fled through smuggling channels to 
different parts of Europe in search of asylum and safe harbours. 
Therefore, the PMOI, no longer serving the cause of destabilising the Iranian 
regime, seen as enemies of the new Shi’ah and Kurdish-dominated Iraq, and desired 
for prosecution by the Iranian authorities, were first abandoned by the MNF, then 
targeted by the Iraqi state, then protected by the UNHCR, and finally rejected by 
most resettlement states.  They were trapped in a protracted space of legal 
uncertainty with no durable solutions on the horizon. 
As they see-sawed between these degrees of legal and political inclusion and 
exclusion, they embodied in many ways the political process of Iraqi state formation, 
as law was used to produce shifting orderings of social and political space.  Their 
initial protection by the MNF reflected the extended sovereign reach and interests of 
the occupying forces which also supported their opposition to the current Iranian 
regime.  The withdrawal of MNF protection, however, was an expression of the 
political aim of handing over sovereign authority to a newly democratic Iraq, and 
proved to be a convenient resolution to the quandary faced by the US in protecting 
an organisation listed as terrorist for reasons of foreign policy.  Their subsequent 
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targeting with violence and expulsion by the ISF was an assertion of the new Shi’ah-
Kurdish political alliance’s power and voice in the state-building process.   
The policies of inclusion of the PMOI exercised by the MNF and later by UNHCR 
were aimed at making them legible to the state and finding a way to bring them back 
within the ambit of the state system.  However, the failures in doing so, indicated by 
their outright rejection by nearly every resettlement state, threats of expulsion by 
Iraq, and fears of detention and execution by Iran, revealed the continually 
contested space in which states fashioned their identities and asserted their 
authority.  In the end, the rejection of the vast majority of these refugees for 
resettlement, despite their delisting as a terrorist organisation, placed sovereign 
decisionism again at the foreground of political power.  They were thus left to their 
own devices and subject to the political exigencies of Iraqi state formation.   
These iterations of law and violence and their spatialisation in encampments 
came to normalise the exception of the refugees from state recognition and 
protection in the borderlands.  Therefore, the refugees’ presence, while subject to 
legal practices aimed at including or excluding them within the logic of statism, also 
became the source of this logic’s own undoing.  Admitted by no state, and emplaced 
in camps along the border, their physical presence exemplified the paradigm of 
sovereignty taken to one extreme.  Instead of being made legible within the black 
and white world of inclusion and exclusion, they remained illegible bodies at the 
borders where inclusion and exclusion existed in a radical and dependent 
relationship to one another.  Here the exception was revealed as the normal mode 
of governance in the borderlands, and the hidden workings of the logic of 
sovereignty were exposed, as law and regulation could no longer mask the brute 
force of state power.   
 
 
 
Chapter 4. Refugees in the “No Man’s Lands”                                                                                                 
 
 
219 
 
2. Exposing and contesting the violence of the decision on the exception 
 
In the slippages that occur as a part of the state formation process at the 
border, where refugees’ lives are contingent and complex,274 and technologies of 
power produce their own “accidents and failures”,275 possibilities emerge for other 
assertions of power, subjectivity, and resistance.  They are the unintended 
consequences of exceptionalism that emerge when the space of violence becomes 
productive in ways that materially expose the hidden mechanisms of sovereignty 
and reconstitute the camp as a symbolic and iconic space.  For some scholars, this 
has signified a decline in the trenchancy of sovereignty, while for others, it has 
suggested the possibility of an emancipatory politics276 – a subjectivity 
unconstrained by strictures of citizenship.  But this risks disavowing, denying, and 
downplaying the political realities of the concrete forms of power that do violence to 
refugees in their everyday lives.277  Given the multiplying sites of exception and the 
deepening entrenchment of statist rationalities in the treatment of the refugees in 
Iraq, perhaps, as Salter asserts, rather than romanticising zones of indifference at the 
border as a means of imagining the decline of state power in interstitial zones, one 
must take the spaces between sovereign states seriously.278   
In keeping with this imperative, it is necessary to examine how sovereign power 
was configured in the face of challenges lodged to its legal and political reach by 
investigating how refugees relegated to spaces of exception in the borderlands 
negotiated their relationship to the state and its exclusionary practices.279  Although 
refugees may be violently displaced, objectified, and silenced, they do negotiate the 
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quality of their lives in displacement,280 and the camps they inhabit are spaces 
performed and invigorated by new forms of sociality, hierarchy, and relations of 
exchange.281  Peteet similarly observed that while camps do confine, they also 
provide space for the formation of new identities and politics.282  In the process, they 
both intersect with configurations of state sovereignty and counter particular 
regimentations of statism.283   
The state of exception to which the refugees in Iraq had been relegated, when 
translated into a material space of exception in the border camps, in this respect not 
only became an abject space of exile and dispossession − a space of bare life − but 
also opened up the possibility for new forms of life and political subjectivity.  The 
refugees problematised their status resulting from sovereign exceptionalism and 
interacted with strategies of regimentation and statisation, using their self-
emplacement in camps as a source of exposure, critique, and contestation.  In so 
doing, they were asserting a kind of “insurgent citizenship” in the effort to make 
themselves visible through claim-making and mobilising their spaces and bodies.284 
The spaces of exception of the camps were subject to state power, but given 
their position in the borderlands, they were also spaces that continuously evaded 
and challenged it, particularly when the refugees negotiated and countered its 
reach.285  The refugees’ refusal to return to the almost certain dangers they faced in 
central Iraq forced the border authorities to engage with them to varying degrees 
that defied their pure relegation to a state of exception − whether to facilitate their 
encampment, provide a modicum of physical protection to the most vulnerable, or 
permit their access to minimal humanitarian assistance.  However, despite such 
resistance, they were continuously displaced, expelled from one encampment to 
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another.  In defiance of such measures, they participated in strategies of re-
emplacement, self-settling in ad hoc camps along the border and drawing ever 
greater numbers from the central regions of Iraq into their fold.   
In this way, they also exposed and countered the forms of sovereign violence 
that both expelled and contained them.  In other contexts, Rua Wall and Olerte 
observed that “displaced persons create camps, and camps create displaced 
persons”, noting that when a camp is demobilised, it can spread symbolically, 
generating a collectivity with other displaced groups in the state. Such ad hoc camps 
can rupture the forms of emplacement normally enacted by state policing 
practices.286   
The refugees in the border camps similarly used self-emplacement and 
re/performed their displacement287 in a bid for inclusion in the state system.  Their 
efforts often worked together with the regimentation and re-statisation practices of 
UNHCR to secure solutions and a way out of the exception which, in the case of the 
Palestinians in particular, had been a fact of life since birth.  These emplacements in 
a bid for entry into the state system took many forms, from human smuggling, to 
encampment, to resettlement.  As the former PMOI found themselves with little 
recourse for state protection through formal channels, they began to dissipate, 
seeking escape through smuggling routes into Europe.  The Ahwazis, while initially 
submitting to repatriation to Iran, then refused these attempts at repatriation after 
facing imprisonment and death sentences, and they began self-settling in Al Waleed 
camp in hopes of gaining protection or resettlement.  In this way, the Ahwazis’ 
continuing arrivals at the camp undermined UNHCR and Iraq’s goal to eventually 
close Al Waleed, as the Palestinian refugees residing there were resettled to third 
states.  Al Waleed began to assume an increasingly permanent character – a space of 
constant reminder and exposure of the failures of state protection and the liminality 
of the border regions.   
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In the case of Palestinians, the cycle of multiple displacements from one camp 
to another along the border zones was an ironic reflection of the kinds of camps to 
which they had been forcibly relegated for generations since their initial 
displacement in the 1948 war.  Having no immediate prospects for repatriation to 
the OPT, they were caught in the grey zones both between states and between the 
mandates of UNHCR and UNRWA.  By drawing increasing numbers to the camps, 
they exposed the violence of the state practices that led not only to their most 
recent expulsions, but also to their increasingly permanent status as stateless 
persons.  The border camps were thus shaped by a temporality that reached far 
beyond the incarnations of violence that led to the Palestinians’ most recent 
displacement.  
The testimonies Palestinians made to the public also demonstrated how they 
portrayed their emplacement in harsh and isolated conditions as a material 
manifestation of both their statelessness and refugee status in search of a more 
permanent solution.  They highlighted the uniqueness of their suffering,288 by 
drawing attention to the long cycles of displacement that characterised the history 
of their community and drew upon their dual identities as stateless persons, yet with 
a right of return, in calling for their resettlement for purposes of acquiring 
citizenship.  They challenged the states of exception to which they were relegated as 
stateless persons, while at the same time supporting state-centric forms of power by 
pleading for solutions in the form of resettlement and eventual citizenship.  Using 
discourses of suffering and rights shaped by the particular spaces they occupied in 
the border zones and the increasing permanence of their statelessness that this 
demonstrated, they used spectacularisation to disrupt state politics.289  They 
engaged in a kind of self-fetishisation as a means of talking back to the state, 
re/performing the “fantasies”290 of the centrality of citizenship.  In doing so, they 
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strained against the legal categories that confined them, engaging in a kind of “re-
splicing” as they mobilised the slippage that occurs in the process of producing such 
disciplinary spaces that are never stable.  They inverted and extended their refugee 
identity in ways that revealed the contradictions in their relationship to the state 
system.291 
Hanafi noted that as the others against whom citizenship is performed in the 
Middle East, Palestinian refugees in reluctant and sometimes hostile societies often 
face prolonged displacement, and their hosts tend to respond more in terms of 
humanitarianism and security than rights and integration.  Refugees in these 
contexts more often than not develop double identities of alienation and 
nationality.292  In Iraq, they enacted identities of both nationality and refugee-ness to 
advance their cause of survival, mobilising their own abject spaces to call for their 
entry into the state system and access to the rights of citizenship.  In this sense, they 
came to represent what Arendt referred to in other contexts as “the vanguard of 
their peoples”.293  They used emplacement and self-settlement in subsequent camps 
to both assert their marginality within and right to entry into the international state 
system and used their marginalised space to produce a discourse of legal rights.  
Their displacement and self-emplacement became productive of a broader 
subjectivity that they were able to mobilise in their calls for a solution to their plight.   
The refugees’ strategies for survival exposed the violence of sovereign 
exceptionalism and de-normalised its operation as a mode of governance, though 
they did not contest state power to make the decision on the exception itself.  They 
were both governed in their collaborations with the state, yet ungovernable, as they 
refused state hegemony.294  They called attention to their spaces of encampment to 
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highlight their illegibility within them.  In politicising the spaces they occupied by 
cutting across the boundaries and borders of the cartographic logic of 
territorialisation,295 they negotiated borders, self-settled between and across them, 
and sought ways to manipulate these spaces towards their own survival.296  They 
also challenged state practices by claiming spaces through self-settlement to which 
they were not legally entitled, and in the process functioned alongside or intersected 
with state-centric forms of sovereignty.297  Their transgression of state boundaries 
challenged the spatial logic of the state system, calling into question the exclusionary 
and violent state practices of boundary inscription.298  In so doing, the political 
“spoke back” to politics and provided for the entry of new forms of belonging.299  
They also exposed the violence that led to their displacement and generated a 
certain language of rights which, for Palestinians in particular, had hitherto been 
silenced in concert with their diminishing prospects for return. 
 
3. Migrating sovereignty 
 
Humanitarian organisations also shaped the forms of political agency that 
emerged in the spaces of exception of the camps, intersecting with the interests of 
both refugees and states in their projects to promote refugee protection.  Similar to 
the entry of UNHCR in the Iraqi refugee context, the crisis posed by the lack of state 
protection for the refugees’ lives in the borderlands and the crisis that these 
“illegible” refugees posed to the state system, enabled the entry of humanitarian 
organisations to manage operations to resolve them, primarily through encampment 
and durable solutions aimed at re-statisation.  Encampment was the initial response 
to state claims that their capacities were dangerously exceeded and economies 
disrupted.  The presence and ubiquity of these camps also spoke to the increasing 
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restriction of durable solutions of repatriation, integration, and resettlement.300  In 
the wake of the inability to recoup statism through these solutions, containment in 
camps and restrictions from entry became the primary mechanisms for regimenting 
and controlling this refugee crisis.301  
These camps were exceptional spaces where humanitarianism, not legal 
protection, was the sole arbiter of survival.302  UNHCR’s entry into and management 
of the camps exemplified how the agency has been increasingly compelled to 
operate within the gap between its ever-expanding scope of responsibilities303 and 
states’ restrictive policies towards refugees on their territories.  In order to reconcile 
this untenable position, UNHCR, UNRWA, and humanitarian NGOs responded to the 
crisis not only by creating some camps, but also by co-opting others to promote and 
strengthen the refugees’ protection.  They built upon the refugees’ techniques of 
self-emplacement and self-governance with institutional and legal regimentation.  
This regimentation subsumed to a certain extent the refugees’ self-governance.  At 
the same time, it challenged the restrictions imposed by states.   They also mobilised 
the camps in their appeals to states for solutions via entry or re-entry of these 
refugees into the state system, primarily through resettlement to third countries.  
UNHCR therefore harnessed the political subjectivities that emerged in the 
refugees’ use of self-emplacement and appeals to the international community in 
the project of both humanitarian governance and protection through re-statisation.  
Statecraft in this sense was redeemed, yet the refugees, rather than becoming 
estranged in the process,304 also appealed to the international community by 
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highlighting their abjection and vulnerability in the camps, thereby intersecting with 
UNHCR’s strategies and participating in their own re-statisation.   
The appropriation and regimentation of the ad hoc border camps in Iraq by 
humanitarian organisations and UNHCR also demonstrated how humanitarian and 
international organisations operate as a transnational regime of governance − a form 
of “migrant sovereignty” that acts in parallel to territorialised state governments, 
migrating to sites of crisis and disaster.305  The paradox of humanitarianism is that it 
both shores up state sovereignty and erodes it at the same time, often attempting to 
legitimise its role through the temporality of emergency.306  Therefore, rather than 
the purported neutrality of humanitarian aid organisations, humanitarian 
government spearheaded by UNHCR has begun to merge with politics as it is 
mobilised in camps for displaced persons.307  
Even assuming such new assemblages of “migrant sovereignty” beyond and 
within the state were not fully realised, the governance structures enacted by 
UNHCR in its management and mobilisation of solutions to this refugee crisis 
nonetheless presented opportunities to reshape the exercise of state sovereignty in 
various sites, infusing them with more flexibility and inclusivity in their governance 
of refugees.  While recognising the continued prominence of the territorial state, 
these practices also countered drives and retreats to ideas of territorial nations.308   
For example, one may consider UNHCR’s response as the border performed a 
kind of violence in the daily lives of the Palestinian refugees, re-producing their 
psychological and physical trauma,309 as the state of exception that had been the 
norm for more than sixty years, became an ever more permanent spatial 
arrangement.  Such permanence, known in UNHCR parlance as “protractedness”,310 
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was countered in the agency’s attempts to premise Palestinians’ human rights over 
the interests of states in the region, particularly those states and the PNA committed 
to the right of return.  Maintaining that resettlement would not undermine the right 
of return, the agency not only participated in re-statisation, but also disrupted the 
myth of social closure that this typically implies, as throughout the process, 
Palestinians retained an excess or a remainder − that Palestinian national identity, 
reframing the temporality of their solution as at once both durable and temporary.  
The international community resettled the vast majority, providing a statist solution 
to their refugee-ness, while recognising that they retained their national identities 
and right of return to Palestine.  UNHCR was also able to promote resettlement as an 
expanded and strategic tool of protection across states.  In encouraging resettlement 
states to “burden-share” by accepting almost all of the Palestinians in the camps, 
and Iraq to register those remaining in the cities, UNHCR may have contributed to 
opening up greater protection space for Palestinians in Iraq.   
In the case of the PMOI, when confronted with the “problem” of their exclusion 
from all legal orders, UNHCR used the international legal definition of the refugee 
itself to argue for the inclusion of those who had renounced the use of violence in 
order to be able to submit them for resettlement to third countries.  This strategy, 
while largely unsuccessful to date, nonetheless indicated that in the absence of 
viable alternatives for ensuring the protection of the PMOI, resettlement to third 
states was the only possible durable solution.  This reinforced the rationality that the 
proper political subject could only be the citizen.311  However, UNHCR’s attempt to 
assert the law in this now purely political space perhaps also challenged the 
sovereign decisionism exercised by the Iraqi authorities, making way for 
international law to counter state decisions taken in times of emergency. 
The refugees’ lives in the borderlands therefore demonstrated how the state is 
contingent, the border a social construct, and the distinction between the norm and 
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exception ever-shifting.312  Space shapes law in the borderlands, and it can be 
mobilised to make way for international principles of refugee protection to enter a 
realm traditionally accorded to states.  But given the persistence of the logic of 
sovereignty and the ideology of statism, strategies for resistance, contestation, and 
protection were primarily in the form of calls for resettlement and citizenship which 
were grounded in the state system.  This demonstrated how sovereignty continues 
to circumscribe the capacity of subjects to contest the terms of their existence, 
limiting possibilities for resistance and shaping oppositional politics into quests for 
re/signification or re/territorialisation within the rationality of state power.313  As 
such, it may indeed be romanticising possibilities for emancipation to envision or 
treat resistance in the border zones as a form of new political formation.  However, 
understanding sovereignty as a process that emerges from ongoing negotiation and 
contestation at state borders, in forms of both complicity and resistance, opens up 
the possibility for understanding how political agency and anomic space can work 
together to produce, reinforce, and stretch the limits of the law and the reach of 
state power in interstitial zones. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The practices of legal exceptionalism towards the refugees in Iraq’s border 
zones were also spatial practices, instrumentalising the border in the project of 
asserting sovereign state authority, producing spaces of exception and isolation, 
shaping processes of citizenship and territorialisation, and engendering resistance 
and subversion.  In the translation of the state of the exception to a lived space of 
exception in Iraq, something happened to the operations of sovereignty within the 
international system, as state power encountered contestations of its legitimacy and 
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reach.  In the liminal spaces that characterised the borders, the refugees were 
relegated to no state at all, their very presence contesting the myth of social closure 
that undergirds the rationality of statism.  As the refugees mobilised their 
vulnerabilities and encampments to call for their entry as full citizens into the state 
system, and humanitarian organisations assumed greater powers of governance in 
the border zones, sovereignty was revealed as both contingent and processual.   
Therefore, in unanticipated ways, the refugees’ multiple emplacements and 
assertions of new political subjectivities, while still premising the citizen as the 
proper legal subject, also un-worked the violence of the sovereign decisions that 
produced them as refugees in these abject spaces at the margins of the state.  And 
UNHCR’s use of the border regions to legally circumscribe and recapture outlaw 
bodies, to justify regimentation, and to then re-instate refugees within the 
protection of third states was productive of a particular relationship of power.  These 
strategies functioned according to the logic of the state system, positioning and 
making legible bodies within the ambit and reach of the state.  But they also 
challenged social and geographical closure by forcing the hand of the state, de-
localising definitions of sovereignty and citizenship, and negotiating a wider 
definition of identity and belonging. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Sovereignty and the ideology of vulnerability in the Iraqi 
refugee resettlement programme 
  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Resettlement has always been a part of the UNHCR’s mandate,1 requiring that 
the agency seek durable solutions for refugees recognised under the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.2  These solutions are aimed at re-
establishing refugees within the ambit of the state system through repatriation,3 
local integration, or resettlement.4  UNHCR has defined resettlement as: 
 
[…] the selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought 
protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with 
permanent residence status.  The status provided ensures protection against 
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refoulement and provides a resettled refugee and his/her family or dependents 
with access to rights similar to those enjoyed by nationals.  Resettlement also 
carries with it the opportunity to eventually become a naturalized citizen of the 
resettlement country.5  
 
The absence of viable possibilities for Iraqi refugees to integrate in their host 
states in the Middle East or to return safely to Iraq led UNHCR to appeal to 
resettlement states to increase their resettlement quotas in the spirit of “burden-
sharing” and widening “protection space” for Iraqi refugees in the Middle East.6  
Donor states responded positively to UNHCR’s appeals, funding the resettlement of 
more than 100,000 Iraqi refugees from the Middle East to Europe, the Americas, and 
Australia by 2010.7   
However, the number of Iraqis resettled constituted less than five percent of the 
total Iraqi refugee population, and around one-fourth of the total number of Iraqis 
registered with UNHCR,8 and their resettlement required a significant amount of 
funding compared to the resources allocated towards the protection of the 
remaining Iraqi refugees in the region.9  Faced with such limited quotas in the face of 
great need, for both protection and pragmatic reasons, UNHCR and resettlement 
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states systematically prioritised for resettlement Iraqi refugees who were deemed to 
be the most legally and physically vulnerable and deprioritised those considered to 
be potential security threats, inadmissible, or potentially excludable.  Between these 
two poles existed the vast majority of Iraqi refugees with no durable solutions on the 
horizon.  They remained within their host states in the Middle East where they were 
able to secure some access to basic social, health, and education services, but to a 
large extent were trapped in tenuous legal positions, either overstaying their limited 
visas or existing on the verge of illegality, and having few rights to employment.   
This chapter considers the implications of this resettlement prioritisation 
process for the operations of sovereignty in refugee protection.  It argues that 
UNHCR’s Iraqi resettlement programme was a set of legal and administrative 
practices that generated a fourth contested space of sovereignty – where UNHCR 
identification of refugees for resettlement referral and donor state decisions on 
resettlement based on ideologies of vulnerability and threat functioned as sovereign 
decisions on the lives of refugees.   
The first section of this chapter maps the legal practices and rationalities that 
undergirded the resettlement policies, functioned as sovereign decisions, and 
produced the spaces in which Iraqi refugees were re/emplaced.  These practices 
included classifications based on the ideology of vulnerability in the selection of 
refugees for resettlement, and also legal measures enacted by resettlement states to 
deny particular refugees admission to their territories.    
The second section of this chapter is an exegesis, theorising how such practices 
were also spatial practices of sovereignty as they were biopolitically enacted on 
refugee bodies through classifications of vulnerability, suffering, rights, and threat.  It 
argues that such classifications were embodied legal practices – an exercise of 
sovereign decisionism by states in reproducing refugee bodies and in turn 
constituting the ideal citizen.  Vulnerability functioned as an ideology that premised 
the bodily vulnerability and suffering of a select few over the rights implicit in the 
recognition of the many as refugees under international law, rendering some 
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individuals hypervisible and others invisible.  And the label of vulnerability itself was 
fractured as states began assessing refugees’ levels of vulnerability in terms of 
whether they could be accommodated within states’ neoliberal paradigms of self-
sufficiency.   
However, at the same time, such practices also contested states’ sovereign 
power, as tensions emerged between UNHCR and resettlement states’ use of 
resettlement as a form of humanitarian aid and its promotion as a means of human 
rights protection.  Also, refugees mobilised their own bodies in appropriating 
ideologies of vulnerability towards their protection interests and continuously 
evaded and contested the constraints imposed by such designations.  These 
practices and tensions, while reproducing the logic of sovereignty as the normative 
mode of politics, also may have created possibilities for it to be contested and 
exposed in the promotion of strengthened refugee protection.  
 
 
II. Mapping legal practices and rationalities in the Iraqi refugee 
resettlement programme 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Until 2007, resettlement states demonstrated little interest in resettling Iraqi 
refugees, and few were identified as needing resettlement.10  The fact that the 
number of refugees fleeing Iraq was relatively low prior to the Samarra bombing in 
2006 may have accounted for this to some extent.  However, Weiss Fegan noted a 
number of additional reasons:  It was a reflection of both the unpopularity of the US 
decision to invade Iraq and the view that the US should assume leadership in 
responding to the crisis that it instigated.  In addition, many Iraqis, having been 
members of the former regime, were perceived to be perpetrators as much as 
                                                                 
10
 See UNHCR (2005, June). Projected global resettlement needs 2006. Annual Tripartite Consultations on 
Resettlement, 14-15 June 2005, Geneva, p. 138, estimating the total number of Iraqis in need of resettlement in 
2006 to be 3,429. 
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victims of human rights violations.  Also, having never conducted large-scale 
resettlement programmes in the Middle East before, resettlement states and UNHCR 
faced the prospect of having to build such a programme.11  The US was further 
concerned that acknowledging the enormity of the crisis would send the message 
that the invasion was “a losing cause”.12 
However, given the lack of other durable solutions of repatriation to Iraq and 
long-term local integration in host states within the Middle East,13 by 2007 at the 
height of the displacement, UNHCR, in cooperation with host countries in the Middle 
East and donor states, was finally able to mobilise resources for Iraqi refugee 
protection.14  During this period, alongside registration and humanitarian assistance, 
resettlement emerged as one of UNHCR’s identified core activities,15 and the 
agency’s internal procedures were modified to expedite resettlement processing in 
anticipation of large numbers of referrals.16   
Resettlement was therefore a critical durable solution – one which the UNHCR 
acknowledged became a significant driver of the Iraqi refugee operation and which 
was heavily resourced.17  UNHCR appealed to donor states to increase resettlement 
opportunities for Iraqi refugees,18 and to introduce more flexible criteria as a tool of 
                                                                 
11
 Weiss Fagen, P. (2007). Iraqi refugees: Seeking stability in Syria and Jordan. Georgetown University, p. 24. 
12
 Statement by former US Assistant Secretary of State Arthur E. Dewey, quoted in Kranish M. (2006, December 
11). Iraqi exodus could test Bush policy: Total expected to exceed quota for refugees. Boston Globe, A1. 
13
 See UNHCR (supra note 6), p. 3. 
14
 UNHCR (2007, January 8). Supplementary appeal, Iraq situation response: Protection and assistance to Iraqi 
refugees in neighbouring states and to IDPs and non-Iraqi refugees in Iraq. Protection under UNHCR’s mandate 
requires preventing refoulement (expulsion to a country where a refugee will face persecution, other ill-
treatment, or torture); ensuring access to an asylum determination procedures, release from detention, and 
issuance travel and identity documents; facilitating voluntary repatriation, family reunification, and 
naturalisation; and promoting access to educational institutions, the rights to work, and access to medical 
treatment. See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (supra note 1); 
Goodwin-Gill, G. & McAdam, J. (2007). The refugee in international law. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 
201, 447; Kelley, N. (Ed.). (2006). Protection gaps: Framework for analysis, enhancing protection of refugees. 
(Strengthening Protection Capacity Project 2006). European Commission and UNHCR; UNHCR (2009, July) 
Surviving in the city: A review of UNHCR’s operation for Iraqi refugees in urban areas of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 
(PDES/2009/03), p. 3. 
15
 UNHCR (supra note 6) p. 2. See also UNHCR (1991, July 9). Resettlement as an instrument of protection: 
Traditional problems in achieving this durable solution and new directions in the 1990s. (UN doc. EC/SCP/65); 
UNHCR (2002, April 25). Strengthening and expanding resettlement today: Challenges and opportunities. (Global 
Consultations on International Protection, 4th Meeting, UN doc. EC/GC/02/7). 
16
 UNHCR (supra note 6), p. 7. 
17
 UNHCR (supra note 9). 
18
 UNHCR (supra note 6), p. 3. 
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burden-sharing19 and protection for the most vulnerable.  UNHCR also called for 
states to adopt an inclusive approach to requests from Iraqis for family reunification, 
to consider other humanitarian visas, and to “look favourably at UNHCR requests” 
for resettlement. Possibly appealing to state interests in managing migration, the 
agency further argued that resettlement would discourage secondary migration 
“within and outside the sub-region” to other countries;20 it would provide legal 
routes of travel for those accepted for resettlement.   
The Iraqi resettlement programme was further envisioned as an opportunity to 
promote the “strategic use of resettlement”.21  As a demonstration of international 
solidarity and burden-sharing,22 resettlement could alleviate burdens on host states, 
thus enabling them to increase the protections afforded to the refugees who were 
not resettled, but remained on their territories.23  Resettlement was included in the 
larger package of economic and social incentives offered to host states to increase 
their capacity to host Iraqi refugees.   
In 2007, UNHCR estimated that of the nearly 2 million Iraqi refugees, there were 
95,458 who were very vulnerable and in need of resettlement.24  Most of the 
refugees were resettled to the US, which had by 2007 begun to admit Iraqis in far 
                                                                 
19
 The importance of burden-sharing by the international community for refugees whom states faced difficulties 
in granting asylum was affirmed in UN General Assembly (1967, December 14). Resolution 2312 (XXII). 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, Article 2.  
20
 UNHCR (supra note 6), p. 4. 
21
 ibid, p. 2.  This discourse was reflected in US government statements regarding the foreign policy implications 
of maintaining a refugee resettlement programme.  See Schwartz, E.P., US Assistant Secretary of State for 
Population, Refugees, and Migration (2010, March 16). Advancing protection in the 21
st
 century: Reflections on 
the 30
th
 anniversary of the US Refugees Act. Speech delivered to Georgetown University Law Center, 
Washington, D.C. 
22
 Loescher, G. (2003). The UNHCR and world politics: A perilous path. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 6. 
23
 UNHCR Excom (2004, October 8). Conclusion 100 LV. Conclusion on international cooperation and burden and 
responsibility sharing in mass influx situations, preamble and para. (m)(iii).  Expanded protection space was 
indicated by “continuous access to the territory, respect for non-refoulement, access to refugees in detention, 
access to basic services/rights such as primary education, health care, adequate housing, access to informal and 
gradually the formal labor market”.
 
UNHCR (supra note 6), p. 3. However, the heavy emphasis on resettlement 
and the significant funding allocated to the programme, also led to some concerns voiced by UNHCR staff 
members that the amount of resources allocated to resettlement activities was disproportionate to the numbers 
of refugees who directly benefited.  They were concerned that while resettlement may have had some strategic 
effect in increasing existing protection space, it may also have diverted focus away from the economic and social 
assistance required to support the vast majority of the Iraqi refugee population remaining in host states in the 
Middle East. UNHCR (supra note 14), p. 51. 
24
 UNHCR (supra note 9), p. 28. 
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greater numbers than previously,25 with the remaining numbers resettled to sixteen 
other countries.26 
 
B. Vulnerable bodies: Prioritising refugees through resettlement 
criteria 
 
While resettlement often provides a sustainable form of protection to refugees, 
the level of need almost always outnumbers the availability of resettlement places 
offered each year, and exceeds the processing capacity of UNHCR.27  Less than one 
percent of the world’s refugees benefit from the limited resettlement places made 
available by Europe, the Americas, and Australia.28  Therefore, it is instructive to 
consider how the 100,000 Iraqis referred for resettlement were selected from 
amongst the 2 million in the Middle East, and to ask why less than five percent of 
this population was identified as having the greatest need for resettlement, despite 
that the vast majority had no other prospects for solutions such as local integration 
in their host states or repatriation to Iraq.  
Due to limited available resettlement places and protection considerations, 
UNHCR and resettlement states systematically identified refugees most in need of 
resettlement on the basis of their relative legal or physical vulnerability.29  However, 
as vulnerability is inherent to the refugee definition and characterises the 
                                                                 
25
 In 2006, the US admitted only 43 Iraqi refugees for resettlement.  Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2006, 
November 28). The Silent Treatment: Fleeing Iraq, Surviving in Jordan. Vol. 18, No. 10(E), p. 99. Despite the 
increases in resettlement of Iraqi refugees facilitated by the US State Department, Iraqi asylum-seekers 
continued to face serious obstacles to recognition of their refugee status due to restrictive interpretations of the 
doctrine of changed circumstances and the doctrine of individualised persecution and limitations on Iraqi 
admissions post September 11, 2001. See Travis, H. (2009). After regime change: United States law and policy 
regarding Iraqi refugees, 2003-2008. The Wayne Law Review 55, 1007-1059. 
26
 UNHCR (supra note 14), p. 49. 
27
 See UNHCR (supra note 9); UNHCR (2008, June). Refugee resettlement: Performance outcomes 2007 and global 
projections 2009. 14
th
 Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, 30 June-2 July 2008, Geneva, p. 39, 
noting that the projected needs for resettlement from the Middle East and North Africa region was 104,995 
persons, while UNHCR’s processing capacity was limited to 27,576 persons. 
28
 At the end of 2010, there were 10.55 million refugees receiving assistance from UNHCR, and 98,800 refugees 
were resettled, comprising less than one percent of the total refugee population. UNHCR (2011). UNHCR global 
trends 2010. 
29
 UNHCR (supra note 4), p. 37; UNHCR (supra note 9), p. 17; Brick, K., et al (2010). Refugee resettlement in the 
United States: An examination of challenges and proposed solutions. New York: Columbia University School of 
International and Public Affairs, p. 7. 
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exclusionary treatment of refugees more generally, the concept of vulnerability had 
to be parsed into gradations of need, so that only those refugees who exhibited the 
greatest degrees of vulnerability would be prioritised for resettlement.  As Kagan 
argued, the need for resettlement was narrowed artificially to more or less conform 
to the limited available places for resettlement.30 
Vulnerability has been defined in multiple ways, but at the core of each of these 
definitions lies a recognition that it is produced as a consequence of unequal power 
relations:31  UNHCR equated vulnerability with being “at risk”, and connected it to 
unequal power relations based upon personal status such as age or gender.32  
UNHCR incorporated this concept of vulnerability into an administrative 
classification system by developing a set of resettlement criteria modelled on various 
forms of vulnerability, many of which were also reflected in receiving countries’ 
resettlement policies and priorities.  These criteria included individuals who were 
most at risk of human rights violations, social exclusion, and trauma on account of 
their marginalised social status in their host states.  In 2007, when Iraqi refugee 
resettlement was initiated on a large scale, UNHCR’s traditional resettlement criteria 
included women and girls at risk of protection problems on account of their 
gender,33 children and adolescents unaccompanied by or separated from their legal 
guardians,34 survivors of violence or torture,35 persons with life-threatening medical 
                                                                 
30
 Kagan, M. (2011, September). Shared responsibility in a new Egypt: A strategy for refugee protection (Center 
for Migration and Refugee Studies, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, The American University in Cairo), 
p. 26. 
31
 Bustamante, J. (2002). Immigrants’ vulnerability as subjects of human rights. International Migration Review, 
36 (2), 333-354, pp. 340-341, 343, 352; Becker, H.S. (1968). Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance. New 
York: The Free Press of Glencoe; Arán, M. & Peixoto Júnior, C. (2007). Vulnerability and bare life: Bioethics and 
biopolitics today. Rev Saúde Pública, 41 (5), 849-857, p. 850, referencing Macklin, R. (2003). Bioética, 
vulnerabilidade e proteção. In Garrafa, V. & Pessini, L., (Eds.). Bioética: poder e injustice (pp. 59-70). São Paulo: 
Loyola, p. 61. 
32
 See UNHCR (supra note 4), p. 38, 174; UNHCR (2010, June). The heightened risk identification tool, Second 
Edition. 
33
 UNHCR (2004, November) Resettlement handbook. Geneva: Department of International Protection, section 
4.5. See UNHCR (supra note 4), section 6.5; UNHCR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme, Standing Committee (2006, October 6). Conclusion 105 LVII. Conclusion on women and girls at risk; 
UNHCR (2008, January). UNHCR handbook for the protection of women and girls; UNHCR (2005, October). 
Ensuring gender sensitivity in the context of refugee status determination and resettlement. 
34
 UNHCR (2004, November) (supra note 33), section 4.7. See UNHCR (supra note 4), section 6.7; UNHCR 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee (2007, October 5). Conclusion 
on children at risk, No. 107 (LVIII); UNHCR (2010, May 31). International protection of children of concern. (UN 
Doc. EC/61/ SC/CRP.13). 
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needs that could be successfully treated upon resettlement,36 elderly persons,37 
persons who require reunification with immediate family members living in a 
resettlement country,38 persons with legal or physical protection needs,39 and 
persons who lack prospects for local integration in their current host societies.40    
These criteria served as the key markers for determining which refugees would 
be prioritised for submission to resettlement states.41  As such, these criteria also 
functioned as sovereign decisions, as those prioritised had the possibility for 
achieving re-entry to the state system and eventual citizenship, while most of those 
not prioritised were in practice effectively left in often legally liminal situations in 
their host states. 
These criteria were applied somewhat differently in the Iraqi refugee context, 
however.  UNHCR’s approach to Iraqi resettlement, while still operating according to 
the rationale of protecting the most vulnerable persons, particularly those who 
experienced gross violations of human rights in Iraq,42 was also part of a trend in 
new ways of thinking about how best to protect the largest numbers of refugees 
hosted in restrictive environments.  First, in cooperation primarily with the US,43 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
35
 UNHCR (2004, November) (supra note 33), section 4.3. See UNHCR (supra note 4), section 6.3; UN General 
Assembly (1984, December 10). Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, Art. 1. 
36
 UNHCR (2004, November) (supra note 33), section 4.4. See UNHCR (supra note 4), section 6.4; UNHCR (2009, 
December). UNHCR’s principles and guidance for referral health care for refugees and other persons of concern. 
37
 UNHCR (2004, November) (supra note 33), section 4.8. See UNHCR Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee (2000, February 7). Older refugees: Looking beyond the 
international year of older persons, 17th mtg. (UN Doc. EC/50/SC/CRP.8). 
38
 UNHCR (2004, November) (supra note 33), section 4.6. See UNHCR (supra note 4), section 6.6; UNHCR (2003, 
June). Summary conclusions: Family unity. Adopted at Global Consultation on International Protection, Geneva 
Expert Roundtable, Nov. 2001. In E. Feller, V. Türk , and F. Nicholson (Eds.) (2003). Refugee protection in 
international law: UNHCR’s global consultations on international protection. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 604-608. 
39
 UNHCR (2004, November) (supra note 33), section 4.2. See UNHCR (supra note 4), section 6.2; UNHCR (2006, 
December 15). Self-study module 5: Human rights and refugee protection, Vol. 1. 
40
 UNHCR (2004, November) (supra note 33), section 4.9. See, UNHCR (supra note 4), section 6.8; UNHCR 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee (2004, June 10). Protracted 
refugee situations, 30
th
 meeting, (UN Doc. EC/54/SC/ CRP.14). 
41
 Although the criteria “lack of local integration prospects” was used primarily for groups of refugees in 
protracted refugee situations, given that the vast majority of the world’s refugees do not have long-term 
prospects for integration into their host communities. 
42
 UNHCR (supra note 6), pp. 2-3. 
43
 The US had also developed a separate “special non-immigrant visa” (US National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1243, 122 Stat. 390, 391, Section 5) and a Direct Access programme in 
collaboration with the International Organization for Migration for resettling Iraqis who assisted or worked with 
the US in Iraq; US Department of State (2011). Iraqi refugee resettlement. The US also exceptionally allowed for 
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which by then claimed that resettlement of Iraqis was a “moral” obligation,44 UNHCR 
crafted an Iraqi resettlement policy in 2007 that identified eleven profiles of Iraqis 
having “specific vulnerabilities”45 who would be prioritised for resettlement.46  They 
included, for example, persons who were targeted on account of their religious or 
ethnic background in Iraq and persons who had cooperated with the Multinational 
Forces (MNF) in Iraq.47  UNHCR attempted to match these profiles with its traditional 
resettlement criteria, explaining that persons who were associated with the MNF 
may have specific legal and physical protection needs, or persons who are religious 
minorities may be women-at-risk, for example48 (see Figure 1 below): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
some Iraqi refugee claims to be processed in-country, meaning while Iraqis were still within the borders of Iraq. 
United States Department of State (2010). United States Department of Homeland Security, and United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, Proposed refugee admissions for fiscal year 2011: Report to the 
Congress Submitted on behalf of the President of the United States to the Committees on Judiciary, United States 
Senate and United States House of Representatives, at < 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/148671.pdf>, p. 6. 
44
 Associated Press (2007, September 19). More Iraqi refugees to enter U.S. USA Today.  See also, Younes, K. 
(2007, January 16). Iraqi refugees: Resettle the most vulnerable. Refugees International. 
45
 See UNHCR (supra note 9), p. 17. 
46
 These categories incorporated, but also exceeded the scope of the priorities for admission identified in the US 
“Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007”. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (supra note 43), 
Section 4. The Act identified the following priority profiles for admission: Iraqis (and their immediate family 
members) who were employed in Iraq by the U.S. government, a U.S. media company, NGO, or any other entity 
that received official U.S. funding; Iraqis persecuted religious or minority communities with “close family 
members” in the United States.   
47
 While these new profiles identified specific religious and political profiles, UNHCR emphasised that 
resettlement selection would not be conducted in a discriminatory manner. UNHCR (supra note 6), p. 4. 
48
 UNHCR (supra note 6); UNHCR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing 
Committee (supra note 33). 
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Priority Profiles UNHCR Resettlement Handbook – Applicable 
Resettlement Criteria 
1. Persons who have been the victims of severe 
trauma (including SGBV), detention, abduction or 
torture by State or non-State entities in Country 
of Origin. 
Survivors of violence and torture  
 
 
2. Members of minority groups and/or individuals 
which are/ have been targeted in Country of 
Origin owing to their religious/ethnic 
background. 
Legal and physical protection needs / Women-at-
risk  
 
3. Women-at-Risk in Country of Asylum Women-at-risk  
(This includes women at risk of “honor killing”)  
4. Unaccompanied or separated children & 
children as principal applicants  
Children and adolescent  
5. Dependents of refugees living in resettlement 
countries  
Family reunification  
 
6. Older Persons-at-Risk  Older Refugees  
7. Medical cases and refugees with disabilities 
with no effective treatment available in COA  
Medical needs  
8. High profile cases and/or their family members  Legal and physical Protection needs  
9. Iraqis who fled as a result of their association 
in COO with the MNF10[7], CPA11 UN, foreign 
countries, international and foreign institutions 
or companies and members of the press  
Legal and physical protection needs  
10. Stateless persons from Iraq  Legal and physical protection needs / WAR/ SVT / 
medical needs / CH  
11. Iraqis at immediate risk of refoulement  Legal and physical protection needs  
(This may include refugees in detention, but not 
necessarily all of them)  
 
Figure 1. Iraqi refugee resettlement profiles
49
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 UNHCR (supra note 6), pp. 4-5. 
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However, while largely successful in securing the resettlement of 100,000 Iraqi 
refugees, these expanded criteria did not always produce the intended results.  For 
example, as Iraqi refugees became aware of the resettlement criteria that were 
being used to define them as vulnerable and prioritise certain individuals amongst 
them for resettlement, UNHCR and resettlement states grew concerned that there 
was an increase in the number of Iraqi women presenting themselves as “women-at-
risk” because they had lost their husbands.  Similarly, more children presented 
themselves as “unaccompanied minors” because they had lost their guardians.  And 
more persons claimed to have life-threatening medical needs or family links in 
resettlement countries.  There were suspicions raised that some of these women 
might not have lost their husbands, particularly as some husbands sometimes 
reappeared following resettlement of their wives; that some of the minors were not 
actually legal minors or did actually have family members accompanying them; that 
some persons were not as ill as they claimed to be; and that some family 
relationships with relatives in resettlement countries may not have been genuine.50  
The very juridical and administrative framework of vulnerability used to identify the 
most vulnerable refugees was in this sense appropriated by refugees who used these 
criteria to draw attention to their protection needs in the only language available. 
Also, resettlement countries increasingly focused upon the “integration 
potential” of refugees in their decisions on resettlement, which undermined the 
policy of resettling the most vulnerable.  Many advocacy groups grew concerned 
that refugees who were less vulnerable, more skilled, younger, and educated, and 
therefore better equipped to become self-sufficient, were quietly being prioritised 
by some resettlement countries at the expense of those who were most in need.51  
                                                                 
50
 These issues were the subject of frequent internal meetings within UNHCR during the height of the Iraqi 
resettlement operation, as procedures were put in place within different offices in the region in an attempt to 
confirm the credibility of these representations. However, misrepresentations by refugees in an attempt to fit 
within resettlement prioritisation criteria have long been an issue in resettlement programming.  See for 
example, Martin, D. (2005). Migration and refuge in the twenty-first century: A symposium in memory of Arthur 
Helton: A new era for U.S. refugee resettlement. Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 36, 299. 
51
 Banki, S. & Lang, H. (2008). Difficult to remain: The impact of mass resettlement. Forced Migration Review, 30, 
42-44, p. 43; Coelho, P. (2007, June 28). ECRE presentation on resettlement and integration potential measures. 
UNHCR Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva, pp. 1-2; UNHCR (2008, October). Remarks by 
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The focus on integration potential was presented as part of a larger project of using 
resettlement to promote self-reliance or self-sufficiency, but it sent a mixed message 
to refugees about how much vulnerability was acceptable to the state. 
Within the US context, for example, there were tensions between the core focus 
and goals of various government programmes.  The Bureau of Population, Refugees, 
and Migration focused upon resettling refugees who were the most vulnerable,52 
while the Office of Refugee Resettlement, through its Matching Grant programme53 
(which was not unlike various welfare-to-work programmes in the US in the 1990s),54 
sought to “promote self-sufficiency and integration”.55   
Also, the goal of using resettlement of vulnerable refugees to help them attain 
self-sufficiency within resettlement states was sometimes undermined by economic 
and social conditions within these states themselves.  For example, some Iraqis were 
reluctant to resettle to the US where they perceived that the benefits and support 
available for their integration would be insufficient to ensure their survival in a 
sustainable way.  Also, the vulnerability classifications that facilitated their selection 
for resettlement often were not addressed sufficiently upon their arrival in the US.  A 
study conducted by Georgetown University noted a number of gaps in effectively 
addressing vulnerabilities of resettled refugees in the US:  There was not always clear 
communication between organisations involved in the resettlement process as to 
the specific needs of refugees, and this resulted in refugees being placed in 
communities that did not have the resources or facilities to address their needs.  
These gaps also included underfunded employment services, inadequate financial 
support, insufficient English language training, inadequate transportation, inability to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Sean Henderson, Senior Resettlement Officer. European Council of Refugees and Exiles, Biannual General 
Meeting, 30-31 October 2008, Paris, p. 3. 
52
 Brick, K., et al (supra note 29), p. 7. 
53
 See Kerwin, D. (2011 May). The faltering US refugee protection system: Legal and policy responses to refugees, 
asylum seekers, and others in need of protection. Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, p. 9; International 
Rescue Committee (2009). Iraqi refugees in the United States: In dire straits. New York, p. 7. 
54
 See for example Morgan, S. (2001, September). The agency of welfare workers: Negotiating devolution, 
privatization, and the meaning of self-sufficiency. American Anthropologist, 103 (3), 747-761. 
55
 U.S. DOS, DSS, HHS (2009). Proposed refugee admissions for fiscal year 2010: Report to Congress, pp. 7-13. 
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obtain professional recertification, and difficulties in accessing medical and mental 
health treatment.56    
Similarly, in Australia, Iraqi refugees faced considerable obstacles to integration 
on account of polices of dispersal which often settled them in economically 
depressed regions  outside of urban centres, where specialised medical and social 
services were very limited, and racism was fuelled by competition for scarce 
employment and resources.  In these regions, refugee access to the labour market 
was restricted by limited English language skills and training, the non-transferability 
of their professional qualifications, few job opportunities, the potential for 
exploitation, and discriminatory attitudes of employers.57  Hence, the idea that 
resettlement would rectify the causes and consequences of vulnerability was not 
always realised in practice. 
 
C. Vulnerable states: Classifications of exclusion and inadmissibility 
in resettlement 
 
The concept of vulnerability was mobilised not only to protect certain refugee 
bodies, but also to address insecurities within states.  These insecurities both 
produced and reinforced the rationality undergirding states’ increasingly restrictive 
legal regimes governing refugee admittance.  Refugees found to be potentially 
excludable and inadmissible occupied the opposite end of the spectrum from those 
deemed to be “deserving” and vulnerable.  Such categorisations were administrative 
tools for deciding upon and demarcating not only who was a refugee, but which 
refugees would be able to access resettlement to the global north.  These regimes 
were often justified as necessary for maintaining the credibility, reputation, and 
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integrity of the resettlement programme as a tool for refugee protection.58  For 
example, during the 2002 Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement in 
Geneva, Canada noted the challenge it faced in maintaining its leadership in refugee 
resettlement while ensuring that refugees who may be excludable or inadmissible 
did not gain entry.59 
As a part of the Iraqi resettlement policy,60 UNHCR therefore identified profiles 
and backgrounds that would trigger the need for a full refugee status determination 
and exclusion assessment, and not just direct and expedited referral as a prima facie 
refugee for resettlement processing.61  For example, to determine whether there 
were any foreseeable exclusion issues, UNHCR and resettlement states screened 
senior members of the Ba’ath Party or persons who had served in the military when 
crimes against humanity were perpetrated by Saddam Hussein’s regime.62 
A number of resettlement states also legislatively implemented bars to 
admission of refugees suspected of providing support for terrorism.  Absent a 
recognised definition of terrorism, these bars to admission were not identical, but 
reflected individual state definitions and interpretations of what constituted 
terrorism.  In North America, for example, domestic legislation was enacted to 
prevent entry of persons who were deemed to be security threats, terrorists, and 
criminals from infiltrating the refugee resettlement system.63  In Canada, the 
Immigration Act contained provisions on inadmissibility based on security 
concerns,64 and courts interpreted the Exclusion Clause Article 1F(a) of the 1951 
Convention to include members of terrorist organisations; Article 1F(b) to treat acts 
of terrorism as non-political crimes; and Article 1F(c) to apply to persons who 
committed acts of terrorism either inside or outside the country of refuge, including 
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not only state officials, but also lower level operatives and persons having no 
connection with the state.65  Senior officials of regimes designated by the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration to have participated in terrorism, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, or gross or systematic human rights violations were also 
inadmissible under Canadian law, including senior officials from Saddam Hussein’s 
regime from 1968 onwards,66 regardless of their individual knowledge or intent. 
In the US, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and REAL ID Act of 2005 amended the 
US Immigration and Nationality Act by broadening the grounds for denying 
resettlement or asylum to refugees who provided “material support” for “terror 
groups”, with some discretionary waivers available for refugees who had provided 
material support under “duress”.67  Material support included, for example, 
providing arms, funds, a safe house, transportation, communications, false 
documentation, food, or services for terror groups; and terrorism included any 
support for armed struggle against an internationally recognised government,68 
regardless of the US’ foreign policy towards that government.69  
Ironically, many of the Iraqi refugees who were subjected to the US’ material 
support bar were amongst those who were the most vulnerable or who had the 
strongest protection claims under the 1951 Convention.  For a period of time before 
duress waivers were issued with more regularity, Iraqis were also barred from 
admission to the US if they had paid a ransom to a US-designated or non-designated 
foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) in order to secure the release of a kidnapped 
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family member.70  Iraqi women who were kidnapped and forced to provided services 
for members of FTOs, which included any militia armed and fighting the government, 
were also barred for providing “material support”.71  Also the People’s Mujahedin of 
Iran (PMOI) was designated as an FTO by the US Department of State, and PMOI 
members who were living as refugees in Iraq were thus barred from admission to the 
US for resettlement, despite the declaration by the US Department of Defense that 
they were “protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and despite 
that they were housed in Camp Ashraf which was protected by the US military.72  In 
such cases, the basis of claims for refugee recognition ironically constituted the basis 
for denying refugees admission for resettlement in the US.   
Refugees referred by UNCHR for resettlement to the US were further vetted 
through security screenings, including the Consular Lookout and Support System 
which ran a name-check, and in some cases Security Advisory Opinion reviews, 
which were triggered by certain combinations of biodata (such as nationality, age, 
and gender) and other categories identified by the Bureau of Consular Affairs on the 
basis of US foreign policy or security interests.73  These procedures caused extensive 
processing delays, leaving some Iraqis waiting for up to four years in dangerous 
conditions before being permitted to finally travel,74 and preventing others from 
entering the US even where there was no evidence that they posed any security 
risks.75 
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Similarly, in Europe, the asylum and refugee admissions system was increasingly 
perceived as vulnerable to abuse by persons who had participated in terrorist 
activities.76  The European Commission (EC) did adopt UNHCR’s view that there was 
no need to institute major changes to the refugee regime,77 but only to apply 
carefully the exclusion clauses in the 1951 Convention – a measure that raised some 
criticism, given the broad definition of terrorism that the EC intended the Exclusion 
Clauses to cover.78  However, subsequent restrictions were nonetheless enacted:  
The Qualification Directive removed the “personal and knowing conduct” 
requirement from the exclusion analysis for persons who had committed serious 
non-political crimes.79  At a national level, Germany, for example, implemented the 
Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 and the Residence Act 2004, both of which placed 
restrictions on entry of asylum-seekers who had provided support for international 
terrorism.  However, without clear definitions of either “support” or “terrorism”, 
German authorities had significant discretion in the interpretation and application of 
this legislation.80    
In the United Kingdom, the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
permitted the Home Secretary to deny entry to any non-citizen suspected of being 
an “international terrorist”.81  The UK’s 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Act, Section 55, similarly permitted the Secretary of State to certify that an appellant 
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was not entitled to the protections of the 1951 Convention on the grounds of 
national security,82 despite previous concerns raised by UNHCR about potentially 
overly broad interpretations of the 1951 Convention’s exclusion clauses,83 and later 
concerns that this might exclude persons involved in opposition movements against 
governments.84   
In this environment, the indeterminate and varying definitions of terrorism gave 
way to further iterations of threat, applying to increasing numbers of persons fleeing 
the conflict.  And as the project of identifying and distinguishing supporters of 
terrorism grew in complexity and scope, the vulnerability that drove many Iraqis to 
flee their country was often recast as a threat to resettlement states.  Hence, the 
concept of vulnerability began to refer as much to state territories as it did to 
refugee bodies. 
 
 
III. Exegesis: Sovereignty and vulnerability in refugee resettlement 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The following sections theorise that in the classifications of vulnerability and 
threat in the Iraqi resettlement programme, vulnerability functioned as an ideology 
intimately bound up in the workings and production of sovereignty.  As much as 
vulnerable bodies were recouped into the state system, these bodies also became 
the sites for the materialisation and expression of sovereign power, marking the 
boundaries between inclusion and exclusion.  And vulnerability referred not only to 
refugee bodies, but also to state borders, as states deployed policies aimed at 
classifying particular persons or acts as excludable or inadmissible.   
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Given the paucity of resettlement places available for refugees globally and the 
crisis or emergency this engendered, vulnerability was deployed as a concept to 
select those refugees deemed most at risk of further human rights violations.  In this 
respect, refugee bodies were instrumentalised in delimiting the parameters of the 
problem, circumscribing the definition of need to a select few, and rendering the 
majority invisible and contained in states of legal uncertainty in the Middle East.   
This exegesis also considers how the concept of vulnerability was deployed in 
another sense – as an ill to be cured through the self-sufficiency or self-reliance that 
is supposed to be enabled by resettlement.  Working in concert with the ideology of 
self-sufficiency, vulnerability was a useful concept to some resettlement states only 
to the extent that it did not challenge these states in their processes of vetting 
refugees and selecting those who would be most amenable to incorporation in their 
neoliberal economic systems.  Such systems distanced states from any 
responsibilities for the protection of those individuals most marginalised in the 
economic order, and these states resisted accommodating those individuals who 
might be the most dependent on state assistance due to severe trauma or disability.  
As such, the ideologies of vulnerability, self-sufficiency, and threat became 
critical in constructing refugee bodies in terms of their relationship to resettlement 
states and the constitution of the citizen as the ideal political subject.  At the same 
time, however, UNHCR attempted to revive the link between human rights and 
human vulnerabilities, and refugees often appropriated the resettlement criteria to 
make their protection needs visible and to obtain re-entry into the state system.  In 
so doing, they also created opportunities for contesting and exposing the hidden 
violence of decisions on refugee lives, in subtle ways pressing for protection 
measures exceeding the strict purview of sovereign state interests. 
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B. Vulnerability as ideology 
 
The resettlement criteria developed by UNHCR were partially a pragmatic 
response to the problem of restricted quotas.  These criteria were also developed to 
redress certain forms of invisibility experienced by persons who did not always fit 
within the strict juridical definitions of the 1951 Convention, such as women and 
children.85  They were further intended to ensure the protection of persons least 
able to survive in the exceptional spaces in which the majority of the world’s 
refugees reside.   
However, the creation of such systems, while attempting to maintain UNHCR’s 
procedural integrity in the face of constraints imposed by donor states, also 
produced other kinds of truth effects, delimiting the most “deserving”,86 the most 
“vulnerable”, and the most “threatening” refugees.  Described in the following 
sections, these truths or “labels” revealed the “political in the apolitical”,87 as they 
served state interests,88 asserted national identities, at some times promoted and at 
other times undermined UNHCR’s mandate, and justified allocations of responsibility 
for alleviating human suffering.   
The morality or intentions of UNHCR or resettlement states in constructing 
vulnerability as the rationality behind their resettlement systems are therefore not 
the focus of this inquiry.  Rather, this section focuses upon the possible unstated and 
indirect effects of power and truth that the institutionalisation of vulnerability as an 
ideology had for Iraqi refugees who were defined and prioritised in these terms.   
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1. Vulnerable and invisible bodies 
 
What does it mean for vulnerability to function as an ideology?  Althusser 
theorised that ideology (the “ideological state apparatus”) functions by 
“interpellating”, or recognising individuals in accordance with specific social and 
juridical identities.  In responding to this call or interpellation, individuals are 
constituted and enter a particular discourse as subjects.89  They become both visible 
and subject to the power of the law,90 and positioned as legal subjects who 
participate in reproducing relations of domination and justifying sovereign power.91  
For example, Bassel examined citizenship as a form of interpellation which 
legitimises and delegitimises certain meanings of belonging and legitimacy, as the 
“citizen” is presented as “natural and necessary” rather than the product of 
coercion.  Interpellation facilitates relationships of power that determine which 
aspects of identity claims are considered important and deserving of support.92  In so 
doing, Butler observed, there is an inherent violence in the process – being 
addressed, given a name, subjected to impositions, and forced to respond.93     
By functioning as an ideology,94 vulnerability was deployed in the creation, 
naturalisation, and normalisation of a “hierarchy of needs” in the resettlement 
criteria.  The implicit message was that only certain forms of violence “matter”, and 
only certain claims are rational.95  Claim-making was therefore restricted,96 as 
vulnerability worked to interpellate only certain refugees as subjects in need 
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according to the resettlement criteria, rendering them “hypervisible”97 to 
resettlement states.  These interpellations of vulnerability left less visible the vast 
majority of refugees in spaces where law had little or no application.  The failure to 
recognise their claims and needs by securing a durable solution for them was in turn 
normalised and rationalised.98 
The deployment of vulnerability therefore not only rectified previous 
inequalities in the juridical recognition of refugees, but also created new ones, 
demonstrating how interpellation as a means of constituting legitimate subjects is 
always at the same time exclusionary – both of other refugee bodies and identities.  
The process of increasing classification and juridification of resettlement criteria 
could never solve the problem of exclusion that resulted from interpellation.  For 
example, Fernandez demonstrated how restricted and gendered constructions of 
“vulnerability” in the Iraqi refugee operation tended to minimise and underreport 
the high levels of physical, psychological, and sexual violence experienced by Iraqi 
refugee men, which resulted in their having the highest death rates,99 but the lowest 
levels of access to social services and protection in host states.  This compromised 
their safety, security, and survival, and reinforced notions of Iraqi men as embodying 
security threats and women as traditional victims.100   
As such, rather than focusing on the rights of all persons recognised as refugees 
on account of their vulnerability to persecution, the ideology of vulnerability 
permitted the prioritisation of the needs of a few who were most at risk.  In this way, 
state responsibility towards refugees and responsibilities for “burden-sharing” 
became focused more on a small group of refugees in need of urgent assistance and 
downplayed the needs and rights of the many who remained in tenuous and 
unstable conditions of bare life on state territories.   
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While resettlement states did contribute financial assistance towards the 
support and protection of Iraqi refugees in the Middle East, such assistance did not 
secure their legal protection in terms of their rights to non-refoulement, residency, 
and work, and was often restricted to those refugees deemed to be the most 
vulnerable.101  The refugees primarily remained in protracted states of legal 
liminality, as such measures not only assisted with their survival in such exceptional 
spaces, but also effectively contained them there.   
The normalisation of the criteria of vulnerability also masked the international 
state system’s failure to accommodate the majority of refugees other than in spaces 
of exile, exclusion, and exception.  Those refugee bodies not recognised in terms of 
vulnerability were not prioritised in protection operations, as their needs and rights 
were placed lower in the hierarchy of need.  The restriction of aid, assistance, and 
resettlement to a few refugees was rationalised in this context as both logical and 
necessary, as the best alternative available, given the political and economic realities 
and constraints.  However, this masked both the inherent violence in the process of 
prioritisation and also the critical lack of resources and political will for protecting all 
persons who were recognised as refugees.  It made states appear that they were 
“doing something” and compelled UNHCR to underscore that resettlement needs far 
exceeded available places,102 in its quest to pressure states to shoulder more of the 
responsibility for refugee protection.   
Also towards the project of protecting state borders, managing migration,103 and 
containing refugees, vulnerability as an ideology, or label,104 identified as 
“legitimate” those refugees who came through legalised resettlement programmes 
rather than those who sought irregular means of entering state territories in search 
of protection.  This message was implicit in statements posing resettlement as the 
answer to the problem of irregular migration, as UNHCR stated that resettlement 
was a key means of preventing irregular and secondary migration of refugees 
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through other routes.105  Refugees referred through the resettlement programme, 
both identified by UNHCR, and then vetted by resettlement states, were in many 
cases provided with better benefits upon resettlement than asylum-seekers already 
seeking recognition in resettlement countries.106   
Such distinctions between refugees who may have entered the territories of 
resettlement countries through irregular means and refugees who entered through 
legal routes provided by resettlement processing had the effect of interpellating 
refugees who went through the resettlement system as deserving subjects – the 
“real” refugees, and condemning those who entered irregularly – the potential 
“illegal”107 migrants who must be discouraged and contained.  The tying of 
vulnerability to resettlement programming, and therefore “legitimacy” and 
“legality”, rendered invisible and delegitimised the vulnerabilities that led many 
refugees to face the dangers of traveling irregularly or with human smugglers to 
escape persecution in Iraq. 
The refugees left invisible by the discourse and ideology of vulnerability became 
what Enns called in other contexts “occupied bodies”, or what Agamben would term 
forms of “bare life”108 through which sovereign power makes itself felt.  The 
development of vulnerability as a juridical category for prioritising refugees for 
resettlement or assistance masked the political moment when all refugees could 
have been recognised as vulnerable and living in conditions of bare life,109 
particularly given that their very status as refugees implied vulnerability to the abuse 
of state power.  Vulnerability as an ideology recognised and recouped into the ambit 
of state protection only certain variegated forms of bare life.  In the process, it left 
intact other forms of bare life that remained excluded from political or legal 
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recognition in the maintenance and production of sovereign power.  The space of 
the sovereign decision in which such interpellation took place was treated as a given.  
The identification of a select few refugees as legitimate subjects for resettlement, 
while ensuring their protection, therefore also masked and normalised the violence 
of containment and exclusion of the many within repressive state systems of 
migration control.   
Vulnerability was also part of a larger discourse of security.  In the context of the 
securitisation of the refugee regime, securing the protection of vulnerable persons 
became caught up with securing the resettlement programme from the infiltration 
of individuals posing threats to states.110  Redressing human vulnerability and 
insecurity became contingent on securing the vulnerable state.111  Rather than a shift 
in security discourse from a focus on states to a focus on individuals,112 the two were 
dialectically connected, and the shifting emphasis was more a matter of political 
expediency in the deployment of particular kinds of governance.  The integrity of the 
system for securing vulnerable bodies required measures aimed at also securing 
state borders. 
Towards the project of shoring up vulnerable states, the exclusion and 
inadmissibility procedures implemented in the Iraqi resettlement programme were 
also forms of interpellation as they de-contested spaces of sovereignty that 
exceeded the scope and boundaries of what was permissible in international law.  
The indeterminacy of terms such as “terrorist” permitted the expansion of the term 
to include increasingly larger numbers of persons.  The lack of a definition for such 
terms enabled ever greater discretion by state agents in their interpretation and 
more easily gave way to political decisions made under the cover of legislation and 
regulation.  Interpellation of refugees as excludable or inadmissible legitimised the 
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restrictive interpretations of international refugee law and naturalised the sovereign 
decisions that premised domestic security concerns over international legal 
obligations.  In the process, interpellation reinforced which law mattered, which 
violence counted, and which individuals would be welcomed. 
The implicit violence in the processes of interpellation, labelling, and 
categorisation suggested that the creation of new categories of inadmissibility could 
never rectify the vulnerabilities created in the production of state borders and 
refugee bodies.  Rather these categories’ expansion and multiplication as markers of 
both vulnerability and threat, which were facilitated by juridical classifications, 
definitions, and hierarchies of subjectivities, violence, and law, represented the 
increasing normalisation of the exception in the face of emergency.   
The truth effects produced by the juridical constructions of both vulnerability 
and threat for purposes of resettlement identification therefore demonstrated 
Butler’s contention that “although we need norms in order to live, and to live well, 
and to know what direction to transform our world, we are also constrained by 
norms in ways that sometimes do violence to us”.113  They affirmed the “Nietzschean 
insight that the origins or generative conditions of laws do not determine their 
subsequent use or value”.114   
 
2. Producing the neoliberal subject 
 
Vulnerability as an ideology within the resettlement criteria not only delimited 
and circumscribed refugee bodies, but also reinforced sovereign identities rooted in 
neo-imperial and neoliberal rationalities of resettlement states.  Following Jarman’s 
reading of disability, the essentialised vulnerabilities implicit in the refugee 
resettlement criteria were also tropes marking and continually reproducing the 
artificial border between the opportunities available within resettlement states of 
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the global north and the limited possibilities and implicit suffering within the host 
states of the global south.  Such vulnerability was operative in constituting 
resettlement states as spaces of greater advancement – in power, knowledge, and 
compassion – where vulnerability could be eradicated or purified.115  The vulnerable 
refugee body became the discursive site upon which anxieties about citizenship and 
identity were projected – it became an object for both consumption116 and 
redemption by resettlement states. 
Resettlement criteria in this sense became a project of first naming and then 
eliminating the difference posed by vulnerability of the individual body and its 
associated “weaknesses”, thereby masking the economic inequality, nationalism, 
racism, and warfare that both created refugees and perpetuated their vulnerable 
status.  Through ostensibly compassionate and benevolent practices to stop 
suffering, the citizen body could claim the security of its “self-possessed” individual 
identity which was dependent upon the exclusion of bodily vulnerability.117   
Also, through the ideology of vulnerability, refugee bodies were produced as 
objects of intervention by states in the global north to protect refugees from their 
own “less civilised” communities in the global south.118  For example, such 
sentiments were mobilised the specific citation of “women at risk of honour killings”, 
in the Iraqi resettlement profiles.119  While such specifications may indeed be used to 
secure the protection of individual women from threats of such harm, they also 
tended to overshadow the reality that many women at risk of human rights 
violations may also be found in resettlement state communities. 
The primary project towards eliminating the “weaknesses” − or “threats” posed 
by human vulnerability to the myth of the self-possessed sovereign subject − was 
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termed “self-sufficiency” (or in UNHCR parlance, “self-reliance”).  The resettlement 
of vulnerable individuals would enable them to decrease their vulnerability and 
dependence upon public assistance and therefore become self-sufficient and 
remade into the model citizen.   
The ideology of self-sufficiency has long been a part of neoliberal rationality, 
which assigns primacy to a market deregulated through privatisation and devolution, 
limits the provision of social services, and aims to reform vulnerable subjects into 
autonomous and employed individuals.120  Morgan observed how neoliberalism 
reframes the systematic economic and social problems of poverty resulting from 
deregulation as one of individual responsibility rooted in individual psychological or 
moral problems – problems of dependency and the lack of individual responsibility.  
It privatises not only the market, but also responsibility, by presenting self-
sufficiency through employment as a moral obligation and individual choice in order 
to ameliorate the problem of dependency.  It downplays any emphasis on the 
structural causes of human need and delegitimises the role of interdependency, 
reciprocity, and shared responsibility for social welfare.121  The focus is on individual 
accountability for welfare, rather than state accountability to individuals.   
UNHCR’s focus on promoting self-reliance, while recognising the need for a 
permissive legal and economic environment, also became bound up in the rationality 
of neoliberalism.  Achieving self-reliance is one of the stated goals of UNHCR’s 
resettlement programme:  
 
Self-reliance can be defined as the “social and economic ability of an individual, 
a household or a community to meet essential needs (including protection, food, 
water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner 
and with dignity”.  As a programme approach, self-reliance refers to developing 
and strengthening livelihoods of persons of concern in an effort to reduce their 
vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian and external assistance. 
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Self-reliance among refugees thus: reduces the burden on the country of asylum 
by decreasing refugees’ dependence on its assistance; boosts refugees’ dignity 
and confidence by giving them more control over their daily lives and hope for 
the future; and helps make any long-term solution more sustainable as refugees 
who actively support themselves are better equipped to take on the challenges 
of voluntary repatriation, resettlement, or local integration.122 
 
UNHCR stated that it promotes self-reliance as a means of restoring rights and 
dignity and addressing the economic needs of refugees, particularly persons living in 
often inhumane situations in camps.  Self-reliance is envisioned as a means of 
empowering refugees to participate in their own protection as active agents rather 
than as passive recipients of aid.123  Ultimately it is manifested in the economically 
independent individual able to sustain a livelihood largely independent of 
humanitarian assistance.124   
Promoting self-reliance is a goal for all UNHCR operational contexts,125 and it 
increasingly has become a focus of the resettlement programme, as well.  However, 
it shares some aspects of the neoliberal rationality undergirding “self-sufficiency”.  It 
became imbricated in neoliberal discourse when self-reliance through resettlement 
was presented by UNHCR as a goal that not only would empower refugees, but 
would also reduce their dependence on state services, hence making resettlement 
states more amenable to receiving them.  Towards this end, in the early 2000s, 
resettlement states participating in UNHCR Annual Tripartite Consultations on 
Resettlement initiated programmes to improve refugee integration (and hence, self-
reliance) following resettlement.126   
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Recognising that individual empowerment requires a restoration of human 
rights and a permissive economic and social environment (i.e. structural changes to 
law and economic policy), UNHCR’s definition of self-reliance is far broader than the 
narrow terms of individual moral responsibility employed by states in their self-
sufficiency agendas and discourses.  This may be due to the protection lens through 
which UNHCR analyses and identifies ways to remedy refugee problems.  However, 
this strategy is problematic for several reasons.  First, it has been criticised by 
scholars as also being self-serving – a means for the agency to reduce material 
assistance in keeping with budgetary limitations rather than based upon actual 
refugee needs.127  Such critiques were bolstered by frequent references in UNHCR 
literature to self-reliance easing budget constraints.128   
Second, it is questionable whether self-reliance is the logical answer to 
addressing the significant structural inequalities that lead to refugee “passivity” 
(non-participation), extreme traumatisation, disempowerment, and dependence on 
humanitarian aid.  How can a tool aimed at individual empowerment and 
responsibility become the key to addressing structural inequalities and injuries 
resulting from violence, discrimination, and severe violations of human rights at a 
state, institutional, and communal level?  The focus on individual empowerment and 
livelihoods as a key goal for Iraqi refugee resettlement programming may have had 
the unintended consequence of focusing solutions on individuals rather than on 
critical structural, economic, or political changes, thereby flattening and de-
politicising the larger context that produced the refugee crisis, and displacing state 
responsibility for its prevention and response.  The use of the term “self-reliance” 
itself, relying as it did on questions of the individual, personal responsibility, and 
dependency, therefore not only risked reproducing neoliberal discourses of self-
sufficiency, but also risked being co-opted by states towards those ends.  Regardless 
of the intended consequences, the terminology was either a product of or subsumed 
within the larger discursive frame of neoliberalism. 
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Third, self-reliance risks reproducing discourses of neoliberalism and individual 
responsibility at the expense of refugee protection.  Projects aimed at increasing 
self-reliance and “alleviating refugee situations” tend to focus on increasing 
individual capacities that will enable refugees to “lift themselves out of poverty” as 
obstacles are removed from increasing individual “productivity”.129  Employment and 
self-sufficiency are equated with dignity, self-respect, and hope,130 implying that the 
dependent individual is somehow less than human, stagnating,131 undignified, 
hopeless, disempowered, and degraded.  Yet the most extreme forms of bodily 
vulnerability may not easily lend themselves to becoming self-sufficient132 (having 
the language, education, and skills necessary for gainful employment).133  When 
goals of self-sufficiency become infused and co-mingled with the concept of 
vulnerability, the programmatic focus can shift from protecting individuals from 
state harm to the production of the neoliberal subject.  
The link between vulnerability and self-sufficiency in the Iraqi refugee 
resettlement programme suggested that refugees could be resettled if their lives 
were bad enough, but not so bad that they could not save themselves and become 
self-sufficient upon resettlement.  This message was implicit in some resettlement 
states’ increasing emphasis on “integration potential”.  “Integration” became 
focused on how to shape refugees into independent citizens upon resettlement, who 
would be acceptable and amenable to the social and cultural mores of the 
resettlement society, and who would not be overly dependent upon state 
assistance.   
Integration potential has also been evaluated on the basis of refugees’ ability to 
replicate the values and norms134 of the resettlement society.  For example, in the 
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context of refugees in Bangladesh, resettlement was used as a means of modifying 
behaviours and attitudes by rewarding persons who practiced certain norms 
(avoiding early marriage and teenage pregnancy, and seeking education for girls) 
with resettlement opportunities.  As the UNHCR representative in Bangladesh 
stated, "The refugees now see and understand the type of people that are being 
considered for resettlement and want to replicate their behaviour. They understand 
it goes beyond just the protection issue now, and this allows more people to 
benefit."135  Ideology, then, is always “positioned” and “political”;136 as Tuitt noted, 
“alien” identity is constructed in terms of the inability to replicate the dominant 
national identity’s values, norms, and behaviours.137   
Resettlement was intended to increase the protection of vulnerable persons 
through this form of social engineering, but by tying protection to the promotion of 
behavioural change, it also reinvigorated the neo-imperial paternalism implicit in 
projects of saving refugees from their own communities.  It further risked producing 
a situation in which the agency might use resettlement as a protection tool for a 
refugee only when s/he was willing to adopt particular norms and values, thereby 
making rights protection contingent on acquiescence to a particular kind of politics. 
While many resettlement states did not overtly select Iraqi refugees for 
admission on this basis, discussions regarding integration potential were on the rise, 
sparking concern about the motivations of some states for accepting or rejecting 
certain particularly vulnerable refugees.  UNHCR and NGOs attempted to respond to 
this slippage both internally and within states where vulnerability was increasingly 
circumscribed by the parameters and demands of self-sufficiency and the ability to 
integrate.  They reiterated that the “integration potential” of individual refugees is 
not a resettlement criteria and should not be used as such to the detriment of the 
                                                                 
135
 IRIN (2010, March 24). Bangladesh: Self-reliant refugees win resettlement. 
136
 Tuitt, P. (supra note 85), p. 75. 
137
 Ibid., p. 76, referencing Cheyney, D. (1993). 'Valued judgments? A re-reading of immigration cases. In 
Bottomley & Conaghan (Eds.). Feminist theory and legal strategy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Chapter 5. Sovereignty and the ideology of vulnerability in the Iraqi refugee resettlement programme  
 
 
263 
 
most vulnerable refugees; rather, the “integration capacity of resettlement states” 
to accommodate refugees should be the focus of state intervention.138   
However, this contention was seriously undermined by the very discourse of 
self-reliance employed by UNHCR itself in its efforts to present resettlement as a 
means for protecting individuals by eliminating their vulnerabilities and remaking 
them into productive citizens.139  The supposed tensions between vulnerability and 
self-sufficiency, although decried by both UNHCR and NGOs as undermining refugee 
protection, were increasingly revealed as an intimate pact in which the two 
ideologies were contingent on one another in both their legitimation and 
deployment:  Vulnerability was produced and then ameliorated through remaking 
the refugee into the neoliberal subject, but only a variegated form of vulnerability 
could achieve this.  More severe forms of bare life could not be recouped into this 
state and citizen-making project, and as such resettlement became contingent on a 
parsing of vulnerability, in which the human remainder implicit in the constitution of 
the citizen was rendered invisible, and the human rights framework for protecting 
the most vulnerable humans risked losing trenchancy in the process. 
Also, despite the rhetoric of self-sufficiency and integration potential as a means 
of redressing or eliminating vulnerabilities, the resettlement of refugees in some 
cases in the US and Australia, for example, produced new forms of vulnerability.  
Vulnerability was reproduced not only as a necessary condition of the resettlement 
process,140 but also as a means of positioning refugees upon resettlement – whether 
as sources of cheap labour, as targets of scapegoating, or as objects of intervention – 
all critical to the ideological power of the sovereign state and the economics of 
neoliberalism. 
The co-mingled and interdependent ideologies of vulnerability and self-
sufficiency were therefore critical to the constitution of the citizen and the 
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production of sovereign power.  Self-sufficiency, posed as the result of ameliorating 
vulnerability, refocused responsibility for protection on the individual away from the 
larger socio-political context that produced the conditions of vulnerability.  Self-
sufficiency was equated with the full person or citizen and could be juxtaposed 
against the vulnerable, abject, or less-than-human non-citizen who needed to be 
brought back within the ambit of state protection, thereby legitimating and 
producing the “need” for the state system.   
The production of the fully empowered and independent neoliberal citizen 
therefore became contingent on the production of vulnerability or bare life of the 
refugee.  Discourses of vulnerability continuously reproduced refugee bodies as 
vulnerable in order to produce the citizen as the proper and ideal subject of politics.  
Rather than recognising the vulnerability of all human beings within the 
deployments of sovereign power and using such dependency as an opportunity for 
greater sociability and contestation, or what Butler would term a “politics of 
humility”,141 vulnerability of the non-citizen refugee was constructed in counterpoint 
to the category of the citizen.  The discursive coupling of vulnerability and self-
sufficiency naturalised both the category of the “citizen” and the logic of sovereignty 
as the normal foundation of political ordering.   
 
C. Exposing the fragility and contingency of sovereignty 
 
Although resettlement certainly provides protections for those who benefit 
from it, it is neither a legal right of refugees nor an obligation of states.142  The 
resettlement criteria are not enshrined in international refugee or human rights law, 
                                                                 
141
 See, for example, Butler, J. (supra note 93), p. 45; McRobbie, A. (2006). Vulnerability, violence and 
(cosmopolitan) ethics: Butler’s Precarious life. The British Journal of Sociology, 57 (1), 69-86, pp. 84-85; Mills, C. 
(supra note 114), p. 145. In most conceptualisations of vulnerability is the common element that it is produced 
through unequal power relations that need to be rectified.  This is quite a different concept from the vulnerability 
envisioned by Butler in her assertion that vulnerability is a common human condition that could open the 
possibilities for a moral responsibility towards one another.  See Butler, J. (1997). The psychic life of power. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 21-25. 
142
 Goodwin-Gill, G. & McAdam, J. (supra note 14), p. 489. 
Chapter 5. Sovereignty and the ideology of vulnerability in the Iraqi refugee resettlement programme  
 
 
265 
 
other than implicitly in the concept of non-discrimination143 and the protection of 
civilians during armed conflict.144  Rather, they serve as more of an administrative 
framework for identifying, classifying, and managing refugee bodies, and are 
vulnerable to arbitrary deployment and political manipulation.   
Consequently, despite its goal of securing legal long-term rights protections for 
the most vulnerable refugees, resettlement also functions as a form of charitable 
humanitarian aid, as it is available only on a discretionary basis at the behest of 
resettlement states.  Rights and vulnerabilities are best understood in terms of one 
another, but when they are separated, the kinds of discourses that emerge around 
them differ, focusing more on legal protection when speaking of rights, and more on 
humanitarian assistance when speaking of vulnerabilities.  The construction of 
refugees as “suffering bodies” with specific needs and vulnerabilities is often 
premised over refugees constructed as “threatened bodies” with specific rights in 
accordance with the 1951 Convention.145  The suffering body requires 
compassionate humanitarian assistance, while the threatened body requires the 
protection of rights.  The construction of the Iraqi refugee crisis as a humanitarian 
emergency in this way enabled host state governments to treat UNHCR as primarily 
an agency providing emergency relief.146   
What happens when the “suffering body”, recognised for its pathology, is 
privileged over the “threatened body” in refugee contexts?  It can depoliticise 
political questions by constructing them as humanitarian problems, as was the case 
for Palestinian refugees in Iraq.147  Fassin noted how humanitarian rationales can 
become continuously prioritised, and political asylum rendered a secondary concern, 
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moving the right to life from a political to a humanitarian arena.148  The political 
increasingly integrates the humanitarian, which in turn redefines it:  Fassin argued 
that “policies of order and a politics of suffering” are interlinked as humanitarian aid, 
rather than human rights protection, both ensures security of the citizen and the 
compassionate treatment of those non-citizens on state territories.149   In this way, 
the construction of refugees as in need of assistance rather than rights protection 
reproduces relations of domination.   
The suffering body also may be used to conflate humanitarian assistance with 
refugee rights, setting the stage for rights to be subsumed within a discourse of aid.  
The realm of humanitarian aid is the space of exception where bare life becomes 
most manifest – where refugees depend upon the discretionary good will of 
governments in securing resources for survival.  As legal exceptionalism towards 
refugees becomes the norm, legal arguments for rights-based approaches to 
protection are undermined, paving the way for humanitarianism as a form of 
charitable compassion to emerge as the dominant moral paradigm governing the 
space of exception.  It reproduces the refugee continuously through the provision of 
survival aid and re-entrenches the borders between inclusion within the polis and 
exclusion from law’s protection.  No longer simply a temporary measure reserved for 
a time of emergency, humanitarian assistance becomes the primary means of 
mediating between the state and the refugee. 
State discourses premising humanitarian aid over human rights in their 
responses to refugee crises exemplify the tensions that emerge as the UNHCR 
attempts to navigate the dialectic between what Fassin termed in other migration 
contexts the “politics of pity and policies of control”.150  UNHCR’s mandate to 
promote state responsibility for refugee rights protection exists in a tenuous 
relationship with the agency’s heavy emphasis on the coordination and provision of 
                                                                 
148
 Fassin, D. (supra note 145), pp. 4-5. 
149
 Fassin, D. (2005). Compassion and repression: The moral economy of immigration policies in France. Cultural 
Anthropology, 20 (3), 362-387, p. 382.  
150
 Ibid., p. 366. 
Chapter 5. Sovereignty and the ideology of vulnerability in the Iraqi refugee resettlement programme  
 
 
267 
 
aid.  This reflects tensions between the UNHCR’s ever-broadening mandate and host 
and donor states’ narrowing interests.   
However, in the context of the Iraqi resettlement programme, such shifts and 
tensions were also productive as they countered the use of vulnerability to premise 
humanitarian assistance over human rights.  While the ideology of vulnerability 
reproduced refugees as either suffering, invisible, or threatening bodies in the 
constitution of the state and the citizen, the process was revealed as neither fixed 
nor totalising.  Rather, at the moments of interpellation of vulnerability, fissures and 
slippages occurred, which exposed the contingency of sovereign power, contested 
the sovereign decision, and created the space to re-think the relationship between 
human vulnerability and refugee protection.  Vulnerability in this sense produced a 
form of abjection − that which Kristeva theorised is produced by disturbances to 
order, systems, and identities that reveal spaces of ambiguity which do not 
correspond to boundaries, borders, or rules and the “fragility” of the law.151 
Three examples will be considered here: first, the discursive shift in UNHCR’s 
Iraqi resettlement policy linking vulnerability with human rights protection; second, 
the ways that Iraqi refugees constructed their narratives of suffering that challenged 
particular interpellations of vulnerability; and third, the difficulties encountered by 
UNHCR and resettlement states in identifying persons who conformed to the specific 
conceptions of vulnerability enshrined in the resettlement criteria. 
 
1. Linking vulnerability to human rights protection 
 
As UNHCR both deployed the new resettlement profiles for Iraqi refugees that 
focused on rights protection and promoted the strategic use of resettlement, 
sovereign state interests and identities produced through the idioms of vulnerability, 
self-sufficiency, and threat were not entirely successful.  To some extent, while these 
ideologies did reproduce and affirm state power, possibilities also presented 
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themselves for envisioning how resettlement programming could be moved from a 
strictly humanitarian assistance paradigm to a more human rights-based protection 
arena, which many resettlement states also came to embrace. 
UNHCR’s Iraqi resettlement policy demonstrated a subtle shift in the 
conceptualisation of resettlement, challenging its traditional seating in the realm of 
humanitarian assistance.  The policy went beyond the purview of resettling 
vulnerable persons as part of a humanitarian programme to protecting refugees as 
part of a human rights strategy in two critical ways.  First, the Iraqi resettlement 
policy revealed a shift in UNHCR institutional discourse of the strategic use of 
resettlement, as resettlement became increasingly highlighted as a means of 
protecting both refugee rights and vulnerabilities, not only for the small percentage 
of refugees who obtained resettlement, but also for the majority who remained 
within host states in the Middle East.   
Second, the Iraqi resettlement policy expanded the scope of vulnerability to 
include profiles of political, religious, and ethnic persecution (e.g. persons perceived 
to be affiliated with the MNF in Iraq, targeted for their religious affiliation such as 
Christians, or targeted for their ethnicity such as Kurds living in central Iraq).  
Whether intentional or not, these new profiles and criteria spoke more to the 
reasons for flight from the country of origin than to vulnerabilities exacerbated in 
the country of asylum.  As such, they were more akin to the definition of a refugee 
enshrined in the 1951 Convention, where persons may be recognised as refugees if 
they fear persecution on account of their race, nationality, religion, political opinion, 
or membership of a particular social group.152  As such, they inadvertently 
recognised the vulnerability inherent in the refugee definition.   
Therefore, the strategic use of resettlement and the introduction of more rights-
based resettlement profiles in the Iraqi resettlement policy suggested an increasing 
institutional emphasis on the intrinsic connection between human rights protection 
and social and bodily vulnerability.   Rather than posing protection as a solution to be 
                                                                 
152
 1951 Convention (supra note 2), Art. 1A. 
Chapter 5. Sovereignty and the ideology of vulnerability in the Iraqi refugee resettlement programme  
 
 
269 
 
obtained only upon the refugees’ departure from the region, refugee departures to 
resettlement states now became important factors in strengthening protection 
within the region.  And the resettlement profiles themselves became a means for 
facilitating the resettlement of refugees whose vulnerabilities were connected more 
directly to their refugee status claims.  Also, as previously noted in the Palestinian 
context, there was a growing willingness to recognise that the protection of 
individual rights need not undermine communal rights of return.153  Hence, while 
resettlement may have continued to serve the political interests of host and 
resettlement states in managing the migration of Iraqi refugees from the region, a 
significant discursive shift nonetheless occurred in refugee protection strategies that 
emphasised the importance of rights protection in resettlement programming.     
In the face of this shift in institutional discourse, host states generally resisted 
rights language by limiting recognition of refugee rights within their legal codes, 
preferring to construct refugee needs in terms of humanitarian assistance.  Yet at 
the same time, in practice, host states increasingly tolerated the promotion of rights 
protection through both resettlement and limited integration of refugees in their 
public welfare sectors.  Perhaps the disjunctures produced in UNHCR’s increasing 
focus on the connections between rights and vulnerabilities in the face of host state 
reluctance to assume legal responsibility for refugee protection provided the 
openings for this sort of compromise to emerge – where refugees could secure 
greater rights in practice through UNHCR’s systems of indirect governance, while 
states could retain the appearance of sovereign control.  This shift was instrumental 
in moving resettlement from the realm of primarily humanitarian and ad hoc 
discretionary assistance for a fortunate few to an arena in which it could be critical in 
negotiating greater human rights protections for the many in the Middle East. 
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2. Refugee testimonies and narrations of vulnerability 
  
The ideology of vulnerability risked de-politicising refugees, constructing them 
as passive victims of human rights violations and suffering, rather than active agents 
in negotiating their survival.  Despite deploying the ideology of vulnerability, UNHCR 
nonetheless stressed the importance of recognising refugee agency, stating: 
 
Furthermore, as active participants in their own quest for solutions, refugees 
must be seen as persons with specific needs and rights, rather than simply as 
members of ‘vulnerable groups’. Seeing only the vulnerabilities can lead to 
insufficient analysis of the protection risks faced by individuals, and, in 
particular, disregard for their capacities.154   
 
Exemplifying their active agency in searching for their own protection solutions, 
Iraqi refugees harnessed the discourse of vulnerability towards their own protection 
goals, employing narratives of suffering in relation to themselves in order to secure 
their human rights protection in a resettlement or host state.  In the process of 
subjectivisation, the refugees used this discourse to make themselves legible and 
visible to UNHCR and resettlement states.  Being recognised before the law requires 
the refugee to situate herself within particular bounded signifying practices, to 
translate herself into a legal problem that then can be jurdically debated and 
resolved, and to submit to the symbolic violence of juridical definitions that suppress 
other potentially oppositional definitions or narratives.155  In so doing, refugee 
testimonies in a Foucauldian sense become technologies of the self – in which they 
define and attach their identities to an external authority such as the state.156 
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Refugees may construct their bodies and identities to the public through 
narratives of suffering, as they are continuously compelled to justify themselves to 
state authorities.  Where the suffering body is the only legible body within the 
refugee protection system, refugees may find it more expedient to construct 
themselves as victims who must solicit compassion, rather than argue for their 
rights.  Visible to the state only in terms of vulnerability, they may appeal to the very 
interpellations of vulnerability that constitute them as deserving subjects as this may 
be their only viable option for exercising personal agency157 and securing legal 
recognition and protection.   
The ascription of extraordinary characteristics to vulnerability in a context 
where all refugees by definition are vulnerable is a political technique for narrowing 
state responsibility.  Given the need for recognition in terms of the resettlement 
criteria in order to secure legal protection through resettlement, refugees are likely 
to be asked and to speak about the aspects of their experiences that are 
commensurate with the definitions and narratives of vulnerability – sometimes 
accentuating or exaggerating what may be an experience common to many 
refugees158 in order to frame it with the realm of the urgent and extraordinary, and 
to ensure that it will be amenable to intervention through resettlement.   
The ways in which Iraqi refugees narrated themselves to the state and UNHCR 
suggested that they were employing UNHCR and resettlement states’ own juridical 
tools in their attempt to secure protection.  Refugees learned to speak in the 
language of vulnerability in order to gain recognition and protection.  They adapted 
their testimonies to conform to this discourse, positioned their specific needs around 
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it, and attempted to “make common sense”159 of their protection concerns in terms 
of extraordinary suffering.   
Hence, the frequency with which Iraqis “misrepresented” themselves as 
women-at-risk, unaccompanied minors, or survivors of torture, against the 
scepticism and disbelief of their adjudicators, suggested that they were attempting 
to use the resettlement criteria as a means for gaining recognition and protection 
where their specific concerns may not have fallen clearly within the established and 
normalised hierarchies of need.  Both resettlement states and UNHCR expressed 
concerns that some refugees were not presenting credible testimonies, but instead 
were committing “fraud”160 in an attempt to enter the resettlement stream.161   
The agency ironically employed the term “vulnerability” to refer to itself, as 
well,162 and launched a series of initiatives to combat fraud in the resettlement 
system.163  These procedures, while intended to maintain the integrity of the 
resettlement system, also became another iteration of the “duty of suspicion” that 
already undergirded many state practices aimed at identifying and excluding any 
migrants who sought illegitimate means to obtain residence – a duty that also 
functioned to protect nationals.164  In this sense, the concerns about credibility and 
fraud in the resettlement system were products of the discursive system itself, which 
provided a limited definition of need to which many refugees, whose needs did not 
fit such categories, attempted to conform for the sake of their own survival. 
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Therefore, it may be more useful to ask why refugees felt compelled to 
“misrepresent” themselves, particularly where they perceived that their specific 
protection needs were neither recognised nor prioritised in the resettlement 
programme.  In this respect, they were indirectly contesting the interpellation of 
vulnerability both by appropriating it, and by positioning and couching their 
protection needs within the only means perceived to be available165 − the language 
of the resettlement criteria.  In a Lacanian sense, having no oppositional legal 
language available with which to either express their desires and needs or to critique 
or contest the resettlement hierarchy, they expressed their needs using the criteria 
that were known to them166 and intelligible to the resettlement programme.   
However, in their appropriation and subversion of these resettlement criteria, 
the refugees also exposed their inherent symbolic violence.  They exemplified 
Bassel’s contention that ideology may not be the totalising experience suggested by 
Althusser, as individuals may not fully internalise such categorisations, but may work 
to contest and position themselves around them.  They exposed the processes and 
power relations at work in restricting “claim-making” by juxtaposing or adapting 
their defined needs and subjectivities with those interpellated by the state.167  They 
demonstrated Butler’s contention that through performativity, the human body can 
occupy, exceed, or rework the norm, not only reinforcing hierarchies, but also 
exposing the structures we assume to confine us as fragile and open to subversion, 
transformation, or being rendered unintelligible.168   Hence, the refugees exposed 
the violence of the categories and labels that circumscribed their lives, thereby 
subverting their dehumanising power.    
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3. The elusive vulnerable body 
 
Ironically, one inadvertent effect of implementing the resettlement policy with 
Iraqi refugees was the difficulty that UNHCR faced in actually identifying individuals 
who met the resettlement criteria related to vulnerability, particularly where they 
lived dispersed in urban settings.169  This could lead to persons with less vulnerability 
but with greater access to the agency benefitting from resettlement at the expense 
of more vulnerable persons.  As assistance resources were allocated in terms of level 
of vulnerability, projects to identify the less visible vulnerable individuals were 
therefore initiated by UNHCR and its partners.170 
The difficulty in identifying vulnerable persons, however, may have unworked 
some of the truth effects of vulnerability as an ideology.  The persons who actually 
met the resettlement criteria were often the most difficult to identify – whether it 
was due to lack of access, their invisibility, their non-existence, or their reluctance to 
be identified.  However, the difficulties may also have lain more in the categories 
themselves; as empty signifiers, they could not fully capture, contain, or illustrate 
the breadth and scope of the human needs of the Iraqi refugees.  As the vulnerable 
bodies defined and required by states were continually evading identification and 
interpellation, persons having other forms of vulnerability may have been able to 
secure recognition in the pressure upon UNHCR to fill resettlement quotas and 
deadlines in accordance with resettlement state demands.   
Not only were refugee bodies continuously eluding the forms of legal closure 
enacted through the ideology of vulnerability, but the resettlement criteria 
themselves were far from determinate.  In the repeated application of these criteria, 
they could never be applied in exactly the same way, but were continuously remade 
and questioned.  There were ongoing debates both within UNHCR and between the 
agency and resettlement states regarding the precise definitions and limits of the 
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resettlement criteria.  Could a person who witnessed torture of a close family 
member also be considered a survivor of torture?  Could a woman with an adult or 
older teenaged son living with her be considered a woman-at-risk?  Could an illness 
such as cancer with an unconfirmed prognosis be classified as a medical need within 
the meaning of the criteria?  Such questions pointed to the indeterminacy of these 
legal categories, as refugees, UNHCR, and resettlement states all worked to position 
themselves within and around them.  This indeterminacy hence not only provided 
opportunities for exposing and de-naturalising the boundaries of these criteria, but 
also for contesting them in the project of securing wider inclusion of Iraqi refugees in 
the resettlement programme. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The concept of vulnerability in the Iraqi refugee resettlement criteria was a 
means of identifying those refugees with the greatest protection needs and of 
responding to previous criticisms of the failure of the refugee protection regime to 
address adequately marginalised populations.171  It could be characterised in this 
respect as a kind of bioethics of protection, in which it was intended to protect 
against the threat of bare life.172  Vulnerability in the resettlement programme, 
however, was also a “prelude to action”, a “problem to be solved” rather than an 
inherent condition of existence,173 in keeping with the ideology of the proper, self-
realised political subject that is the citizen.  This raised the question of whether 
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vulnerability could ever be fully disentangled from the logic, discourse, and violence 
of sovereignty. 
And how was one to define and apply the concept of vulnerability in the context 
of a population defined by its very vulnerability?  Refugee status is a direct 
consequence of vulnerability to abuse of state power.  Hence, despite the ethical 
and normative intentions of employing vulnerability as a discursive frame, selecting 
the most vulnerable is always at once a pragmatic, principled, and political decision – 
an act of sovereignty that determines which individuals will benefit from inclusion in 
resettlement countries and opportunities to gain citizenship, and which individuals 
will be part of the vast majority who remain behind in countries of asylum that do 
not respect refugee law, placing refugees in continuous and variegated states of 
legal liminality, exclusion, and isolation.   
Vulnerability then functioned as an ideological tool, rendering certain refugees 
hyper-visible and those deemed not to fit within the resettlement criteria less visible.  
Vulnerability also became coupled with the ideology of self-sufficiency, restricting 
access to resettlement to primarily those who would not be dependent on state 
assistance.  This blocked the access of those living with the most extreme forms of 
social, physical, and psychological trauma − those who could not be easily 
“rehabilitated” into the neoliberal economic orders of resettlement states.  
Vulnerability was thus an ideology that worked to reproduce refugees as suffering 
bodies as much as bearers of rights.  Their subjectivisation as such was critical to the 
constitution of the self-contained, secure citizen, the normalisation of sovereignty, 
and the neo-imperial self-imaginings of resettlement states. 
However, vulnerability as an ideology could never be totalising in its 
interpellation of refugee bodies and deployment of suffering for purposes of 
asserting the logic of sovereignty.  In the production of resettlement criteria in the 
Iraqi resettlement policy, slippages occurred which allowed for both the exposure of 
the workings of sovereignty undergirding the ideology of vulnerability and for 
imagining new ways to contest sovereign decisions on life.  In different ways, the 
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discourse of rights assumed greater prominence of place in resettlement 
programming. First, through the strategic use of resettlement, resettlement became 
highlighted as a means of protecting refugee rights for both the vulnerable refugees 
who were relocated and the refugees who remained on host state territories.  
Protection for those within the state became more intrinsically tied to the protection 
of those who were resettled beyond state borders.  Second, the new resettlement 
criteria suggested an increasing emphasis on the interconnectedness of rights 
protection and vulnerability.  Third, some Iraqi refugees’ appropriation of the 
vulnerability-based resettlement criteria in constructing narratives of suffering in 
ways that would be legible to the state was a contentious project that exposed the 
political projects at play in constructing criteria that limited and circumscribed the 
recognised scope of their human needs.  They employed narratives of suffering, 
changed their testimonies to conform to particular criteria, or eluded such 
categorisations altogether.   
Vulnerability thus remained an ideology critical to preserving the sovereign 
power to decide upon the exception, reproducing the logic of sovereignty as the 
normative mode of politics, and premising the citizen as the proper political subject.  
Yet it also became possible to harness the discourse of vulnerability to expose and 
contest such operations of power − in the project of not only seeking recognition 
within the state system, but also linking compassion more securely to obligation in 
the protection of refugee rights. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis set out to examine the paradox that international refugee law is not 
simply a set of rules for states to follow in the protection of certain non-nationals, 
but is also a social and political phenomenon that produces state power through the 
regulation of individual bodies, as was demonstrated in the context of the refugee 
crisis following the 2003 war in Iraq. 
With regard to the first limb of this paradox, the Iraqi refugee crisis was 
frequently constructed by human rights advocates as a failure of protection, as 
states did not rise to meet their moral duties or obligations under international law.  
This was first evident in the debates over the legality of the invasion of Iraq and the 
severe violations of human rights that occurred during the subsequent occupation 
and rise of the insurgency, forcibly displacing nearly four million people.  As two 
million refugees crossed Iraq’s borders into neighbouring states, they were subjected 
to harsh and arbitrary measures governing their rights of entry and residency, often 
in contravention of international human rights law and the principle of non-
refoulement.  Those refugees who remained trapped in the camps along Iraq’s 
borders were held up as symbols of the failure of the international community not 
only to protect them, but also to find a resolution to the larger political questions 
related to the Palestinian right of return and the protected status of the PMOI.  And 
even in the resettlement programme, which boasted the resettlement of more than 
100,000 refugees, there were concerns raised about the conditions in which 
resettlement states were hosting their new arrivals and whether they were doing 
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enough to share the “burden” of protecting the vast majority of Iraqi refugees 
remaining in situations of legal uncertainty in the Middle East. 
But what exactly failed?  This question implicates the second limb of the 
paradox in that the kinds of closure, determinacy, and certainty that were 
envisioned in promoting human rights and refugee law were hardly achieved.  
Instead, in the gaps, indeterminacy, and liminal spaces of exception where law had 
no force in the Iraqi refugee crisis, appeared the spectre of sovereignty – the raw 
power to decide upon the exception that is usually hidden within state 
bureaucracies, regulation, and the biopolitical management of populations.  The 
failures of law to protect refugees might therefore also be characterised as 
assertions of sovereignty, as states fought to revive their power, shore up their 
borders, and reproduce their fictions of nation in the face of crisis.   
Yet law did not entirely lose its force, as it was mobilised by both UNHCR and 
refugees to contest the reach and legitimacy of state power.  UNHCR continued to 
reproduce the logic of sovereignty by seeking opportunities for refugee protection 
through re-entry into the state system and by facilitating possibilities for the shared 
governance of refugee spaces.  And refugees often sought solutions in state-centric 
terms.  At the same time, however, as the logic of sovereignty migrated from state to 
non-state actors and was materialised in geographical and bodily space, slippages 
occurred in the repetition of this logic that provided openings for also countering 
and exposing the normalisation of sovereign exceptionalism towards refugees.  The 
consequences of this contestation set the stage for imagining new kinds of political 
formation and identity rooted in a responsibility exceeding the strict purview of the 
sovereign state.  
 
 
I. The persistence of sovereignty 
 
In concluding this thesis, it is important to reflect on whether and how 
sovereignty was reconfigured in the face of efforts by UNHCR to promote 
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frameworks of international human rights and refugee law.  As critics of Agamben’s 
theory of sovereignty have suggested, his paradigm is totalising, failing to account 
for the contingency of the state and possibilities for resistance.1  Contrary to 
academic critiques of state sovereignty as a fetish that is reproduced through 
academic scholarship on the state,2 this thesis found that while sovereignty may be 
fragile and subject to continual challenge and evasion, its consequences are 
nonetheless real and material.  As demonstrated in the Iraqi refugee crisis, the logic 
of sovereignty persisted in reconfigured and de-territorialised forms and had 
significant ramifications for the lives of the refugees.   
The logic of sovereignty in the Iraqi refugee crisis was realised through new 
configurations and conceptions of territory.  Sovereignty was extended into fields 
beyond states’ geographically delimited borders through new configurations and 
assemblages of states asserting their own authority, non-state actors seeking to 
control the state by producing specific national or sectarian identities, and 
international institutions assuming certain sovereign responsibilities and their 
implicit power to decide upon the exception.  The populations governed according to 
the logic of sovereignty were no longer confined to those included in the nation-
state, but now also reached new categories of bodies (refugees, stateless persons, 
terrorists, insurgents, rogue states) who cut across geographic and national borders.   
The logic of sovereignty proliferated as these new formations of actors deployed 
international law, state legislation, organisational and institutional norms, and forms 
of micropower to produce and govern refugees.  These practices functioned as 
technologies of power as they established and normalised hierarchies and rules that 
depended upon the existence of an exception in the stabilisation and normalisation 
of emerging political orders.  They continuously reproduced and recouped refugee 
bodies and shaped the spaces of their survival, at some times normalising their 
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exceptional treatment and at other times exposing the violence of such 
exceptionalism. 
Hence, in the space of exception that produced the Iraqi refugee crisis, the 
invasion, sectarianisation of government, rise of the insurgency and sectarian 
militias, deployment of counter-insurgency operations in Iraq, and remote provision 
of humanitarian aid were all technologies of power that functioned according to the 
logic of sovereignty.  They each constituted decisions on the exception in which 
whole sectors of the Iraqi population, based upon their biopolitical, ethnic, or 
sectarian categorisation, were denied legal protection and targeted with violence 
and displacement under the auspices of emergency, security, and threat they posed 
to competing visions of political order.   
In the refugee spaces in urban centres in the Middle East, in the name of 
emergency due to claims of overburdened economic, security, and social 
infrastructures, UNHCR and host states developed techniques for managing the Iraqi 
refugee population – from shadow legal regimes for governing refugees, to shifting 
border controls and visa regimes, controlled access to economic and social rights, 
and strategies for re-emplacement.  These techniques enabled decisions upon the 
refugees’ relative inclusion or exclusion from their host societies and facilitated or 
denied their access to fundamental forms of protection.  They demonstrated how 
international human rights and refugee law is intimately bound up in the practice 
and discourse of protection. 
The grey zones of the border camps in practice did not always fall within the 
clear jurisdiction of particular states, as states invoked security and economic 
emergency as a reason to deny refugees admittance to their territories.  These 
refugees were subjected to technologies of violence and expulsion, multiple 
displacements and re-emplacements, and humanitarian governance by UNHCR and 
aid organisations, all of which functioned as decisions on their lives.  The camps 
became visceral and material markers of the spaces where law devolved into an 
exercise of pure sovereign power.   
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In the space of the resettlement programme, the ideology of vulnerability – both 
of the refugee body and the state border – enabled the development of an 
administrative regime that decided upon refugees’ access to resettlement.  The 
emergency posed by threats of terror served as the justification for ever-broadening 
categories of exclusion and inadmissibility.  And the emergency posed by the 
overwhelming need for a durable solution served as the justification for parsing 
vulnerability into gradations of need in order to determine who would have access 
to the limited resettlement places actually made available for refugees. 
The materialisation of the logic of sovereignty in the spaces of refugee bodies, 
border zones, and state territories therefore had critical consequences for the forms 
of life available to Iraqi refugees.  Functioning as decisions on the exception, the 
technologies of power that produced these spaces enabled both proliferations of 
violence and discourses of protection, exclusion from citizenship and inclusion within 
the polis, and survival in bare life and securing livelihoods in the city.   
The rise of necropolitical sectarian violence, the deaths of nearly 700,000 Iraqis 
following the invasion and emergence of the insurgency, the forced displacement of 
four million people, and the protracted states of legal ambiguity in which the 
refugees survived were all evidence of the ways in which the logic of sovereignty and 
the decision on the exception were materialised in the forms of life and death to 
which Iraqis were relegated.  The drastic consequences of decisions that determined 
whether they would be treated within the framework of emergency and exception, 
or would be recouped within the ambit of state recognition and legal protection, 
demonstrated that sovereignty must be taken seriously in any discussion of the 
efficacy or purposes of refugee protection. 
 
 
II. Exposing the normalisation of sovereign exceptionalism 
 
The persistence of the logic of sovereignty and the insistence of states on the 
exception of refugees from full legal or political protection in each of the spaces of 
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the Iraqi refugee crisis also suggested that, as Benjamin3 and Agamben4 predicted, 
the exception increasingly became the norm.  The legal exceptionalism that led to 
the invasion of Iraq, the forced displacement of Iraqis to situations of prolonged legal 
insecurity in the Middle East, the creation of border camps, and the ideology of 
vulnerability in the resettlement programme were all practices that normalised and 
continuously reproduced particular relations of power within the international state 
system – between states, citizens, refugees, and UNHCR.  However, where sovereign 
authority was expressed in terms of brute force, and fact merged with law in 
increasingly permanent spatial arrangements, the sovereign power of exception also 
became the source of its own undoing and delegitimacy.  In the attempt to produce 
law, sovereignty was increasingly asserted through a violence unconstrained by law. 
When the exception coincides with the norm, the state can no longer employ 
the exception as the legal fiction against which to ground the state’s legitimacy, 
authority, and law.  This begs the question whether in the wake of ever deepening 
exclusions, the state will be able continue to revive and produce its authority, as it 
did in the birth of the refugee regime in the early 20th century.  Or has the process of 
sovereignty’s own undoing been set in motion as the distinction between the 
refugee and the citizen has begun to blur in the permanent state of emergency that 
characterises so many current expressions of forced displacement?  When all citizens 
become subjects of political exceptionalism, who can be constituted as the norm 
against which the refugee is continually reproduced? 
The exception may also be delegitimised through acts of profanation and 
exposure.  The performance of such actions might re-inscribe sovereignty in ways 
that highlight its factitiousness or constructedness, rather than its facticity and 
normalisation, as a means of using law to subvert itself.5  While such acts may not 
contest the logic of sovereignty, they do challenge the normalisation of sovereign 
                                                                 
3
 Benjamin, W. (2003). On the concept of history (H. Zohn, Trans.). In H. Eiland & M.W. Jennings (Eds.). Walter 
Benjamin: Selected writings, Vol. 4 (193801940). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 392. 
4
 Agamben, G. (2005). State of exception (K. Attell, Trans.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (Original 
work published 2003), p. 5. 
5
 See Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter. On the discursive limits of ‘sex’. London: Routledge. 
Conclusion  
 
 
284 
 
exceptionalism.  As such, the challenges lodged by refugees and UNHCR to state 
sovereign decisions in the Iraqi refugee crisis were attempts to gain protection, 
admittance, and recognition within the state system, but they did so by 
inadvertently calling attention to how the normalisation of the violence of sovereign 
exceptionalism threatened to undo the logic of sovereignty itself. 
Following the invasion and occupation of Iraq, contrary to the expectations of 
the MNF, the rise of the insurgency not only contested the violence of the invasion, 
but also gave way to new iterations and cycles of deepening violence.  Insurgents 
fought the MNF and new Iraqi government for control over the direction of the Iraqi 
state.  Attempting to gain a voice in the political process, the insurgent and sectarian 
militias appropriated the violence used against them in their own quests to define 
their national community through the expulsion of biopolitically determined 
“others”.  This led to the increasingly violent counter-insurgency efforts that exposed 
the raw power of the state, no longer able to hide behind the cloak of law and 
regulation. 
Additionally, UNHCR’s assumption of state-like roles in the governance of the 
Iraqi refugee population in host states in the Middle East, while reproducing the logic 
of sovereignty and structures of decisionism, at the same time facilitated the 
introduction of human rights protection norms in the process.  In so doing, the 
violence of arbitrary state decisions on Iraqi refugees’ admittance, residence, and 
access to rights on these territories, was exposed and contested.  This paved the way 
for concepts of shared responsibility to gain greater trenchancy in the face of 
sovereign prerogatives of exclusion.  Such moves towards global governance, while 
perhaps not yet formalised in law, further interrupted the increasing normalisation 
of exceptionalism towards refugees in the region. 
The emplacements of refugees in the border camps also revealed the violence 
of sovereign exceptionalism.  Their presence in these liminal zones and UNHCR’s 
assumption of governance in these spaces materially contested the myth of social 
closure implicit in statist rationalities.  Also, the refugees and UNHCR used the 
Conclusion  
 
 
285 
 
encampments and conditions of bare life that they engendered to call attention to 
the violence of sovereign exceptionalism and its increasingly permanent 
manifestation at the borders.  They mobilised these spaces to call for refugees’ 
admittance or re-entry into the state system, a way out of the exception that had 
come to define so much of their existence in situations of protracted displacement. 
The Iraqi refugee resettlement programme further produced opportunities for 
exposing and unworking the normalisation of the exception where the ideology and 
parsing of vulnerability had long rendered certain refugees hyper-visible and others 
invisible and illegible to resettlement states.  In the Iraqi context, discourses of rights 
protection emerged in concert with human vulnerability, and gained increasing 
traction in the resettlement programme.  The strategic use of resettlement policy, 
the introduction of more rights-based profiles for prioritising refugees for 
resettlement, the reproduction of vulnerability in resettlement states where rights 
were ostensibly protected, and the appropriation of resettlement criteria by 
refugees themselves all exposed the inherent violence in decisions based on 
ideologies of vulnerability. 
 
 
III. Profaning sovereign borders 
 
Hence the materialisation of the logic of sovereignty through space 
demonstrated that the logic of sovereignty could migrate amongst the actors who 
performed it.  But in the production of normalised hierarchies that quickly assumed 
the character of law, the power of the law multiplied with every iteration of its 
interpretation and application.  This sometimes occurred in unexpected ways, not 
only exposing the violence of the logic of sovereignty, but at the same time often 
also reproducing it.  Perhaps in this regard, as Butler contended, it is not possible to 
escape from discourse, and resistance to the violence of a particular discourse can 
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only occur in terms of that discourse itself.6  Or as deBenoist noted, sovereignty from 
a Schmittian perspective is an inherent condition of human social organisation − not 
only an instance of the state but also of hegemony; the elimination of one sovereign 
instance will therefore always give way to the rise of another.7  Foucault also 
theorised that resistance is intimately bound up in power and therefore can never 
exist in a position of exteriority to it,8 thereby producing what Jennings called “the 
irresolvable Gordian object” in current critical scholarship on the problem of 
sovereignty.9 
Such contentions, however, risk feeding the kind of capitalist realism and 
fetishisation of sovereignty that holds that there is no real alternative – that 
resistance can only end in resignation, accommodation, or “the melancholy of 
confinement”.10  In order to resist such a trivialisation of politics,11 it is therefore as 
important to take both refugees and UNHCR’s efforts as seriously as one might take 
the actions of sovereign states.  But given how such efforts continuously reproduced 
the logic of sovereignty in new forms, the normative question then would be the one 
posed by Foucault when he asked, “What forms of power do we want to live with 
and which forms do we wish to limit or prevent?”12  Or as Cubero asked, how can 
one embrace the state, but at the same time disarticulate its homogeneity and lay 
bare the structures of its power?13   More specifically, in order not to participate in 
the fetishisation of sovereignty, one must investigate whether it is possible to both 
engage with the logic of sovereignty and yet also subvert the forms of violence that 
it enacts.  Can one enact new forms of governance or political ordering without 
                                                                 
6
 Ibid., p. 122-123. 
7
 de Benoist, A. (1999) What is sovereignty? (J. Kostova, Trans. from “Qu’est-ce que la souveraineté?) Éléments, 
No. 96, 24-35), p. 111. 
8
 Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality: An introduction, vol. 1 (R. Hurley, Trans.) London: Penguin Books) 
(Original work published 1976), p. 95. 
9
 Jennings, R. (supra note 2). 
10
 Gilroy, P. (6 Feb 2012). Subject in the kettle: Notes on citizenship, dissent, and securitocracy. Oecumene 
Opening the Boundaries of Citizenship Conference, 6-7 February 2012. UK: The Open University. 
11
 Ibid. 
12 See Thorpe, S. (2012, February 7). In defense of Foucault: The incessancy of resistance. Critical Legal Thinking: 
Law and the Political, at <http://www.criticallegalthinking.com/?p=4873#more-4873>. 
13
 Cubero, C. (2012, July 12).  De-fetishising EU immigrant integration: Transnationalism as integration.  
Uncertainty and Disquiet. European Association of Social Anthropologists 12
th
 Biennial Conference. 11-13 July 
2012. Paris: University of Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense. 
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creating new forms of violence and exclusion?   And does the denaturalisation of 
sovereignty open up these kinds of possibilities for ethically reconceptualising the 
nation-state?14 
Some of the forms of de-territorialised sovereignty and possibilities for global 
governance that emerged in the Iraqi refugee crisis, while certainly reproducing the 
logic of sovereignty on many occasions, and serving as regulatory cover for 
governing spaces of exception, might also have opened up avenues for thinking 
through such questions.  Most prominently, the forms of refugee protection that did 
emerge in these otherwise rightless spaces demonstrated how it might be possible 
to at least expose the violence of sovereign decisionism and to contest the 
grounding of sovereign power as solely within the state.  In this sense, refugees 
became “critical beings”,15 both central to and disruptive of the processes that 
created and governed them. 
UNCHR’s attempts to meet the demands of its expanding mandate and to 
promote protection beyond the interests of sovereign states demonstrated how 
international norms of refugee protection might find greater purchase.  Through 
power-sharing arrangements with states, UNHCR was able to apply principles of 
international refugee law, promote de facto access to economic and social rights, 
and secure states’ quiet acquiescence to refugee residence on their territories.  Such 
forms of shared responsibility denaturalised the exceptional treatment of refugees 
and contested the many forms of state violence that circumscribed their lives. 
However, the possibilities and promise of such moves towards global 
governance and complementary responsibilities for refugees in the future must 
always be tempered by a clear recognition of the violence inherent in such forms of 
governance.  The bureaucracies developed to enable humanitarian protection and 
governance also contained the seeds of sovereignty as they enacted decisions on 
                                                                 
14
 See Stauffer, J. (2004). The fiction of the state of nature in real time: The social contract, international human 
rights and the refugee. In P. Tuitt & P. Fitzpatrick (Eds.). Critical beings: Law, nation and the global subject (pp. 3-
18). UK: Ashgate. 
15
 Tuitt, P. & Fitzpatrick, P. (2004). Introduction. In P. Tuitt & P. Fitzpatrick (Eds.). Critical beings: Law, nation and 
the global subject (pp. xi-xix). UK: Ashgate, p. xi. 
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inclusion and recognition, and therefore also exclusion and lack of status.  It will be 
critical for UNHCR to acknowledge and contend with this reality, foremost by 
assuming responsibility for its decisions and creating mechanisms for greater 
institutional accountability to refugees.  Yet it must find ways to do so that do not 
further de-politicise refugee spaces in the quest for legal closure and determinacy. 
 
The spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis therefore revealed that in the face of the 
persistence of sovereignty, it was nonetheless possible to envision possibilities for 
finding responsibility for refugee protection beyond the sovereign state.  It became 
conceivable that the “human” in human rights could be revived, as new forms of 
refugee identity emerged that exposed and contested the status of the citizen as the 
privileged bearer of rights.16  However, in securing greater protections within the 
frame of sovereignty, in limiting certain forms of power and increasing institutional 
accountability through law, there is always an inherent risk that such projects aimed 
at legal closure also depoliticise refugee spaces, enabling the continued 
normalisation of the logic of sovereignty.  The question remains therefore whether it 
is possible to find new ways of political ordering and securing human protection that 
do not reproduce the violence of sovereignty.  Perhaps such possibilities may be 
found in the slippages, fractures, and contingent spaces of sovereignty that are 
revealed as it is materialised in the spaces of refugee lives.  The sites of contestation 
that result might provide the kinds of ruptures necessary for envisioning this kind of 
future. 
                                                                 
16
 Perera, S. (2002). What is a camp...? Borderlands 1(1), para. 61. 
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